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Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel: Trends Over Time

ALMOST EVERY STUDY of American Jewry includes references to the place of Israel in the lives of American Jews. Similarly, works on the history of Israel and American-Israeli relations discuss the contributions of American Jewry in helping to sustain the Jewish state. It is widely recognized and accepted that the two largest contemporary Jewish communities have a special relationship.

This article examines continuities and changes in the attitudes of American Jews toward Israel, as they have been expressed in public-opinion surveys over a period of some four decades. The specific dimensions measured are the overall strength of American-Jewish attachment to Israel, attitudes toward U.S. governmental and private Jewish aid to Israel, and opinions about various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Data Sources

The article is based on data from a number of surveys carried out under both general and Jewish auspices, beginning in 1948. Methodologically, the studies represent a variety of sampling approaches.¹ The earliest surveys of Jewish attitudes were conducted in cities with easily identifiable Jewish neighborhoods. The first such

Note: The author acknowledges the support of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University in the preparation of this article. He also thanks Herbert Kelman, Mordechai Gazit, Milton Himmelfarb, and Chaim Waxman for valuable comments on an earlier draft.

¹Problems of design and sampling in surveys of American Jewry are discussed in Harold S. Himmelfarb, "Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification: Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects," in Marshall Sklare (ed.), *Understanding American Jewry* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982), esp. pp. 66-73; Samuel C. Heilman, "The Sociology of American Jewry: The Last Ten Years," *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 8 (1982), pp. 135-160; and Egon Mayer, *From Suburb to Shtetl: The Jews of Boro Park* (Philadelphia, 1979).

survey was carried out in Baltimore in May 1948, just a few days after the creation of Israel, by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.²

In 1952 and 1957-1958 the American Jewish Committee conducted surveys of Jews living in two different types of communities. The first was an East Coast city of 130,000, with a Jewish population of 8,500, identified only as "Riverton."³ The second community studied, a Midwestern suburb of 25,000 people, of whom approximately 8,000 were Jews, was named "Lakeville."⁴ While the Riverton sample of 200 Jewish families was considered representative of about a third of American Jewry (excluding the Jews of New York City), the Lakeville sample of 432 individuals was seen as "representing to a greater or lesser extent the experiences of most American Jews."

Additional surveys conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s targeted more specific samples. In 1969 Charles Liebman investigated the views of rabbis and presidents of synagogues affiliated with Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism, while in 1970 Leonard Fein and others conducted a major survey of Reform Jews.⁵ In two separate studies, initiated in 1965 and 1972, Simon Herman investigated the attitudes of several hundred American students who were spending a year at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.⁶

In the early 1980s the major polling organizations—Harris,⁷ Gallup,⁸ and

²Marshall Sklare and Benjamin B. Ringer, "A Study of Jewish Attitudes Toward the State of Israel," in Marshall Sklare (ed.), *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), pp. 437-450.

³Marshall Sklare and Marc Vosk, *The Riverton Study: How Jews Look at Themselves and Their Neighbors* (New York, 1957).

⁴Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York, 1967).

⁵Charles Liebman, "The Role of Israel in the Ideology of American Jewry," *Dispersion and Unity*, Vol. 10 (Winter 1970), pp. 19-26; Leonard J. Fein et al., *Reform Is a Verb: Notes on Reform and Reforming Jews* (New York, 1972).

⁶Simon N. Herman, *American Students in Israel* (Ithaca and London, 1970); *Jewish Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977).

⁷In July 1980 the Harris organization conducted a comprehensive survey of both Jews and non-Jews, using personal interviews. The Jewish sample consisted of 1,030 respondents. Louis Harris, *A Study of the Attitudes of the American People and the American Jewish Community Toward Anti-Semitism and the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Middle East*, Study No. 804011, August 1980.

⁸The Gallup organization preferred telephone interviews. In September 1981, for example, they interviewed a sample of 522 Jews and in August 1982 a national sample of 605 adults and an additional cross-section of 258 American Jews. Gallup claimed a margin of error of ± 8 percentage points for the September 1981 poll and ± 8 percentage points for the August 1982 survey. These margins of error are somewhat larger than those normally accepted for national samples. See *Newsweek*, September 14, 1981, and October 4, 1982.

Yankelovich⁹—carried out comprehensive polls of American-Jewish opinion, primarily on issues surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, Steven M. Cohen produced four national surveys of American Jews (1981–1982, 1982, 1983, 1984), carried out under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee.¹⁰ Sample size in these surveys ranged between 500 and 1,000.

In 1984 Deborah Lipstadt, Charles Pruitt, and Jonathan Woocher administered lengthy questionnaires to participants in a United Jewish Appeal conference for young leaders. This effort produced the American Jewish Young Leadership Survey, whose sample of 750 had a median age of 33.¹¹

While the surveys that form the basis of this study used a variety of sampling and interviewing approaches, the fact that important questions and themes were repeated over time provides a sufficient basis for trend analysis.

Attitudes Toward Israel

AMERICAN-JEWISH ATTACHMENT TO ISRAEL

In September 1945, a few months after the end of World War II, the Roper organization asked a cross-section sample of American Jews to state their views about the following proposal:

"A Jewish state in Palestine is a good thing for the Jews and every possible effort should be made to establish Palestine as a Jewish state or commonwealth for those who want to settle there."¹²

Some 80 percent of the respondents approved of this statement, while 10 percent disapproved. In response to another question, more than 80 percent rejected the notion that "Jews are a religious group only and not a nation, and it would be bad for the Jews to try to set up a Jewish state in Palestine or anywhere else." The Roper organization commented that the decision to support or oppose the establishment

⁹In February 1981 the Yankelovich organization conducted a major survey of Jews and non-Jews about their beliefs on Israel and other issues. It was based on 1,215 interviews, of which 174 were with Jews. Gregory Martire and Ruth Clark, *Anti-Semitism in the United States* (New York, 1982).

¹⁰Steven M. Cohen, "The 1981–1982 National Survey of American Jews," *AJYB*, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 89–110 and "What American Jews Believe," *Moment*, July–August 1982, pp. 23–27; "After the War and Before the Peace: A Survey of American Jewish Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the Israeli/PLO War in Lebanon" (New York, September 1982); *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis: The 1983 National Survey of American Jews and Jewish Communal Leaders* (New York, 1983); *The 1984 National Survey of American Jews: Political and Social Outlooks* (New York, 1984). Cohen used a mail-back questionnaire which was sent to a national sample of households with distinctive Jewish surnames (DJN).

¹¹Deborah Lipstadt, Charles Pruitt, and Jonathan Woocher, "What They Think," *Moment*, June 1984, pp. 13–17.

¹²*AJYB*, Vol. 48, 1946–47, pp. 243–255.

of Israel was taken with a high "degree of firmness," and that supporters "were evenly distributed through all economic levels." Two months later a Gallup Poll found overwhelming support in the American Jewish community (90 to 10 percent) for the proposal to allow Jews to settle in Palestine.¹³

In May 1948, just a few days after the birth of Israel, NORC put this question to Jews in Baltimore:

"The Jews have set up a new Jewish state in part of Palestine. Do you approve or disapprove of this action by the Jews?"¹⁴

Ninety percent approved of the establishment of Israel and a similar percentage thought that the United States was right to recognize Israel.

All in all, the initial surveys of American Jewish opinion were highly favorable toward Israel. By a ratio of 90 to 10 percent, American Jews supported the establishment of Israel, Jewish immigration to Israel, the Israeli declaration of independence, and the decision by President Truman to grant recognition to Israel immediately after its founding.

Since the establishment of Israel, American Jewry has consistently held highly favorable feelings toward it (Table 1). In these surveys conducted between 1957 and 1983, all but one of the pro-Israel scores rank above 90 percent. The breakdown of the last score, for 1983, shows an enormous affinity for Israel, both among the public and the leaders of the Jewish community. Of the 91 percent expressing favorable feelings toward Israel, 43 percent said that they were "very pro-Israel," while 48 percent were "pro-Israel." The combined score for all the remaining categories—"neutral," "anti-Israel," and "very anti-Israel"—was less than 10 percent.

TABLE 1. OVERALL ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAEL, 1957-1983 (PERCENT)

Date	Poll	Favorable Pro-Israel	Unfavorable Anti-Israel	Neutral	(n)
1957	Riverton	94	5	1	(200)
1972	Herman	91	9	—	(269)
1981	Yankelovich	96	4	—	(174)
1981	NSAJ	94	1	6	(673)
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon	88	1	11	(500)
1983	NSAJ	91	3	6	(640)

Sources: Riverton—footnote 3; Herman—footnote 6; Yankelovich—footnote 9; NSAJs and Cohen Post-Lebanon—footnote 10.

¹³George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion, 1935-1971*, Vol. 1, 1935-1948 (New York, 1972), p. 554.

¹⁴Sklare and Ringer, op. cit., p. 441.

Because Israel has faced a large, hostile Arab world since its inception, the question of its very survival has been a source of concern. In the 1981 Yankelovich survey, 93 percent of the respondents said that "the continuation of Israel as a Jewish state is important," while only 5 percent held the opposite opinion.¹⁵

Even stronger evidence of Israel's importance to American Jews is found in the responses to a query regarding the hypothetical destruction of Israel (Table 2). The great majority of those questioned said they would feel a sense of great personal loss if Israel were destroyed. The figures for 1981, 1982, and 1983 are particularly striking since participants were asked to agree or disagree with the assertion that the loss of Israel would be the "greatest personal tragedy" in their lives: 83, 83, and 77 percent of respondents, respectively, answered in the affirmative.

In May-June 1967, when the hypothetical situation of Table 2 turned suddenly into the frightening reality of the Six Day War, American-Jewish political activity in behalf of Israel was coupled with an outpouring of volunteers and money, all of which testified better than any public-opinion poll to the strong attachment of American Jews to Israel. Polls taken after the war basically confirmed the high levels of concern and action shown during the crisis.

Marshall Sklare, chief author of the 1957-1958 Lakeville studies, returned to Lakeville in the early months of 1968 to "learn something about the response" of American Jewry "to the Israeli crisis, to the war, and to its aftermath."¹⁶ Sklare called his mission "a reconnaissance effort," and indeed was able to interview only 17 residents of Lakeville, 11 of whom were from the original study sample of 432. He found that, during the crisis, most of the respondents were very concerned about

TABLE 2. HYPOTHETICAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL, 1957-1983 (PERCENT)

Date	Poll	Yes	No	Not Sure	(n)
Q. "Would feel a personal sense of loss if Israel were destroyed."					
1957	Lakeville	90	10	—	(432)
1975	Harris	94	6	—	NA
Q. "Would feel as if I had suffered the greatest personal tragedy of my life if Israel were destroyed."					
1981	NSAJ	83	13	5	(673)
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon	83	9	8	(500)
1983	NSAJ	77	10	13	(640)

Sources: Lakeville—footnote 4; Harris—footnote 7; NSAJs and Cohen Post-Lebanon—footnote 10.

¹⁵Martire and Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

¹⁶Marshall Sklare, "Lakeville and Israel/The Six Day War and Its Aftermath," *Midstream*, October 1968, pp. 3-21.

the survival of Israel. They strongly supported Israel's position and increased their financial contributions to the state. The decisive Israeli victory not only relieved them of tension and anxiety, it gave them a sense of pride and confidence. These feelings were shared even by those who claimed to be anti-Zionists.

In this same period, Simon Herman was investigating the feelings of Jewish identity of American-Jewish students studying in Israel.¹⁷ Since these students were experiencing the pressures of the war directly, their reactions were, not surprisingly, even more intense than those of their compatriots in the United States. Statements like the following, cited by Herman, well represent the students' feelings: "I'd say the biggest impact of the Six Day War on me was the realization (the knowledge was there before June 1967) that the destruction of Israel meant the end of our sign of hope in modern Jewish existence. American Jews couldn't live without Israel." According to Herman, 87 percent of the respondents indicated that they had been reminded of the Holocaust during the Six Day War.

Similar attitudes and behavior emerged during the 1973 Yom Kippur War as during the Six Day War, thus making clear the depth of American Jewish commitment to Israel's survival.

Zionism and Pro-Israelism

Analysis of the data cited above reveals the strong emotional attachment of American Jews to Israel. But do the data also point to a clear Zionist commitment? A few months after the Yom Kippur War, Norman Podhoretz, the editor of *Commentary* magazine, argued as follows: "If Zionism means supporting the idea of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine, then most American Jews have been Zionist since the end of World War II."¹⁸ Podhoretz's equation of Zionism with "support" of a sovereign Jewish state did not go unchallenged. Columbia University professor David Sidorsky maintained that American Jews rejected both Zionist and non-Zionist ideologies, adding:

Support of Israel in a non-ideological way without a philosophy of Jewish history or a coherent set of principles, but with a sense of moral purpose and pragmatic policies, has become a major aspect of the American Jewish consensus. The obvious question to put to the thesis is whether the distinction between pro-Israel consensus and a Zionist ideology is a distinction with a difference.¹⁹

Sidorsky did not provide a direct answer to his question, but others did. Simon Herman and Chaim Waxman argued that there was a major difference between

¹⁷Herman, *American Students in Israel*.

¹⁸Norman Podhoretz, "Now, Instant Zionism," *New York Times Magazine*, February 3, 1974, p. 11.

¹⁹David Sidorsky, "The End of Ideology and American Jewry," *Beṭfuzot Hagolah* (Hebrew), No. 85/86, Summer 1978, p. 114.

Zionism and pro-Israelism. In Herman's view, Zionism "represents an all-encompassing approach to the problems of the Jewish people," not just positive attitudes toward Israel or even readiness to emigrate to Israel. Waxman asserted that from a true Zionist perspective, Israel was the spiritual and cultural center of Judaism. "A Zionist is one for whom Israel plays a central role in his own personal life, in his identity and very existence." By contrast, Waxman said, a pro-Israel American Jew is one "who lives in the U.S. and supports Israel economically, politically, and even emotionally, but whose primary source of Jewish identification is derived from, and oriented to, the American Jewish community."²⁰

The lack of clarity on the theoretical issue was reflected in popular attitudes as well. The 1983 National Survey of American Jews showed 39 percent of the public and 50 percent of the leadership identifying themselves as Zionist. In the same period, several major non-Zionist organizations joined the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization. All this, however, needs to be viewed in the broader context of the time. In the mid-1970s the Arab bloc, the Communist nations, and the Third World countries sought to delegitimize Israel via the denunciation of Zionism, an effort that culminated in the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism. This resolution was seen by Jews everywhere as a direct assault on world Jewry, no less so than the State of Israel. Thus, favorable statements about Zionism made during the mid and late 1970s do not provide an accurate measure of the true feelings of American Jewry on this subject.

It is clear that in earlier surveys American Jews did not equate support of Israel with support of Zionism (Table 3). Within each of the groups studied, individuals assigned far more importance to supporting Israel than to supporting Zionism as essential or desirable to being a "good Jew."

Classical Zionism defines the condition of Jews in the Diaspora as permanently insecure, and consequently views settlement in Israel as essential. American Jews, however, have never accepted these assumptions. As far back as the 1948 Baltimore study, only 5 percent of the respondents said that they would like to emigrate to Israel; in the 1952 Riverton survey, 7 percent expressed an interest in moving to Israel. Results in more recent studies are slightly higher, but do not alter the basic trend. In the 1981-1982 National Survey of American Jews, 12 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement "Each American Jew should give serious thought to settling in Israel," while 82 percent disagreed. The 1983 National Survey of American Jews reported that only 17 percent of American Jews had "ever seriously considered living in Israel."

²⁰Chaim I. Waxman, "The Centrality of Israel in American Jewish Life: A Sociological Analysis," *Judaism*, Vol. 25, Spring 1976, p. 177.

For more extensive discussion on the question of Zionism and pro-Israelism, see Steven M. Cohen, *American Modernity and Jewish Identity* (New York, 1983), pp. 162-163; Jonathan S. Woocher, "The Civil Judaism of Communal Leaders," *AJYB*, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 149-169 and Chaim I. Waxman, *America's Jews in Transition* (Philadelphia, 1983).

TABLE 3. PRO-ISRAELISM VS. ZIONISM, 1957, 1970 (PERCENT)

	Support Israel		Support Zionism	
	Lakeville (n = 432)	Reform Jews (n = 864)	Lakeville (n = 432)	Reform Jews (n = 864)
Percent who believe that to be a "good Jew" the item:				
Is essential	21	37	7	13
Is desirable	47	45	23	30
Makes no difference	32	—	59	—
Is essential not to do	—	1	9	—
Rank order of item, of 22 total items				
	14	5	17	16
Rank order of item, of 14 items of specifically Jewish content				
	7	2	9	9

Sources: Lakeville—footnote 4; Reform Jews—footnote 5.

Economic and Military Assistance

The extensive economic assistance that American Jewry has given to Israel over the years can undoubtedly be viewed as one of the most impressive measures of American-Jewish attachment to Israel.²¹ All surveys of American Jews show overwhelming majorities expecting the U.S. government to aid Israel, but American Jews themselves even more so. In the 1948 Baltimore survey, 76 percent of the respondents supported American aid to Israel, but a much larger majority, 95 percent, said that American Jews should assist Israel even if the U.S. government did not. Preference was shown for assistance in the form of money, food, and clothing (Table 4); least support was given to the sending of soldiers, although about half of the respondents still expected American Jews to volunteer for military service in Israel's behalf.

The 1957–1958 Lakeville survey also found substantial support for Jewish economic aid to Israel. Of six different types of possible Jewish support, "raising money for Israel" was approved by 93 percent of the sample.

In general, insufficient data have been generated to assess accurately the percentage of American Jews who have contributed money to Israel. A few sources of information are available, however. In a July 1980 Harris survey, 83 percent of the respondents said that they had contributed financially to "an organization which supports Israel." In the 1981–1982 National Survey of American Jews, almost half

²¹See Marc Lee Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal, 1939–1982*, Brown Judaic Studies 34 (Providence, R.I., 1982).

TABLE 4. TYPES OF AID TO ISRAEL: U.S. GOVERNMENTAL OR JEWISH, MAY 1948 (PERCENT)

Type of Aid	NORC-Baltimore Survey (n=230)	
	Favor U.S. Government Aid	Favor Jewish Aid
Food and clothing	59	93
Money	62	91
Arms and ammunition	51	80
Sending soldiers	23	51

Source: NORC-Baltimore—footnote 2.

the respondents said that they had contributed directly to "Israeli educational or charitable institutions"; the same survey in 1983 found 34 percent of the respondents reporting that they "have given the UJA \$100 or more in the last twelve months." One of the best indicators of American Jewry's attitude regarding financial contributions to Israel is a Harris survey (1974-1975) in which 87 percent of the respondents agreed that "Jews who live in the U.S. have special obligations to support Israel with funds and other aid."²²

Between 1971 and 1985, Israel received some \$30 billion worth of military and economic aid from the United States. Even as Israeli financial needs grew, and increased demands for aid were made, surveys of American Jews yielded consistent support for official U.S. aid in the range of 91 to 96 percent (Table 5). Almost half of American Jews also approved of American diplomatic and military assistance to Israel, even at the risk of the United States becoming involved in a Middle East war. More than half of the respondents supported sending American troops to defend Israel in case of extreme danger.

Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict

BASIC ISSUES

The American-Jewish community has been concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict since the beginning of Israel's existence. This concern is heightened in times of crisis and war, when it is channeled into massive financial and political support. American Jews have generally agreed with fundamental Israeli positions in the conflict. Recently, however, they have begun to express reservations about certain policies, especially those which have also generated controversy in Israel.

²²Quoted in Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, "Carter Vs. Israel: What the Polls Reveal," *Commentary*, November 1972, p. 27.

TABLE 5. U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 1971-1983 (PERCENT)

Date	Poll	Question	Don't Know/		
			Yes	No	No Opinion
1971	<i>Newsweek</i> -Gallup	The U.S. should help Israel with diplomatic support & military equipment	95	2	3
1974/75	Harris	Agree-disagree: U.S. sending military support & supplies to Israel	96	2	2
1980	Harris	" "	96	2	2
1981	Yankelovich	The U.S. should increase (continue at same level, cut back) military aid to Israel. (Increase & continue=yes, cut=no)	93	2	5
1981	Yankelovich	The continuation of U.S. support to Israel is important	95	2	3
1981	NSAJ	U.S. support for Israel is in America's interest	93	2	5
1983	NSAJ	" "	91	3	6
1971	<i>Newsweek</i> -Gallup	U.S. should help Israel with diplomatic support and military equipment, even at risk of becoming involved in a war	49	32	19
1980	Harris	If it looked as though Israel were going to be overrun by the Arabs in another war, the U.S. should be willing to send troops to support Israel	56	27	17

Sources: *Newsweek*-Gallup—*Newsweek*, March 1, 1971; Harris—footnote 7; Yankelovich—footnote 9; NSAJ—footnote 10.

During the 1950s the vast majority of American Jews blamed the Arab side for failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. In November 1955, for example, 69 percent said that the Arabs were more to blame for the conflict, while none said that Israel alone was at fault.²³ In April 1957, following the Sinai campaign, 83 percent held the Arabs responsible for the conflict, while only 2 percent saw Israel as responsible.

Various surveys of American Jews conducted since 1967 reveal consistent support for Israel's position overall as well as for specific policies (Table 6). During the 1967 Six Day War, 99 percent of American Jews who were polled said that Israel was "more right" than the Arabs. Successive polls taken before and after the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979 indicated a strong belief in Israel's peaceful intentions. In both the 1981-1982 National Survey of American Jews and Steven Cohen's post-Lebanon study, approximately three-quarters of the respondents held the view that Israel's policies were neither "too hawkish" nor "too dovish," but "about right."

Cohen's 1982 study included items specifically related to the war in Lebanon. Two of the given choices referred to the controversial invasion of West Beirut and Israel's actions there. Forty-nine percent of the respondents believed that Israel was right to "try and expel the PLO military forces," and 27 percent thought "Israel should have attacked and destroyed" those forces. Only 5 percent said Israel should never have gone into Lebanon, and 13 percent thought "Israel should have gone into Lebanon, but should have stopped after 25 miles."

THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

Questions on the Palestinian issue—couched in various forms—have been asked by several investigators. The findings help to clarify the range of American-Jewish opinion on the matter, while at the same time making clear the limitations of public-opinion polls.

Most probing of the Palestinian issue focuses on two specific matters: Israeli-PLO negotiations and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. In the years 1980-1984 pollsters approached the issue of Israeli-PLO negotiations by asking respondents to agree or disagree with two different propositions (Table 7). One was the actual Israeli official position of nonnegotiation; the second was a hypothetical situation: Israel should talk to the PLO, contingent upon PLO recognition of Israel and renunciation of terrorism. A comparison of the responses to the two questions reveals a distinct contrast. As long as the PLO was seen as adhering to the goals stated in its National Covenant and was employing terrorism, American Jewry overwhelmingly supported Israel's refusal to negotiate with PLO

²³Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Western Partisanship in the Middle East," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 33, Winter 1969/70, pp. 633-634.

TABLE 6. POSITIONS AND POLICIES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967-1982 (PERCENT)

Date	Poll	Question	Yes	No	Don't Know
1967	Harris	Israel was more right than the Arabs in the Six Day War	99	—	1
1975	Harris		89	5	6
1976	Harris	Israeli leadership is reasonable and will really work for a just settlement	94	3	3
1980	Harris		87	8	5
1980	Harris	Israel really wants peace with Egypt	92	5	3
1981	Yankelovich	Israeli attitudes toward a Palestinian state in the West Bank are reasonable	71	17	12
1981	Yankelovich	Israel's refusal to give back the Golan Heights is reasonable	78	13	9
1981	Yankelovich	Israel has the right to make Jerusalem its capital	74	14	12
1981	NSAJ	Israeli policies are about right (not too hawkish, not too dovish) or too dovish	77	23 ^a	—
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon		81	19 ^a	—
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon	Israel was right to send forces to expel the PLO from West Beirut; Israel should have attacked and destroyed the PLO in West Beirut (responses combined)	76	18 ^b	7

Sources: Harris 1967—Erskine, footnote 23; Harris 1974, 1976, 1980—footnote 7; Yankelovich—footnote 9; NSAJ and Cohen Post-Lebanon—footnote 10.

^a"Israeli policies too hawkish."

^bOf this 18 percent, 5 percent said "Israel never should have gone into Lebanon in the first place," and 13 percent said "Israel should have stopped after the first 25 miles."

TABLE 7. ISRAELI-PLO NEGOTIATIONS, 1980-1984 (PERCENT)

Date	Poll	Yes	No	Don't Know/ No Opinion	(n)
Q. "Israel is right in refusing to negotiate with the PLO [because it is a terrorist organization that wants to destroy Israel]." ^a					
1980	Harris	90	7	3	(1,030)
1981	Yankelovich	62	28	10	(174)
1981	NSAJ	74	18	8	(673)
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon	76	15	9	(640)
Q. "Israel should talk to the PLO if the PLO recognizes Israel [and renounces terrorism]." ^a					
1980	Harris	53	34	13	(1,030)
1981	<i>Newsweek</i> -Gallup	69	23	8	(522)
1982	Cohen Post-Lebanon	66	23	10	(500)
1983	NSAJ	70	17	13	(640)
1984	AJYLS	66	24	9	(756)

Sources: Harris—footnote 7; Yankelovich—footnote 9; NSAJ and Cohen Post-Lebanon—footnote 10; *Newsweek*-Gallup—footnote 8; AJYLS—footnote 11.

^aThe bracketed phrases did not appear in the Yankelovich survey.

representatives. However, given the possibility of PLO recognition of Israel and renunciation of terrorism, a sizeable majority of American Jews and their leaders indicated readiness to approve PLO-Israeli talks.

A similar picture emerges in relation to attitudes toward the establishment of a Palestinian state (Table 8). When the idea of an independent Palestinian state was presented in a humanitarian context (question "a"), almost half the respondents supported the idea. However, when the context was broadened to include other elements, such as Israel's security and the PLO, the outcome was totally different. The prospect of a Palestinian state that would include Yasir Arafat and the PLO (question "b"), for example, elicited enormous opposition (86 to 6 percent). In polls by Harris and the National Survey of American Jews, when respondents were asked to choose between two alternatives—Israeli annexation of the West Bank or the establishment there of a Palestinian state (question "c")—they showed significant support for Israeli annexation, in one case by a margin of 54 to 20. An item (question "d") affirming both Palestinian rights and Israel's security needs produced mixed results, in this case, perhaps, due to the composition of the samples.

While inconsistent opinions on the matter of a Palestinian state most likely reflect the objective complexity of the issues, they may also be attributed to the conflict between wishful thinking and realistic expectations among those interviewed. In the

TABLE 8. PALESTINIAN STATE, 1980-1984 (PERCENT)

Q.	Date	Poll	Context	For	Against	Don't Know
(a)	1980	Harris	Humanitarian	49	36	15
(b)	1980	Harris	Under PLO	6	86	8
(c)	1980	Harris	Israeli Security	20	54	26
(c)	1981	NSAJ	Israeli Security	28	42	30
(d)	1983	NSAJ	Rights & Israeli Security	48	26	27
(d)	1984	AJYLS	"	34	46	19

Questions:

- (a) "The Palestinian people are now homeless and deserve their own independent state, just as much as the Jews deserved a homeland after World War II."
- (b) "Arafat and the PLO should be given the West Bank and allowed to form an independent Palestinian state."
- (c) "If the alternatives are permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank or an independent Palestinian state, then an independent Palestinian state is preferable."
- (d) "Palestinians have a right to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza, so long as it doesn't threaten Israel."

Sources: Harris—footnote 7; NSAJ—footnote 10; AJYLS—footnote 11.

July 1980 Harris survey, a 59-to-25-percent plurality of respondents agreed with the following statement: "There must be a way to guarantee Israel's security and also give the Palestinians an independent state on the West Bank." Yet, in the same Harris survey, 63 percent of the respondents agreed with the following statement: "If the West Bank became an independent Palestinian state, the Russians would soon use it as a launching pad for them to destroy Israel and to take over the entire oil-rich Middle East." A similar proportion, 64 percent, agreed with the following statement, which was presented in the 1981-1982 National Survey of American Jews: "If the West Bank became an independent Palestinian state, it would probably be used as a launching pad to endanger Israel."

On a related issue—whether Israel should take permanent control of the West Bank—42 percent of respondents in the 1983 National Survey of American Jews and 48 percent of the respondents in the 1984 poll of United Jewish Appeal young leadership favored such action. Even higher pluralities emerged in polls conducted by *Newsweek-Gallup*: 61 percent of the respondents in 1981 and 58 percent of the respondents in 1982 favored Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank—with or

without civil control by local Palestinians. Only between 7 and 9 percent of the respondents, respectively, supported the establishment of a Palestinian state (Table 9).

Conclusion

The bulk of American Jewry is concerned with the survival and well-being of Israel and has supported it both politically and economically. The great majority of American Jews share the larger American consensus about the need for economic and military aid to Israel, on the grounds, primarily, that it serves both American and Israeli interests. At the same time, most American Jews do not consider themselves Zionist in the classical sense, and only a few have expressed the wish to settle in Israel.

American Jews have traditionally supported basic Israeli positions and strategies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, mobilizing to assist Israel during times of war and crisis. Regarding the Palestinian problem, American Jews have opposed negotiations with the PLO and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank. However, they have shown readiness to revise these opinions in the event that the PLO changes its ideology and tactics, and if the establishment of a Palestinian state no longer threatens the security of Israel.

The most striking conclusion to be drawn from the data cited in this study is that the attitudes of American Jews toward Israel have been remarkably stable and

TABLE 9. SOLUTIONS TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, 1981-1982 (PERCENT)

Proposals	Newsweek-Gallup Poll	
	Sept. '81 (n = 522)	Sept. '82 (n = 258)
Q: "The Camp David accords call for negotiations on Palestinian autonomy over the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Which of these proposals for the West Bank would you prefer to see implemented?"		
Israeli sovereignty with military & civil control by Israel	29	19
Israeli sovereignty with military control by Israel but civil control by the Palestinians themselves	32	39
Returning the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty and making it a demilitarized zone	14	16
An independent Palestinian state	9	7
Don't know	16	19

Source: Newsweek, October 4, 1982.

consistent. Still, while the likelihood is strong that American-Jewish support for Israel will continue, there is some evidence that older, less educated, and more religious individuals have been more committed to Israel than those who are younger and better educated, and who cannot remember a time when there was no Israel.²⁴ This means that the bonds between Israel and American Jewry must not be taken for granted, but rather should be closely guarded and cultivated.

EYTAN GILBOA

²⁴See Steven M. Cohen, "Romantic Idealism to Loving Realism: The Changing Place of Israel in the Consciousness of American Jews," in William Frankel (ed.), *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1985* (Madison, N.J., 1985), pp. 169-182.

Demographic

Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait

As a city, Los Angeles is quite unlike New York. New York is concentrated and urban, while Los Angeles is spread out over hundreds of square miles. As a Jewish center, too, Los Angeles differs from New York. New York has the Lower East Side as a visible link to the Jewish immigrant past; Los Angeles is a continent away from such links. Moreover, in New York, "Jewish" is a conspicuous ethnic identity; in Los Angeles it is easy for Jews to get lost.

Still, Los Angeles has developed a Jewish community with identifiably Jewish neighborhoods, an impressive range of institutions, and a dynamic cultural life. For older communities in the Southwest, and especially for a host of new "pioneering" communities, Los Angeles has become the great Jewish center.

This article presents a portrait of the Los Angeles Jewish community: its development since earliest days, its demographic characteristics, and the patterns of participation by Jews in community activities and institutions. Data for the study come from three primary sources: a 1979 survey carried out by the author for the Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, three earlier surveys (1951, 1959, 1967) conducted by Fred Massarik, and the 1980 U.S. population census.

GROWTH OF THE LOS ANGELES JEWISH COMMUNITY

Early History

Unlike the major urban centers of the East and Midwest, Los Angeles was never a city of direct disembarkation for immigrants during the nineteenth century. Since it did not emerge as a city until the beginning of the twentieth century, its Jewish community is relatively young. While there were some German Jews living in Los Angeles in the nineteenth century, San Francisco was the center of population in California for Jews and non-Jews alike.¹ The dramatic growth of the Los Angeles Jewish community occurred as part of the growth of

¹Robert E. Levinson, *The Jews in the California Gold Rush* (New York, 1978), p. 7.

Los Angeles itself and can only be understood within that context. (Table 1 traces the growth of both the Jewish and the general populations over a 100-year period.*)

In the 1870s Los Angeles began making the transition from a dusty frontier town—not much larger than the original Spanish pueblo—to the second-largest city in the United States. Between 1870 and 1880 the population grew by 101 percent, and by another 213 percent between 1880 and 1890. As the general population of Los Angeles County increased, so did the number of Jews, except that the Jewish population grew at a faster rate. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, when the general population of Los Angeles County grew fivefold, the Jewish population increased almost 20 times: from 136 Jews in 1880 to 2,500 at the dawn of the new century.

Even before the Southern Pacific Railroad had arrived in Los Angeles, speculators were busy turning open land into new towns. The "SP" itself was busy promoting southern California through excursions from the East and Midwest, and even sold plots of land in the city.² As Los Angeles journalist and social historian Carey McWilliams has noted:

Every city has its booms, but the history of Los Angeles is the history of its booms. Actually, the growth of Southern California since 1870 should be regarded as one continuous boom punctuated at intervals with major explosions. Other American cities have gone through a boom phase and then entered upon a period of normal growth. But Los Angeles has always been a boom town, chronically unable to consolidate its gains or to integrate its new population.³

A "bust" in 1888 following a boom in 1887 caused growth to slow down in the 1890s, but it resumed again after the turn of the century. The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the general population of Los Angeles County multiply fivefold and the Jewish population twelvefold. While great waves of Eastern European Jewish immigrants continued to settle in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, smaller but still significant numbers made their way across the continent. In addition to the attraction of expanding business opportunities, the area's mild climate drew sufferers from tuberculosis and the other respiratory ailments that were common among the sweatshop workers of the East.

Not until the 1920s did the growth rate for the county as a whole (135 percent) catch up to and even surpass that of the Jewish population (128 percent). The 1920–1930 period, which included a major land boom in 1923, brought over 200,000 people to California, the majority (72 percent) to the southern part of the state. According to McWilliams, "The migration to Southern California in this decade has been characterized as the largest internal migration of the American people."⁴ By

*See Appendix for tables.

²Carey McWilliams, *Southern California; An Island on the Land* (Layton, Utah, 1973), pp. 125–126.

³*Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 135.

the end of the decade, the Jewish community of Los Angeles had become the sixth largest in the country (just behind Detroit).

Although both Jewish and general growth rates slowed during the Great Depression, Jewish growth between 1930 and 1940 remained almost twice the general rate: 44 percent as compared with 27 percent.

Wartime and Postwar Period

The decade of greatest expansion for Los Angeles Jewry was the 1940s. During the war, the entire Pacific coast, and the southland in particular, gained strategic importance as a staging area for the Pacific theater and also as an aircraft manufacturing center. The combination of a land boom in 1943 and a burgeoning economy sparked a new cycle of growth. Once again the Jewish rate surpassed that of the overall population, and by the end of the decade the proportion of Jews in the county had risen from 4 to 7 percent.

Between 1940 and 1950 more than 168,000 Jews came to Los Angeles—more Jews than came in any decade before or after, and more Jews than lived in Detroit, Boston, Cleveland, or Baltimore in 1950. Many of these were servicemen who had been stationed in California—or had passed through en route to the Pacific—liked what they saw, and decided to make it their home. As a result of this migration, the size of the Jewish community almost tripled in the space of a few years. Indeed, by 1955 the Los Angeles Jewish community had become the second largest in the United States.⁵

In the 1950s Jewish growth slowed to the same rate as that of the county—if a growth rate of 50 percent can be called “slow”—and has remained close to the county rate ever since. During the 1960s the rate of Jewish growth fell behind that of Los Angeles County, while in the 1970s the Jewish growth rate was higher. This is noteworthy because the decade of the 1970s also brought large-scale immigration of Mexicans, Central Americans, and Asians to the area.

The dramatic growth of Jewish Los Angeles, as seen in the population figures, can be explained only partially by the general westward migration to California. Many factors undoubtedly served to attract Jews in such large numbers, among them the promise of unparalleled business and professional opportunities, a benign climate, the casual and glamorous lifestyle depicted in the movies, and ease of social integration. Perhaps there was a greater willingness among those who came to pull up roots and start over again and perhaps, too, a greater desire to break with the past and start afresh in a place that seemed to embody the ultimate American dream.

Changing Jewish Residential Patterns Within Los Angeles

With growing population movement into Los Angeles, urban boundaries were forced to expand, and the city's physical appearance underwent radical change.

⁵As reported in the AJYB, Vol. 57, 1956, pp. 126–130.

Hollywood, for example, which was largely rural as late as 1915, became entirely urban within the succeeding ten years. During the various boom decades of Los Angeles' growth, the nature of Jewish settlement also changed, with Jewish neighborhoods springing up in newer and more distant areas. Since World War II was a watershed in the community's development, the discussion of changing residential patterns falls naturally into two main periods: 1900-1940 and 1940-1980. (The areas referred to in the discussion that follows are shown on maps A-1 and A-2, pp. 130-131.)

1900-1940

At the turn of the century Los Angeles Jews lived in the area now known as "downtown," with two additional concentrations in the nearby Westlake and University districts.⁶ As Los Angeles changed from a frontier town to a city in the early decades of the century, the Jewish population began to spread. Between 1910 and 1926, the percentage of Jews living in the older Jewish settlement shrank from 30 to 3 percent, while two nearby areas succeeded "downtown" as Jewish centers: Temple Street (near what is now the new downtown Civic Center) in the teens, and Central Avenue (south of what is now "Little Tokyo") in the twenties. However, since both areas were close to what was then "downtown" (and are in fact considered part of the contemporary downtown), Jews remained essentially urban, even as the city itself was moving further outward. The real departure from "downtown" began only during the boom years of the 1920s, with the development of two important migration trends: east across the Los Angeles River to Boyle Heights, and west to the neighborhoods of Fairfax, Hollywood, and West Adams.

From the point of view of urban development, Boyle Heights can be considered similar to areas of second settlement in older cities. Like the Roxbury section in Boston, for example, Boyle Heights was built in the late nineteenth century as a "streetcar" suburb, in the first ring of settlement outside the boundaries of the "walking city."⁷ As happened elsewhere, upwardly mobile Jews replaced upper-class Protestants, and Boyle Heights became a transition area between the ethnic neighborhoods of the inner city and the residential urban mainstream.⁸ Unlike Boston, however, Los Angeles had no immigrant "ghetto," and newcomers to Boyle Heights were predominantly newcomers to Los Angeles. Boyle Heights, then, functioned simultaneously as an area of first and second settlement for Jewish Los Angeles.

⁶Max Vorspan and Lloyd Gartner, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles* (Philadelphia, 1970), p. 117; Mitchell Gelfand, "Progress and Prosperity: Jewish Social Mobility in Los Angeles in the Booming Eighties," *American Jewish History*, June 1979, p. 414.

⁷Sam Bass Warner, *Street Car Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900* (New York, 1972), p. 58.

⁸Robert A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, *The Zone of Emergence: Observations of the Lower Middle and Upper Working Class Communities of Boston, 1905-1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 31-35.

MAP A-1

Los Angeles County: Geographic Areas



MAP A-2

Los Angeles County: Communities



LEGEND

* Includes Beverly Fairfax and Wilshire Fairfax

† Includes Beverlywood

 Urban Core

Boyle Heights grew from 1,800 Jewish households in 1920 to more than 10,000 in 1930, and to more than 14,000 by 1938.⁹ It was the first visibly Jewish neighborhood in Los Angeles: "On the main streets of Boyle Heights were stores where Jews bought and sold, Yiddish was freely used, and Saturdays and Jewish holidays were marked by festive appearances and many closed businesses. Such was Boyle Heights of the late 1920s and the years following as mass immigration created a large-scale Jewish environment."¹⁰

Although numerically small as compared to the great Jewish urban enclaves of the East and Midwest, Boyle Heights had an immense psychological impact on Los Angeles Jewry. For Jews experiencing the inevitable anomie of the dislocated, Boyle Heights was a link to communities left behind. Jews who lived in Boyle Heights during the '20s, '30s, and '40s exhibit a nostalgic affection for "the Heights" to this day.

At the same time that Boyle Heights was undergoing its period of rapid growth, important changes were taking place in newly developed neighborhoods on the westside of Los Angeles, neighborhoods that had not even existed ten years earlier. Los Angeles Jews, like other Angelenos, flocked to these new areas of the city. According to Vorspan and Gartner:

More prosperous and acculturated Jews settled westward in such areas as Wilshire, West Adams and Hollywood. Affluent Wilshire, with about 310 Jewish households in 1914, had 2,410 in 1926. Hollywood, still sylvan in 1914, had hardly any; by 1926 there were about 3,287. West Adams rose during the same period from 143 to 1,534.¹¹

As a result of the population movement that took place between 1920 and 1940, there emerged two sides to Jewish Los Angeles: the Yiddish, Orthodox, working-class eastside and the more affluent and acculturated westside, with its two main centers in Beverly Fairfax and West Adams. The difference in socioeconomic status between eastside and westside can be documented from the 1940 U.S. census. Five census tracts were notably Jewish (using the "Russian stock" population to identify Jews): three in Beverly Fairfax and West Adams and two in Boyle Heights. Using occupation, education, and rent as indicators, the Beverly Fairfax and West Adams tracts were of middle social rank, while the Boyle Heights tracts were of low social rank.¹²

By 1940, the westside had replaced the older eastside as the leading Jewish neighborhood of Los Angeles. In the meantime, a new "westside" was forming in more affluent areas.

⁹Vorspan and Gartner, *op. cit.*, pp. 118, 203.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 118.

¹²Eshref Shevsky and Marilyn Williams, *The Social Areas of Los Angeles: Analysis and Typology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), p. 70.

1940-1980

As the population of Los Angeles mushroomed during the 1940s, the scope of Jewish settlement widened beyond what Fred Massarik has termed the "Urban Core" areas, described above, to include two new areas: the San Fernando Valley and the Western Area.¹³ Between 1950 and 1980 the new areas expanded and the Urban Core declined, with the result that by 1980 there were almost equal numbers of Jewish households in the San Fernando Valley, the Western Area, and the Urban Core.

A few geographical definitions will be helpful at this point. The Urban Core begins with Beverly Fairfax, Wilshire Fairfax, and West Hollywood and extends eastward to Boyle Heights. The Western Area begins with Beverly Hills and Cheviot Hills-Beverlywood and extends west to the ocean, taking in the exclusive hillside communities of Westwood and Brentwood, the flats of West Los Angeles, Mar Vista, and the ocean communities of Venice, Marina Del Rey, Santa Monica, Pacific Palisades, and Malibu. While both the Western Area and Urban Core are separated from the San Fernando Valley by mountains, they are divided from each other by socioeconomic rather than geographic barriers.

The "westside" of Los Angeles—wherever its location in any particular decade—has always been the most prestigious section of the city. Beverly Hills, legally an independent city, is considered part of the westside by virtue of its affluence and international social status. South of Beverly Hills are the communities of Cheviot Hills and Beverlywood, which developed after the boom years of the twenties. Their modern single-family dwellings on winding streets contrast markedly with the older homes and many apartment buildings, laid out on square blocks, that characterize Beverly Fairfax, Wilshire Fairfax, and West Hollywood—the three neighborhoods that border Beverly Hills and Cheviot Hills-Beverlywood. Thus, the Western Area can be distinguished from the Urban Core by neighborhoods that are more affluent and less urbanized.

The San Fernando Valley lies to the north of the Western Area and Urban Core and is separated from them by the Santa Monica Mountains. Ecologically, historically, and logistically it is entirely separate from the rest of Los Angeles. In the early decades of the century, when the Valley was largely agricultural, it was accessible only through the Cahuenga Pass (where the Hollywood Bowl is located). Even today access to the Valley is limited to four winding canyon roads and three freeways.

Two sections of Los Angeles have remained Jewishly marginal: the Eastern Area, consisting of the San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys, and the Southern Area, extending south from Los Angeles International Airport, the Fox Hills and Baldwin Hills

¹³Fred Massarik, *The Jewish Population Indicator Reports, 1971-1974*, Community Planning Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, mimeo, 1976.

areas, to San Pedro and the Palos Verdes Peninsula. These areas, which together have never accounted for more than 15 percent of the Jewish population of Los Angeles, are discussed separately below.

Beginning in 1951, Fred Massarik began to collect and publish estimates of the number of Jewish households in over 20 named communities in Los Angeles. As a result, it is possible to study population shifts both among and within the three major Jewish areas—the San Fernando Valley, the Western Area, and the Urban Core—during the period 1950–1980 (Tables 2A,B,C).

In 1951 Jewish Los Angeles was still largely urban; over half (61 percent) of all Jewish households were located in the Urban Core. The Western Area, the second largest in the city, had fewer than half the number of Jewish households found in the Urban Core. (Beverly Fairfax, now included in the Urban Core, was still considered at that time to be on the “westside,” as evidenced by the naming of the “Westside Jewish Community Center” in the early 1950s.¹⁴) The San Fernando Valley, just beginning to open up to Jewish settlement, had less than half again as many households as the Western Area (Table 2C).

In 1959 the Jewish community was still urban, but less so than it had been just a few years earlier. The Urban Core entered a period of decline in the 1950s, while the San Fernando Valley grew by 125 percent, increasing its share of Jewish households from 9.5 to 19 percent. The Western Area, which grew by a more modest 25 percent, particularly in Santa Monica and Cheviot Hills-Beverlywood, was just barely maintaining its position as the second-largest Jewish area (Tables 2B, C).

Jewish residential trends established in the 1950s continued throughout the 1960s. Overall, the Urban Core lost another 9 percent of its Jewish households, the San Fernando Valley grew by another 80 percent, and growth in the Western Area accelerated to 53 percent. The result was that by 1970, the number of Jewish households was almost evenly divided among the three major areas: 33 percent in the Urban Core; 28 percent in the Western Area; and 26 percent in the San Fernando Valley.

The rapid growth of Jewish population in the San Fernando Valley and the Western Area was part of the postwar suburban growth that characterized all American cities. It was also associated with economic changes and the movement of minorities within the city.

The changing economic fortunes of the Valley, Western Area, and Urban Core have been plotted over a 30-year period by the City of Los Angeles, using U.S. census data from 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970.¹⁵ Based on information on income, education, and home value, all Los Angeles census tracts were assigned economic ranks from “1” (the highest) to “4” (the lowest). The 30-year period 1940–1970 saw

¹⁴Located two blocks east of the intersection of Olympic Boulevard and Fairfax Avenue.

¹⁵1980 *Los Angeles County Forecast*, Appendix A, Community Development Department, Community Analysis and Planning Division, City of Los Angeles, Sept. 1977.

a marked decline in the socioeconomic status of the Fairfax area. Whereas in 1940 census tracts in Beverly Fairfax, Wilshire Fairfax, and West Hollywood had all been either in the first ("upper economic") or second ("above average") ranks, by 1950 only three tracts were in the first rank, and by 1960 only one. Beginning in the 1960s, tracts which had formerly been in the second ("above average") rank had fallen to the third ("below average") rank. Only the exclusive hillside areas of West Hollywood remained in the first rank.

Even more dramatic change occurred in the San Fernando Valley. In 1940, when all the census tracts in and around Fairfax were in the first or second rank, most Valley tracts were in the second and third ranks—none were in the first. Little change took place in the San Fernando Valley between 1940 and 1950. By the 1960 census, however, a number of second-ranked census tracts had moved to the first rank, and a number of third-ranked tracts had moved to the second. This economic upgrading took place primarily in a strip of communities hugging the Santa Monica Mountains "south of the Boulevard" (i.e., Ventura Boulevard): Encino, Sherman Oaks, and Tarzana. Particularly notable improvement took place in Woodland Hills (West Valley), which moved, between 1940 and 1960, from the third to the first rank, and in Northridge (North Valley), sections of which moved, between 1950 and 1970, from the third to the first or second rank. Census tracts in North Hollywood, the original area of San Fernando Valley settlement, either declined or remained stable during this period.

By 1970, the areas in the Valley with the highest economic standing were also those that had experienced the most Jewish growth: the North Valley and West Valley (including Granada Hills, Woodland Hills, and Northridge), Encino, and Sherman Oaks. Thus the move to the Valley, which in the 1940s and early 1950s had commonly been a move to affordable single-family housing, became two decades later a move upward in socioeconomic status.

Even more so did the shift to the Western Area reflect a movement of upward social mobility. Beginning in the 1940s, Cheviot Hills came to occupy the first rank, as did Westwood and Brentwood. Beverlywood, on the eastern slope of the Cheviot Hills, was consistently in the second rank.

These trends continued until the mid-1970s. Between 1970 and 1974 the Urban Core declined an additional 17 percent, losing more Jewish households in five years (8,681) than it had in the previous ten (4,962). By contrast, the Valley gained an additional 10,309 Jewish households and the Western Area an additional 7,745.

Beginning in the post-World War II period, the movement of Jews to the west and the north was accompanied by a movement of blacks into the areas that the Jews were vacating.¹⁶ The impact of this change was felt first in West Adams, in the late

¹⁶*An Ethnic Trend Analysis of Los Angeles County, 1950-1980*, Community Development Department, Community Analysis and Planning Division, City of Los Angeles, mimeo, Dec. 1977.

1940s, after restrictive housing covenants were struck down by the Supreme Court. When the extent of black migration into West Adams became apparent, the Jewish Community Centers Association canceled plans for additional building that had been contemplated in that area.¹⁷

Just to the west of West Adams, Baldwin Hills—which was the primary residential area for Sephardic Jews from Greece and Turkey¹⁸—attracted growing numbers of upwardly mobile, middle-class blacks, and by 1970 blacks had moved just east of Beverlywood and just south of Wilshire Fairfax, adding to the black student population of the two “Jewish” high schools—Fairfax and Hamilton.¹⁹ The same year, after a major earthquake destroyed the predominantly black Los Angeles High School, situated in the district just east of Fairfax, a number of black students were transferred to Fairfax. In response to these changes, Beverly Fairfax, Wilshire Fairfax, and West Hollywood lost Jewish households for the first time since the 1920s, thereby reversing a half century of growth. Cheviot Hills-Beverlywood, located in the Hamilton High School district, experienced no change, ending a period of growth that had begun before 1950. In contrast, neighboring Beverly Hills, with its independent school district, grew by 30 percent in the years 1970–1974.

By 1974 it appeared that the Urban Core would eventually be eclipsed entirely by the San Fernando Valley and the Western Area. However, a housing speculation boom in the late 1970s dramatically reversed the trend. The recession at the beginning of the decade had caused a slump in housing starts, even as the population continued to grow. As a result of increased demand, existing housing appreciated rapidly, with prices fueled by heavy speculation. As housing costs became prohibitive in more desirable neighborhoods, more Jewish families (and even single persons) bought houses and rented apartments in what had been declining, and therefore less expensive, neighborhoods. Thus, the Urban Core, which had consistently lost Jewish households through 1974, showed a 40-percent increase by 1979 (for a net increase of 16.8 percent during the decade 1970–1979) (Table 2B). For every household that moved out of Beverly Fairfax between 1974 and 1975, more than two new ones moved in.²⁰ The turnaround in the area was so complete that by 1981 a report commissioned by the Young Israel Community Development Corporation in the Fairfax area warned that small shopkeepers and low-income residents were in danger of being forced out by escalating rental charges.

¹⁷Fred Massarik, *The Jewish Population of the West Adams Area: A Tentative Report*, Jewish Centers Association, mimeo, 1948.

¹⁸Eliezer Chammou, “Migration and Adjustment: The Case of Sephardic Jews in Los Angeles,” Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Social Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, 1976.

¹⁹*An Ethnic Trend Analysis of Los Angeles County, 1950–1980*, op. cit.; map “1980 Ethnic Clusters.”

²⁰Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980, p. 30.

In contrast to the Urban Core, growth in the Western Area, during 1974–1979, slowed to 6 percent, but the picture was far from uniform. All the growth was concentrated in the Brentwood-Westwood area, in which the number of Jewish households more than doubled.²¹ The Valley continued to grow, but in new ways. Expensive areas such as Encino and Tarzana (ranked as “1” even in 1970) lost Jewish households, while less desirable communities such as Van Nuys, Reseda, and North Hollywood gained Jewish households.²² Communities in the West Valley and North Valley that were in the first rank but further out from the urban center gained new households as well.

SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AREAS

The Eastern and Southern Areas have always had an insignificant share of the Jewish population of Los Angeles County. The San Gabriel Valley to the east never held much attraction, probably for two reasons. First, it is geographically isolated from the rest of Los Angeles, not only by mountains but by bumper-to-bumper commuter traffic on the freeways. Second, the San Gabriel Valley as a whole is of lower socioeconomic status than the rest of Los Angeles.

The Southern Area can be divided into three separate sections: the beach cities, the midcities inland from the beach communities, and the promontory of the Palos Verdes Peninsula. The midcities, located on the flat plains of South Los Angeles and of lower socioeconomic status, have never attracted Jewish settlement. Nor have the beach cities (Hermosa Beach, Redondo Beach, Playa Del Rey), though Jews did move to other beach communities, such as Santa Monica and Venice, early on. The probable reason for Jews avoiding the Southern Area is that these beach cities not only did not welcome Jews but were the headquarters for a number of overtly antisemitic organizations.²³ The exclusive and expensive Palos Verdes area was largely off-limits to Jews until the 1960s, but has since experienced growing Jewish settlement.

Distribution of Jewish Households in 1979

A striking feature of the Jewish population of Los Angeles is that it is widely spread out, but also highly localized. If Jews were randomly distributed throughout the county, any given community in 1979 would have had a Jewish density of about

²¹Ibid. Although Cheviot Hills had been in the first rank economically in 1970, the continued movement of the black population in its direction reduced its desirability. By the 1980s, high prices in Westwood made Cheviot Hills once again attractive to Jewish home buyers.


²²Valley neighborhoods that are south of Ventura Boulevard are more desirable and expensive because they are either in or adjacent to the foothills. Reseda, Van Nuys, and North Hollywood are all on the floor of the Valley.

²³Information communicated to the author by John Babcock, author of a forthcoming history of Jewish Los Angeles.

MAP B


JEWISH DENSITY BY ZIP CODE

LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1979



LEGEND

Jewish Households as a percent of all households



7 percent (the percentage of Jews in the population). Even if only those communities outside the black concentrations of Watts, Compton, and South-Central Los Angeles are considered, a random distribution would have produced approximately 10-percent Jewish density. In actuality, more than half of all Jewish households were concentrated in 32 zip-code areas that had Jewish densities of at least 14 percent—twice that of the overall Jewish density for Los Angeles.

Map B illustrates the concentration of Jews throughout Los Angeles County in 1979. More than 30,000 phone calls from a random-digit-dialing survey were used to estimate the size of the Jewish population and its distribution by zip codes. (See "Sociodemographic Profile," below.) The zip-code percentages were then assigned to four strata: the first with 30 percent or more Jewish households; the second with 15 to 29 percent Jewish households; the third with 7 to 14 percent Jewish households; the fourth with less than 7 percent Jewish households.

The pattern that emerged was one of concentric rings of decreasing Jewish density. The area of highest density—the darkest on the map, shaped like a *T* with a fat base—included both Valley and city (i.e., Western Area and Urban Core) zip codes. The south, or city, side of this first stratum included Beverly Hills, Beverly Fairfax, Beverlywood, and West Hollywood. These formed the stem of the *T*. The Valley part of the first stratum, or the cross of the *T*, consisted of Encino, Van Nuys, Sherman Oaks, Studio City, and North Hollywood. Thus, the Valley zip codes of the first stratum were directly north over the hills from the city zip codes, indicating that the most Jewish parts of the Valley were those closest to the city.

While the city had a smaller Jewish population, it was more densely Jewish than the Valley, which occupied an extensive land area and offered a large selection of acceptable places to live in. All but one of the first-stratum zip codes in the city had Jewish densities of 40 percent or more, as contrasted with the Valley, where all but one of the first-stratum zip codes had Jewish densities of less than 40 percent. An interesting feature of the distribution is that in both city and Valley, the first stratum consisted of both newer affluent areas and contiguous older areas (e.g., Beverly Fairfax and Beverly Hills in the city, North Hollywood and Sherman Oaks in the Valley).

In both Valley and city, the most densely Jewish areas included the communities generally regarded as most desirable. These were Woodland Hills, Encino, Brentwood, Pacific Palisades, and, slightly lower in status, West Wilshire—including Beverly Fairfax and West Hollywood—and West Los Angeles. An analysis of census-tract characteristics in the 1970 census identified the residents of these communities as having the highest per capita income and the most years of college education, as well as homes with the highest real-estate values and rental costs.²⁴

²⁴A *Trend Analysis of Los Angeles County, 1950-1970*, Community Analysis Bureau, Office of the Mayor, City of Los Angeles, mimeo, June 1, 1976.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF LOS ANGELES JEWRY

Sampling Methodology

The sociodemographic profile of Los Angeles Jews that is presented here is based on a telephone survey of 800 randomly selected Jewish households that was conducted in spring 1979.²⁵ A random-digit-dialing sample was stratified by area (with an oversampling of the Southern and Eastern Areas due to need for planning) and by the distribution of residential phone numbers within the area. The sample included all of Los Angeles County (except for predominantly black areas in South-Central Los Angeles) and those areas of Ventura County that are contiguous to and form a Jewish extension of the West Valley (e.g., Agoura, Thousand Oaks, Newbury Park, etc.).

A minimum of five calls was made to each phone number in the sample, at random intervals including evenings and Sundays. Interviews were conducted in English, Spanish, Arabic, Hebrew, Parsi (Persian), Yiddish, and Hungarian. All persons answering the phone were read a short explanation of the survey based on standard protocols used at the Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Science Research at UCLA. The purpose of the initial screening was to eliminate nonresidential phone numbers from the sample. If the phone number was determined to be a residence, the respondent was read a further explanation of the study and asked whether any Jewish persons lived in the household.

In addition to the 1979 survey data, comparable data are introduced into the discussion from Jewish population surveys conducted in 1951, 1959, and 1967 (referenced in Table 3) as well as the 1980 U.S. census for Los Angeles County.²⁶ With the help of the older surveys it is possible to evaluate the extent of social change that has taken place among Los Angeles Jews. The comparison with the non-Hispanic white population made possible by the availability of data from the 1980 census highlights similarities and differences between Los Angeles Jews and other whites in the population.²⁷

²⁵The study was funded by the Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles and conducted by the author as Research Director of the Planning and Budgeting Department. (See Phillips, *op. cit.*)

²⁶Special tabulations for the non-Hispanic white population in Los Angeles County were ordered from the California State Demographic Office, from Summary Tape File #4, Part B, as described in *1980 Census of Population and Housing, User's Guide Part A. Text*, PHC80-R1-A, Mar. 1973; and *User's Guide Part C. Index to Summary Tape Files 1 to 4*, PHC80-R1-C, Sept. 1983, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

²⁷The effect of the one-year difference between the 1979 Jewish population study and the 1980 census is minimal. The validity of the comparison was enhanced by including only non-Hispanic whites in the analysis. Although many Hispanics classify themselves as white in the census, they constitute a distinct linguistic, cultural, and ethnic group. Because of significant differences in family size and socioeconomic status between Hispanic and

Impact of Mobility on the Jewish Population

Los Angeles has long been described as a community without roots, and this is true of Jewish Los Angeles as well. In every decade there have been significant numbers of Jewish newcomers who have been living in Los Angeles less than ten years (Table 3). The proportion of new arrivals rose to its highest in 1951, after the population explosion of the 1940s. At that time the majority (62 percent) of Jewish households reported being in the city five years or less; a mere 16 percent of Jewish households in Los Angeles in 1951 had lived in that city before World War II. In effect, a whole new community came into being in the space of a decade.

In the 20 years following 1959, newcomers constituted a small but sizeable element in the city. In that period, between one-fifth and one-quarter of all Jewish households had been in Los Angeles less than a decade. The significance of this can be highlighted by noting the proportion of Jewish households in 1979 that were resident in Los Angeles when earlier population surveys were conducted: 75 percent in 1967; 55 percent in 1959; and 25 percent in 1951. Another indicator of the youthfulness of the community is the proportion of households in 1979 that had been in the city 21 years or longer (Table 3)—55 percent. The comparable figure for a more established community, such as Milwaukee, was 75 percent.²¹

While all the Jewish areas within Los Angeles benefited from movement into the city, it was not evenly distributed in terms of either period or rate (Table 4). The Urban Core, for example, experienced an upsurge between 1974 and 1979—20 percent newcomers as compared with a citywide newcomer rate of 14 percent. The San Fernando Valley, which experienced major growth in the 1950s and 1960s, saw a tapering off in the 1970s. In Santa Monica, Pacific Palisades, and Malibu, which were relatively new areas of Jewish settlement, 45 percent of Jewish households had moved in just in the ten years prior to 1979. By contrast, the populations of Beverly Hills and other Western Area communities were older and more stable; in Beverly Hills, 68 percent of Jewish households had been in the city 20 years or longer, as compared with 55 percent citywide.

As might be expected in a community made up largely of newcomers, relatively few Jewish adults were native-born Angelenos. Between 1951 and 1979 the

non-Hispanic whites, inclusion of the former can either spuriously accentuate, or accidentally mask, the differences between Jews and other whites, making it harder to evaluate the extent to which Jews are "blending in" to mainstream American society.

Because the census does not ask about religion and there is no way of identifying Jews, Jews are included in the data for the non-Hispanic white population (of which they constitute about 10 percent in Los Angeles County). The effect of comparing the Jewish population with a larger population that includes them is to underestimate differences between Jews and non-Jews. Thus, if a comparison could be made between the Jewish population and the non-Hispanic white, *non-Jewish* population, the differences would be even greater than those reported here.

²¹Bruce A. Phillips and Eve Weinberg, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population: Report of a Survey*, Milwaukee Jewish Federation, Jan. 1984, p. 1-25.

proportion of Jewish adults born in Los Angeles increased from 8 to 14 percent—almost doubling but still remaining relatively small (Table 5). The effect of post-World War II migration is to be seen in the fact that 39 percent of 18–29-year-olds—those born since 1950—were native-born (Table 6). With regard to the future, assuming that in-migration remains constant, as the current cohort of 18–29-year-olds ages, and as children under 18—three-quarters of whom are native Californians (Table 8)—become adults, native-born Angelenos will come to predominate in the community.

While the proportion of foreign-born Jews in Los Angeles decreased from 37 percent in 1951 to 29 percent in 1979 (Table 5), the late 1970s brought a new wave of immigration from abroad. Fully one-third of all born-Jewish respondents who arrived in Los Angeles between 1974 and 1979 had been born in other countries (Table 7). Included in this immigration were three particularly visible groups: Soviet and Iranian Jews and Israelis.

There were an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 Israelis living in Los Angeles in 1979. While popular estimates generally put this number much higher—anywhere from 50,000 to 150,000—the 1979 estimate was corroborated by a study of immigration data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service²⁹ that was later confirmed informally by statisticians from the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel.

In comparison with the white population as a whole, Jews were more likely to have been born either outside of California or out of the United States (Table 8). Jews were more than twice as likely as all American-born whites to have been born in the Northeast (comprising the Mid-Atlantic and New England regions).

Age and Household Type

AGE

Jewish demographers and federation planners tend to focus on the oldest and youngest ends of the age distribution in order to track the extent to which the American Jewish population is aging—thanks to increased life expectancy—and declining in numbers—due to low fertility. Surprisingly, the common assumptions about these demographic indicators were not confirmed—or at least not totally—for Los Angeles Jewry. Thus, while Jewish fertility had declined, it was actually slightly ahead of the rate for non-Hispanic whites. Similarly, while the proportion of the aged had increased over several decades, by 1979 it had leveled off. Indeed, the proportion of the aged was higher among non-Hispanic whites in Los Angeles than among Jews.

Following the baby boom of the 1950s, the proportion of children (aged 0–19) in the Jewish population rose from 27 percent in 1951 to 35 percent in 1959 (Table

²⁹Pini Herman and David LaFontaine, "In Our Footsteps: Israeli Migration to the U.S. and Los Angeles," master's thesis, University of Southern California School of Social Work and Hebrew Union College, Los Angeles, 1983.

9). With the end of the baby boom and the start of a trend away from childbearing, the proportion of children dropped to 32 percent in 1967 and to a low of 23 percent in 1979. The change was most dramatically apparent in the proportion of children under age 10, which declined from 20 to 10 percent between 1959 and 1979. While the drop in fertility was a cause for concern, the Jewish fertility rate was actually slightly ahead of the non-Hispanic white rate (Table 10), as reflected in the proportion of the population under 5 years of age.

On the national level, Jewish planners work on the assumption that the Jewish population is becoming increasingly aged.³⁰ In Los Angeles, however, Jews are not older than the non-Hispanic white population. In fact, in 1979 non-Hispanic whites as a group had a greater proportion of the elderly (60 and older) than did the Jews: 20.2 as against 16.4 percent (Table 10). Moreover, Jews and non-Hispanic whites had nearly identical proportions of children aged 0-9 and 10-19. The only significant differences were in the higher proportion of Jews aged 30-39 and the lower proportion aged 20-24. The latter may well be accounted for by the large number of Jews attending college and graduate school outside the county.

HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND DISTRIBUTION

While the overall contours of household type and family structure of the non-Hispanic white and Jewish populations were similar, Jews were more likely to be married, to have children, and to be married with children (Table 11). Thus, 58 percent of all Jewish households contained married couples as against 50 percent of non-Hispanic white households; 28 percent of all Jewish households had children as against 25 percent of non-Hispanic white households; and 24 percent of all Jewish households contained married couples with children as against 20 percent of non-Hispanic white households.

As would be expected from the preceding figures, fewer Jewish households were headed by single persons (42 vs. 50 percent), and far fewer were single-parent families (non-Hispanic white households were 1.4 times as likely as Jewish households to be single-parent families). This was not because Jews did not divorce, for the percentage of divorced persons in the Jewish population rose steadily from 1951 on.³¹ However, 22 percent of all ever-married Jews under age 54 had been divorced, as compared with 33 percent of non-Hispanic whites (Table 12). Jews were also more likely to be remarried. Approximately one-third of all married persons had gone through divorce, yet more Jews than non-Jews were currently married.

As with the geographical distribution of the total Jewish population, Jewish household types were not homogeneously distributed throughout the city. Rather, particular household types were more numerous in some areas than in others. The analysis of the distributions is complicated, however. An attempt was made to

³⁰See, for example, *Jewish Environmental Scan to 1990*, Council of Jewish Federations, Long Range Strategic Planning Committee, mimeo, Oct. 1984, p. 2.

³¹Phillips, op.cit., p. 9.

include as many separate communities as possible, even while bearing in mind that small subsamples have large variances which are reflected in over-large or -small proportions of particular household types. Two typologies were employed for the analysis: "household type," combining the marital status of the respondent with the presence or absence of children; and "family-cycle stage," grouping households according to the ages of respondents and children.

The Valley and the Eastern Area had higher proportions of married couples with children (37 and 30 percent respectively) than any of the other areas or the Jewish community overall (24 percent) (Table 13). Conversely, never-married households were least likely to be found in the San Fernando Valley.

The San Fernando Valley, with a Jewish population ten times as large as that of the Eastern Area, was the premier family area in Los Angeles. Over half (56 percent) of the Jewish married couples with children lived in the San Fernando Valley, the majority (58 percent)²² concentrated in the North Valley and West Valley (running from Woodland Hills and Agoura north through Granada Hills and Northridge). In fact, a majority of Jewish households in these two areas consisted of married couples with children: 53 percent as compared with 24 percent in Los Angeles overall (Table 14).

The communities contiguous with the North Valley and West Valley—Encino, Tarzana, and Sherman Oaks—would have been expected to have the next highest concentrations of married couples with children, but this was not the case. These communities actually had the lowest proportions of married couples with children, and it was the Central Valley that contained the next highest (30 percent) proportion of married couples with children in the San Fernando Valley. Since Encino, Tarzana, and Sherman Oaks were the most expensive areas in the San Fernando Valley, it is likely that they were too costly for younger families. This observation is confirmed by looking at the ages of the children in the households (Table 15). The less expensive Central Valley had the highest proportion of families with children under age 6 of any area either in the San Fernando Valley or Los Angeles.

While the area breakdown shows the Urban Core and the Western Area as having the lowest proportions of married couples with children and the highest proportions of never-married and divorced household heads, closer analysis reveals a more complex picture. The Western Area, for example, includes such disparate communities as Beverly Hills and Venice-Mar Vista-Culver City. Beverly Hills, renowned for its excellent school system, had the highest percentage of married couples with children in Los Angeles (35.1 percent), while Venice-Mar Vista-Culver City, an area with many small apartments near the beach, had the lowest (6.7 percent).

The figures for Beverly Fairfax-West Hollywood may also be misleading. These Urban Core communities, which experienced a rejuvenating influx of young families, showed the third-lowest proportion of married couples with children. However,

²²Ibid.

these were largely families with young children. If only households with children under the age of 6 are considered, the Urban Core proportion (7.4 percent) was almost the same as that in the North Valley and West Valley (10 percent), which were highly suburban areas, strongly identified as family centers.

Just as the Eastern Area was identified as being family-oriented, so the Southern Area stood out as having large numbers of single-parent families. Single-parent families were relatively rare (4 percent) in the Los Angeles Jewish community as a whole, but they accounted for 13 percent of all Jewish households, and 36 percent of all households with children, in the Southern Area. While there were numerically more single-parent families in the Western Area and Urban Core, this is explained by their much larger Jewish populations. Only the Central Valley came close to having the same proportion of single-parent families as that in the Southern Area—8 percent of all households and 22 percent of all households with children. What these two areas had in common was availability of apartments and relatively low housing costs.

Marriage and Divorce

The 12 years between the 1967 and 1979 surveys saw the rise of a new marital pattern—Jews delaying marriage longer, in many cases not marrying until their 30s. Although the 1979 survey questionnaire did not include an item on age at first marriage, by comparing the relationship between age and marital status in 1967 and 1979 it is possible to document the dramatic shift that took place (Table 16A).

The most striking difference is found in the cohort aged 30–39. In 1967 only 6.2 percent of 30-year-olds had never been married, whereas in 1979 the proportion had more than doubled (16 percent). Tracing this shift in detail is made difficult by the use of ten-year intervals in the 1967 survey, which masks significant five-year changes. That five-year intervals are important can be seen from Table 16B, which presents data from 1979 only, but broken down into five-year cohorts. The percent never-married in 1979 drops by half (from 80 to 38 percent) after age 25, and then again by three-fourths (from 23 to 8 percent) after age 35.

Changing patterns of divorce since 1967 are also striking, particularly in the 30- and 40-year-old age groups. In 1979 the percentage of Jews aged 30–39 who had been divorced was three times as high as in 1967 (12.6 as against 3.9 percent), while the percentage of those aged 40–49 was twice as high (13.6 as against 6.8 percent). Overall, the percentage of divorced persons more than doubled during the period.

Intermarriage

Religious intermarriage (defined as marriage to a non-Jew by birth who has not converted to Judaism) dramatically increased in the decade of the 70s. This can be seen by comparing the percentage of born Jews married to non-Jews in different age

groups (Table 17). Whereas 13 percent (an average of the male and female figures) of those in the 30-39 age group had non-Jewish spouses, some 30 percent of Jews under age 30 had non-Jewish spouses. Thus, the individual intermarriage rate for Jews under age 30 was nearly one-third. As against this, the couple intermarriage rate for the same age group was 49 percent, or one-half (Table 18). The difference in the two rates is due to the method of reporting. When individuals are counted, each born-Jew counts as one. When a tabulation is made of all *couples*, however, two Jews who marry persons not born Jewish are counted as two marriages, but two Jews who marry each other are counted as one. This reduces the total (the denominator) on which the percentage is taken and results in the higher rate.

Sex differences in intermarriage show no consistent patterns, although overall a slightly higher percentage of females was intermarried. In the 30-39 age range, Jewish males were 50 percent more likely to be married to non-Jews than were Jewish females. Under age 30, however—the age group in which intermarriage rates increased sharply—Jewish females were 35 percent more likely to be married to non-Jews than were Jewish males. Similarly, Jewish females in their 40s were more likely to be married to non-Jews than were Jewish males of the same age.

The relationship between conversion and intermarriage is characterized by a sharp break between the over-40 and under-40 age groups (Table 18). While in absolute numbers conversion was on the increase—because the total number of exogamous marriages (marriage to a born non-Jew who may or may not have converted) was increasing—the proportion of convert marriages to the total of all intermarriages actually showed a steep decline, dropping from 31.4 percent for 40-49-year-olds to 11 percent for those under 40. Thus, the rate of conversion declined as the intermarriage rate increased.

That the intermarriage rate for couples under age 40 was in fact higher than in the past is borne out by a comparison with earlier studies (Table 19). First, however, a methodological problem has to be clarified, involving the computation base used in earlier studies. Whereas in 1979 intermarriage was computed against a base of *all current marriages* (couples)—the standard practice—in 1951, 1959, and 1967 intermarriage was reported as a percentage of all *households*. The number of total households is always greater than the number of married couples, since the former includes single as well as married household heads. A comparison between the 1979 and earlier studies cannot proceed, then, without a common denominator of households. Because married couples made up 58 percent of all households in 1979 (Table 13), the 20 percent of all couples who were intermarried (Table 18) is equivalent to 11.7 percent of all Jewish households.

A comparison using a consistent intermarriage rate essentially confirms the expected rise. The 11.7-percent household intermarriage rate reported for 1979 represents a 100-percent increase over the 1967 rate of 5.4 percent and a 125-percent increase over the 4.8-percent rate reported in 1951. The one apparent inconsistency in the figures—a decline from 6.3 percent in 1959 to 5.4 percent in 1967—is a

methodological artifact.³³ Given the tendency toward later marriage, it is probable that the 1979 figures do not reflect the full magnitude of the trend toward increased intermarriage. As more of the 20-year-olds who were surveyed in 1979 marry in their late 20s and early 30s, an even more dramatic increase in the intermarriage rate is likely to be seen.

Socioeconomic Status

EDUCATION

Jewish males and females in 1979 were better educated than non-Hispanic whites. Across all age groups, Jewish males were between 40 and 50 percent more likely than non-Hispanic white males to have gone beyond high school, and twice as likely to be college graduates (Table 20). Jewish females, too, had more education than non-Hispanic white females. Jewish women under age 65 were twice as likely to have gone beyond high school, and between 50 and 60 percent more likely to be college graduates.

Among Jewish males, educational attainment was inversely related to age. The percentage of those who had attended college jumped from 43 percent among those aged 65 and over to 75 percent in the 45–64 age group. The increase in college attendance was less pronounced, but still steady, for males under age 45, 90 percent of whom had attended college. College attendance among Jewish females showed a similar pattern—increasing from 30 percent of the over-65 age cohort to 59 percent of the cohort aged 40–49, to 79 percent of the cohort aged 25–44. The biggest gain among Jewish females was in the proportion graduating from college: those under age 45 were twice as likely as those aged 45–64 to have graduated from college, while the latter, in turn, were twice as likely to have completed college as those over age 65.

The educational gap between Jewish males and Jewish females narrows with age, though never completely closing. Jewish males over age 65 were 1.4 times as likely to have gone beyond high school as Jewish females of the same age group; Jewish males aged 45–64 were 1.3 times as likely to have gone beyond high school, and

³³When intermarriage is calculated as the proportion of all households—as was the case in the 1951, 1959, and 1967 studies—single household heads are counted as if they were in-married couples. As long as the proportion of single-headed households stays constant over time, this does not present a problem. In 1959, however, the percentage of single-headed households was 50 percent lower than in 1951 and 25 percent lower than in 1967. Thus, the high intermarriage rate reported in 1959 reflects the lower proportion of singles, rather than a lower proportion of in-married households. See Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, November 1959; and *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968.

Jewish males under age 45 were 1.14 times as likely to have gone beyond high school. Similarly, Jewish males over age 65 were 2.6 times as likely to be college graduates as Jewish females of the same age; Jewish males aged 45–64 were 2.1 times as likely to be college graduates; and Jewish males under age 45 were 1.4 times as likely to be college graduates.

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

As would be expected, increased education was accompanied by an increase in professionalization, most conspicuously in the years between 1951 and 1967 (Table 21). The proportion of males employed professionally grew by 63 percent between 1951 and 1959, and then by another 42 percent over the next ten years. Beginning in 1967 the professions were the modal category for employed males, although the percentage dropped slightly over the next 12 years. The percentage in the category of "proprietors, managers, and officials" was lower than it had been in the 1950s and 1960s, but was slightly higher than in 1967. The employment of Jewish males in clerical and sales positions declined during the 1950s but leveled off at about 21 percent after 1967. The proportion of males employed in skilled, craft, and unskilled occupations also decreased after the 1950s.

Jewish males worked in higher-status occupations than non-Hispanic white males, with the greatest differences appearing in the professional and retail categories (Table 22). Just as Jewish males were twice as likely as non-Hispanic white males to be college graduates, so also were they twice as likely to be professionals: 32 as against 17 percent. As to choice of profession, Jewish males were more likely to be working in the health area (e.g., as physicians and dentists) and in law, while non-Hispanic white males were more likely to be employed as engineers (Table 23).

The biggest difference between Jews and non-Hispanic whites was in the category of retail business, with Jewish males almost 8 times as likely as non-Hispanic white males to be in self-employed retail management and proprietorship.³⁴ Still, retail ownership was not a primary Jewish occupation in Los Angeles. More Jewish males worked in the professions than in any other category, followed by managerial (21 percent) and sales positions (exclusive of self-employed retail managers and proprietors) (18.2 percent). One out of every five employed Jewish males worked in a clerical, service, skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled position.

— Since no occupational data were reported for working females in earlier studies, it is not possible to chart employment trends for Jewish females in Los Angeles. However, in 1979 the differences reported between Jewish and non-Hispanic white males applied to females as well, with the exception of managerial positions and sales

³⁴The U.S. census reports "Retail self-employed managers" separately from "Supervisor, self-employed," in Sales, as shown in Table 23. The two categories are reported together in Table 22, "Retail-mgr./proprietor."

employment, where the proportions of Jewish and non-Jewish females were about the same (Table 22). Like Jewish males, Jewish females were more likely to be employed in the professions and in retail ownership than their non-Hispanic white counterparts.

Although Jewish females were most likely to be employed as professionals, they tended toward such traditionally female professions as teaching (13.1 percent), librarianship (3.4 percent), and social work (5.5 percent) (Table 23). However, they were also clustered in two "male" professional areas: lawyers and judges (4 times as likely as non-Hispanic whites) and "writers, artists, and athletes" (2.3 times as likely as non-Hispanic whites).

After the professions, Jewish females were next most frequently employed in clerical (i.e., "administrative support") occupations, but less so than non-Hispanic white females, for whom clerical work was the largest category. Jewish females were also much less likely than non-Hispanic white females to be employed in service occupations (5 as against 12 percent) or in skilled, unskilled, and craft positions (5 as against 9 percent).

The biggest difference between Jewish and non-Hispanic white females was in self-employed retail management and proprietorship—Jewish females were 5.4 times as likely to be so employed. Overall, however, only 2.7 percent of working Jewish females were self-employed retail managers and proprietors. They were more likely to be employed in sales (exclusive of self-employed proprietorship), where their rate of participation (14 percent) was almost the same as that of non-Hispanic white females. Within this occupational category, however, Jewish females were more likely to be salaried supervisors and financial representatives than cashiers or retail workers.

Despite differences in occupation and education, the labor-force-participation rates of Jewish females were virtually identical to those of non-Hispanic white females (Table 24). Married females with children in both groups were equally likely to be in the labor force, and in both cases females with children aged 6–17 were more likely to be working than females with children aged 5 and under. In both groups employment was highest among single mothers—78 percent for non-Hispanic white females and 81 percent for Jewish females.

PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION IN JEWISH COMMUNAL LIFE

Except for the neighborhoods around Fairfax Avenue, the Jewish community of Los Angeles is largely invisible. It is the formal institutions and organizations of the community that provide it with its structure. For that reason, it makes sense to employ institutional affiliation as the measure of Jewish identity. Formal affiliation

is defined here as participation in one or more of three major types of associations: synagogues, Jewish organizations, and the local Federation.³⁵

Findings

Of all Jewish households in Los Angeles, 44 percent had some kind of formal affiliation, and 56 percent had none (Table 25). If a Jewish household was formally affiliated, it most likely had a single kind of affiliation. Only 12 percent of Jewish households had two affiliations, and only 5 percent had all three kinds.

Although the Federation is the largest, wealthiest, and most visible Jewish organization in Los Angeles, it was the synagogues and Jewish organizations that were the primary points of formal affiliation. Among Jewish households with one or more affiliations, 39 percent belonged to a synagogue or a Jewish organization (or both), as compared to 14 percent who gave to the Federation. If a household had only one affiliation, it was much more likely to be a synagogue (11 percent) or an organization (12 percent) than the Federation (4 percent). Similarly, those households with two affiliations were much more likely to belong to both a synagogue and an organization (7 percent) than to either of these two and the Federation (2 and 3 percent).

Membership in synagogues and Jewish organizations was divided almost equally between those who were affiliated with either of the two and those who were affiliated with both. Of the 39 percent of Jewish households that claimed membership in either a synagogue or a Jewish organization, 13 percent belonged to a synagogue and not to an organization, 14 percent belonged to a Jewish organization and not to a synagogue, and 12 percent belonged to both. Stated another way, just under half of all synagogue members (48 percent) belonged to a Jewish organization, and just under half (46 percent) of Jewish organization members belonged to a synagogue.

Over the years, the level of synagogue affiliation has remained at about one-quarter of all Jewish households: 24 percent in 1951;³⁶ 27 percent in 1967;³⁷ and 25 percent in 1979. When the growing rate of intermarriage is taken into consideration, the synagogue affiliation rate may actually be seen as increasing since 1967. Intermarriage increased 100 percent between 1967 and 1979, and only 7 percent of intermarried couples had a congregational membership. Thus, if the overall rate of congregational membership remained stable in the face of rising intermarriage, the affiliation rate of in-married couples must have increased. The unusually high rate of congregational membership of 34 percent³⁸ observed in 1959 is linked to the

³⁵For a more extensive discussion of affiliation and Jewish identity in Los Angeles, see Neil C. Sandberg, *Jewish Life in Los Angeles: A Window to Tomorrow* (Washington, D.C., forthcoming).

³⁶Massarik, *Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, p. 31.

³⁷Massarik, *Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Table 20.

³⁸Massarik, *Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, p. 31.

higher marriage rate found in that study, corroborating the positive relationship between marriage and synagogue affiliation that is discussed below.

Federation giving was closely related to other forms of affiliation. Only 4 percent of Los Angeles Jewish households claimed Federation giving as their only formal affiliation, and less than a third (31 percent) of all Federation givers had no other affiliation. Exactly half of all Federation givers were synagogue members, and just over half (53 percent) belonged to an organization. The vast majority (68 percent) of Federation givers were affiliated either with a synagogue or with a Jewish organization.

Respondents could name up to five separate Jewish organizations to which they or their spouses belonged. When the individual Jewish organizations were grouped into eight categories, the most popular in terms of membership (11.7 percent of all households) was that of clubs and social organizations. This category included a diverse range of associations, from Jewish community center groups to groups for singles, young adults, and seniors, and a Jewish Masonic lodge. The next most popular category was women's organizations, such as Hadassah, ORT, Mizrahi Women (now AMIT Women), and the National Council of Jewish Women; 10.4 percent of all Jewish households claimed a membership in a women's organization.

The other categories were all named by less than 5 percent of households. Thus, 4 percent were affiliated with Jewish health and welfare organizations, such as Jewish Big Brothers, Cedars-Sinai Hospital, and the Jewish Home for the Aged. This category was followed by Israel-oriented organizations, such as Habonim, Histadrut (Labor Zionists), ARZA (Reform Zionists), and support groups for Israeli hospitals and universities, which were mentioned by 2.5 percent of the respondents. Jewish "defense" organizations, such as the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Congress, drew 1.8 percent of households, followed by voluntary activities in the Los Angeles Federation, such as working for the Welfare Fund or participation in a Federation committee. Educational and cultural groups were mentioned by 0.8 percent of respondents, and special-interest groups, such as Jewish Marriage Encounter and Jewish homosexual organizations, were mentioned by 0.4 percent.

Affiliation Variables

Affiliation with the Jewish community is related to two sets of social variables: those relating to the type of family or household, and those relating to the place of the household in the social structure of the Los Angeles Jewish community. The family and household variables examined here are age, household type, family-cycle stage, and Jewish status of the spouse (i.e., intermarriage status). The two social-structure variables considered are length of residence in Los Angeles and income.

Family and Household Variables

AGE

Synagogue membership was only loosely related to age: households with respondents aged 36–50 were the most likely to belong; households with respondents 18–35 years old were the least likely to belong; and households with respondents over age 50 were in the middle (Table 26). Organizational membership, on the other hand, was very much related to age—the older the respondents, the greater was the probability of one or more memberships. Federation giving, too, was related to age, with respondents over the age of 36 being between 4.6 and 9 times as likely to give as those under age 36.

Overall patterns of affiliation increased with age, from 26 percent for those under age 36, to 44 percent for those aged 36–50, 58 percent for those aged 51–65, and 68 percent for those aged 65 and over (Table 27). The sharpest increase in affiliation (one, two, and three affiliations) occurred with a move into the 36–50 age group.

HOUSEHOLD TYPE

Single parents, separated or divorced persons, and the never-married were the least likely to be affiliated with any institution (Table 29). Married couples with children and widowed household heads were the most likely to be affiliated. Married couples with children were the most likely to have all three kinds of affiliation (8 percent) as well as two out of the three (21 percent).

Married couples with children were the most likely to belong to a synagogue (44 percent), followed by married couples without children (24 percent), and widows (23 percent) (Table 28). Married couples with children were also the most likely to be Federation givers, along with married couples without children (22 and 20 percent). Widows and widowers were the most likely to belong to a Jewish organization (45 percent), followed by both kinds of married couples (31 percent).

FAMILY-CYCLE STAGE

Synagogue affiliation was lowest for families with no children and a household head under age 40 and highest for families with children aged 6–17 (with a slight dip for families with only teenagers) (Table 30). Synagogue membership was 44 percent higher for families with children of bar-mitzvah age than for families with children under age 6 only. (This is undoubtedly related to the desire for bar-mitzvah preparation, which is a significant—often the only—inducement for Jewish education.)

Although married couples with children were the most likely to belong to a synagogue, fewer than half of them actually did so, and fewer than half (42 percent) of Jewish children aged 6–13 were receiving any Jewish education. Among children

past bar-mitzvah age, religious-school enrollment dropped to 18 percent; in the San Fernando Valley, where most Jewish children lived, only 7 percent of teenagers were enrolled in a Jewish educational program.³⁹

Although children tend to leave Hebrew and religious school after bar mitzvah, their parents apparently maintain ties to the sponsoring synagogue. Synagogue affiliation was the same for families whose children were all past bar-mitzvah age as for those with 6-13-year-olds. Moreover, Jewish families with only teenage children were the most likely to belong to a Jewish organization (43 percent) and to give to the Federation (36 percent).

Among households with no children, those with household heads over age 40 were more likely to be affiliated than those with under-40 heads; the over-40 household heads were almost twice as likely to belong to a synagogue, 6 times as likely to belong to a Jewish organization, and more than 12 times as likely to be Federation givers.

Families with only teenage children were the most likely to have all three kinds of affiliation (20 percent), and households without children with a head under age 40 were the least likely (only 15 percent had any affiliation at all) (Table 31).

INTERMARRIAGE

Intermarried couples had very little formal connection with the Jewish community (Table 32). Only 8 percent belonged to a synagogue (as compared with 42 percent of in-married couples), and only 1.5 percent held membership in a Jewish organization (as compared with 27 percent of in-married couples). None of the intermarried couples in the survey were Federation givers. Overall, the total rate of formal affiliation among intermarried couples was only 8 percent, as compared with 53.2 percent for in-married couples (Table 33).

The affiliation patterns of convert couples are puzzling because they differ substantially from those of in-married couples. The convert couples were more organizationally than congregationally involved, 37 percent claiming affiliation with a Jewish organization and only 10 percent with a synagogue. Also, while a much larger proportion of convert couples than of in-marrieds had all three affiliations, their overall affiliation rate was lower than that of in-married couples. Since the number of convert marriages in the sample was small, the anomalous patterns may simply be a reflection of sample size.

Social-Structure Variables

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES

The number of years lived in Los Angeles was a significant factor in affiliation. For synagogue membership, 6 and 11 years of residence were thresholds at which

³⁹Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

membership increased (by 44 percent and 80 percent respectively) (Table 34). The thresholds for membership in a Jewish organization were 6 and 31 years of residence; after 5 years in Los Angeles, organizational membership doubled, from 10 to 20 percent, and after 30 years it increased another 80 percent. For Federation giving, 11 and 31 years were the thresholds, with the giving rate increasing by 55 percent after 10 years, and by 51 percent after 30 years.

The overall rate of affiliation was also related to length of residence, increasing in the first 20 years, declining in the 21–30-year range, and climbing to its highest in the 31-years-and-over range. Whereas just over one-fifth (22 percent) of Jewish households present in Los Angeles for fewer than 6 years were affiliated, one-third (32 percent) of those in the community 6–10 years, one-half (51 percent) of those in the community between 11 and 20 years, and 57 percent of those in the community 30 years and over had at least one affiliation (Table 35).

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

The relationship between household income and Jewish participation is clearly evident in Los Angeles, with \$30,000 being the threshold figure (Table 36). At \$30,000, synagogue membership increased by 56 percent, organizational membership by 87 percent, and Federation giving by over 400 percent. The number of affiliations also increased with income (Table 37). Households with incomes of \$50,000 and over were the most likely to have all three kinds of affiliation, followed by households with incomes between \$30,000 and \$49,000. Interestingly, households with incomes under \$20,000 were more likely to belong to a Jewish organization, give to the Federation, and have all three affiliations than households with incomes between \$20,000 and \$29,000. This was due to the higher proportion of older persons in the lowest income category, with older people being more likely to participate in community activities.

Mean Affiliation Score

Table 38 summarizes the mean level of affiliation for the family and social-structure variables discussed above with a mean affiliation score. Households were coded as "0" for no affiliation, "1" for one type of affiliation, "2" for two types of affiliation, or "3" for three types of affiliation. The mean affiliation score does not give the average number of total affiliations, but rather the average number of *types* of affiliation. If all Jewish households had one type of affiliation each, the mean affiliation score would be "1." Similarly, if every household had all three kinds of affiliation, the mean affiliation score would be "3." The mean affiliation score for all Jewish households in Los Angeles was 0.065, less than 1, because there were more Jewish households with no affiliations whatsoever—56 percent—than there were with two or three types of affiliation—16.8 percent (Table 25).

Only three groups had mean affiliation scores of 1.00 or higher—married couples with children (1.00); households with only teenage children (1.25); and born Jews married to converts (1.05). Another 12 groups had mean affiliation scores of 0.70 or higher: born Jews married to born Jews (0.98); households headed by persons 51 years of age or older (0.89 and 0.98); households headed by widow(er)s (0.86); households with children aged 6–13 (0.85); households in Los Angeles 31 years or longer (0.84); households with incomes over \$30,000 (0.80 and 0.84); households without children, where the respondent was 40 years and over (0.83); households in Los Angeles between 11 and 20 years (0.78); households headed by persons aged 36–50 (0.71); and married couples with no children (0.71).

Because several of the variables related to affiliation are also related to each other, it is difficult to tell which are the most weighty. Age, for example, is related to marital status (Table 16A), and also, among married couples, to the Jewish status of the spouse (Table 17). Which of the variables discussed, then, are most strongly associated with affiliation? A multiple-regression model was created to deal with this question.

Multiple regression is a statistical technique that measures the degree of correlation between a single dependent variable and a number of independent variables, using a linear equation. The dependent variable that was employed for this analysis is the mean level of affiliation discussed above, and called **AFFILIATION** in the regression model.

Seven independent variables, based on the variables discussed above, were entered into the equation as follows: *AGE*—Age was used as a continuous variable running from 18 to 95. *INCOME*—The 13 categories for income used in the questionnaire were entered into the regression equation rather than the 4 categories used in the discussion above and in Tables 37 and 38. *MARRIED*—Married was entered as a dummy variable based on marital status of the respondent; a married household head was coded "1" and a single household head as "0." *WIDOW*—Widows were seen to have particularly high organizational affiliation, so widowhood was entered as a dummy variable with "1" coded for widow(er) and "0" for all other marital-status categories. *KIDCYCLE*—The family-cycle typology used above was altered to emphasize both the presence and ages of children. Households with no children were coded as "0," households with children only under age 6 were coded as "1," households with children between ages 6 and 13 were coded as "2," and households with children only aged 14 and over were coded as "3." *LAYEARS*—The number of years in Los Angeles was coded as a continuous variable starting with "0" for households that had moved to Los Angeles in 1979. *MARRIAGE*—Marriages between two born Jews and between a born Jew and a convert were coded as "1"; intermarried couples and single household heads were coded as "0."

The stepwise regression model that was used for the analysis orders the independent variables in order of correlation, starting with the variable that has the highest individual correlation. Each subsequent variable is entered into the equation

controlling for the effect of the previous variable(s). The results of the multiple regression are found in Table 39. The simple *R* in the table is the independent correlation coefficient, or the correlation between the independent variable and AFFILIATION, without controlling for the other variables. The beta is the coefficient used in the regression equation for predicting the value of the dependent variable. The *R*-Square is the amount of variance explained by the individual variable combined with all the previous variables. An independent variable that contributes to our understanding of the dependent variable is one that adds to the *R*-Square. In other words, including it in the equation explains additional variance in the dependent variable.

The variable called *MARRIAGE* is the first-ranked variable in the equation, with the highest individual correlation (.36). In other words, being married to another Jew (as opposed to not being married or being married to a non-Jew) is the factor most predictive of affiliation. *AGE* is the next best predictor, followed by *KIDCYCLE*, which takes into account the presence and ages of the children. These are the three most important variables because, taken together, they explain 21 percent of the variance in AFFILIATION.

The remaining four variables, *MARRIED*, *INCOME*, *WIDOW*, and *LA-YEARS*, together explain only an additional 2.4 percent of the variance in AFFILIATION. In other words, being married to a born Jew is more important for affiliation than simply being married. Similarly, being elderly (as reflected in *AGE*) is a better predictor of affiliation than the particular marital status of widowhood.

The biggest surprise of the regression analysis is the fifth-place rank and relatively low correlation of *INCOME* with AFFILIATION. Once the family variables (marital status, type of marriage, and ages of children in the household) are held constant, the correlation between *INCOME* and AFFILIATION is greatly reduced.

In summary, although all the variables were found to be associated with the degree of affiliation presented first in the cross-categorical analysis (i.e., combinations of affiliation with the Federation, a synagogue, and Jewish organizations), it is the family-related variables that are the best predictors of affiliation. In-married families with older children in the household had the greatest degree of formal affiliation with the Los Angeles Jewish community.

IS LOS ANGELES DIFFERENT?

To round out the analysis, it would be well to take a brief look at Los Angeles Jews in the broader context of American Jewry. Toward that end, Los Angeles is here compared with the other "big three" Jewish communities of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The comparison is based on three dimensions: age and family structure, intermarriage, and affiliation.

Age and Family Structure

Given the popular images of hedonistic, freewheeling California, one would expect there to be proportionately fewer Jewish families in Los Angeles than elsewhere. This is partly true (Table 40). Los Angeles has a lower proportion of Jewish married couples with children than does either New York or Chicago (24 percent in Los Angeles vs. 30 percent in New York and 36 percent in Chicago), but it has almost the same proportion as Philadelphia (26 percent). Thus, Los Angeles can be said to be part of a larger demographic pattern rather than to stand by itself.

When age is taken into account, Los Angeles appears even less deviant, for it has the same proportion of children as New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago (Table 41). Los Angeles, however, has a larger share of the young-adult cohort (aged 30–39)—17 percent of Los Angeles Jews as against 14 percent of New York and Philadelphia Jews—a difference that may help to explain the smaller percentage of married couples with children. As noted above (see Table 16A), since 16 percent of the 30–39-year-olds in Los Angeles have never been married, and another 13 percent have been separated or divorced, 30 percent (including 0.8 percent who are widowed) of this age cohort are single. With most of these individuals living in single-person households, the effect is to lower the proportion of households with children.

Los Angeles also has fewer elderly Jews than the other three communities: 22 percent of New York Jews and 23 percent of Philadelphia Jews are 60 and over, as compared with only 16 percent of Los Angeles Jews. Or, put another way, there are 1.4 elderly Jews in New York and Philadelphia for every 1 elderly Jew in Los Angeles. In Chicago, 15 percent of the Jewish population is 65 and over as compared with 11 percent in Los Angeles—again a ratio of almost 1.4 to 1.

The lower percentage of the elderly and the higher percentage of young adults in Los Angeles are both associated with migration. Since Los Angeles is not the retirement city that Miami is, migrants have tended to be younger rather than older. Further, since half of all Jewish household heads have come to Los Angeles only since 1959, they have not resided there long enough to become elderly.

Intermarriage

The intermarriage rate has historically been higher in the West than in the Midwest or East. A study using data from 1964 found that Jews born in the West were up to 2.6 times as likely to intermarry as Jews born in the Northeast and almost twice as likely to intermarry as Jews born in the North Central states.⁴⁰ Reviewing more recent community studies (i.e., since 1979), Charles Silberman found that

⁴⁰Fred Solomon Sherrow, "Patterns of Religious Intermarriage Among American College Students," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University (University Microfilm #72-28, 099), 1971, p. 103.

intermarriage rates continued to be higher in the West than anywhere else in the country.⁴¹

Within the West, Los Angeles has the lowest intermarriage rate of any community studied thus far (Table 42). For those under the age of 30—the cohort in which intermarriage is highest—the intermarriage rates (for couples) are 66 and 60 percent in Denver and Phoenix respectively, as compared with 49 percent in Los Angeles. For the 30–39 age group, the couple intermarriage rate in Denver is 40 percent, nearly twice as high as the 21-percent rate in Los Angeles.

Affiliation

Statistics on affiliation show that Los Angeles Jews are less likely to belong to Jewish organizations than are Chicago Jews, and are much less likely to do so than Philadelphia Jews (Table 43). Only 25 percent of Los Angeles Jewish households belong to a synagogue, as compared with 41 percent or more in Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago. The statistics on Federation giving follow the same pattern: only 14 percent of Los Angeles Jewish households gave to the Federation as compared with 26 percent in New York.⁴²

To sum up: it is clear that the Los Angeles Jewish community is different from the large Jewish communities of the Midwest and the East in certain key aspects. Its population is younger overall, it has a higher intermarriage rate, and its Jews are much less likely to be affiliated with the organized community than Jews elsewhere. At the same time, marriage and family patterns of Los Angeles Jews closely resemble those in other communities.

Looking to the Future

If New York symbolizes continuity with the Jewish past, Los Angeles represents the emergence of a new Jewish America in the Sunbelt, particularly in the West. This second Jewish America is distinctive in that it has no significant European roots, its cultural heritage is more Wild West than Lower East Side, and its members

⁴¹Charles E. Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York, 1985), p. 294.

A direct comparison of Western with Eastern and Midwestern cities is not feasible either because the intermarriage data have not been published or because they are not clearly comparable. However, to provide some basis for comparison, it is worthwhile to report estimates of the individual intermarriage rate for the under-35 population, as cited by Silberman, based on correspondence with various study directors: New York Metropolitan Area, 13 percent; St. Louis, 14 percent; Chicago, 20 percent; Philadelphia, 24 percent; Cleveland, 24 percent.

⁴²The Federation's estimate of the number of givers is higher, but at any rate is not higher than the giving rate in New York. See also Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, "The Social Characteristics of the New York Area Jewish Community, 1981," *AJYB*, Vol. 84, 1984, p. 133.

have few cultural reference points in common. Nevertheless, there is a growing community in the West, with Los Angeles its acknowledged capital. This fact has been recognized by the three main religious groups in Jewish life, which have established branches of their schools of higher learning in Los Angeles.⁴³

For Jewish communities in the West, the issues of intermarriage, migration, and affiliation are particularly acute. Rather than counting on affiliation as part of the natural course of the Jewish life cycle, the organized Jewish community is increasingly thinking in terms of outreach. The Hebrew Union College, for example, is developing a museum-outreach center situated in the Sepulveda Pass between the westside and the Valley. The Council on Jewish Life of the Jewish Federation Council sponsors a task force on synagogue affiliation as well as a commission on outreach to intermarrieds.

Additional help may come from an unexpected quarter. Situated as it is on the eastern shore of the "Pacific rim," Los Angeles has attracted growing numbers of Asian immigrants—Japanese, Chinese, Thais, Filipinos, Koreans, Laotians, Cambodians, and Samoans. In addition, because it is only a two-hour drive from Mexico, Los Angeles is a natural destination for Spanish-speaking immigrants—both documented and undocumented. (Los Angeles is already the second-largest Spanish-speaking city in the world, after Mexico City.) Immigration has had such an impact on Los Angeles that *Time* magazine recently called it "the New Ellis Island."⁴⁴ As the population of Los Angeles becomes increasingly varied, ethnicity could easily become the city's dominant cultural motif. Such a development might spur Los Angeles Jews to strengthen their own sense of identity and community as part of the expanding ethnic mosaic.

Whatever the future holds, one thing is clear. Los Angeles will remain the largest Jewish community as well as the Jewish institutional center of a rapidly growing western region. This includes Dallas, Houston, Denver, Phoenix, San Francisco, and Orange County—all with Jewish communities that have doubled their populations over the last decade. These communities represent the new face of American Jewry.

BRUCE A. PHILLIPS

⁴³These are the West Coast branch of the Hebrew Union College, representing the Reform movement; the University of Judaism, which is the West Coast branch of the Jewish Theological Seminary; and Yeshiva University of Los Angeles.

⁴⁴*Time*, June 13, 1983, pp. 18–27.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. GENERAL AND JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1880-1980: ABSOLUTE NUMBERS, GROWTH RATE, AND JEWISH DENSITY

Year	General		Jewish		Jewish Density ^b (Percent)
	Population Size	Growth ^a (Percent)	Population Size	Growth ^a (Percent)	
1880	33,381	—	136	—	0.4
1890	101,454	200	No estimate	—	—
1900	170,298	68	2,500	—	1.5
1910	489,322	180	9,000	260	1.8
1920	880,862	80	31,500	250	3.6
1930	2,066,460	135	72,041	128	3.5
1940	2,621,372	27	103,634	44	4.0
1950	3,900,920	49	272,100	163	7.0
1960	5,615,748	44	400,000	47	6.8
1970	6,579,585	17	444,934	11	6.8
1980	7,116,066	8	503,000	13	7.1

Sources: U.S. Census of Population (not including Long Beach). Jewish population estimates for 1880 to 1920 are from Max Vorspan and Lloyd Gartner, *History of the Jews of Los Angeles* (Philadelphia, 1970). Estimates for 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960 are extrapolated from the AJYB figures for 1927, 1937, 1944, 1948, 1954, 1959, and 1964. The 1970 estimate was provided by Dr. Fred Massarik in an unpublished report to the Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles. The 1980 estimate is from Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

^aRelative to the previous decade, for example:

$$\text{Change}_{1960-1970} = \frac{(\text{Population}_{1970} - \text{Population}_{1960})}{\text{Population}_{1960}}$$

^bJewish households as a percent of Los Angeles County households, minus Long Beach households.

TABLE 2A. DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND NAMED COMMUNITY, 1951-1979

Area & Community	1951	1959	1970	1974	1979
Urban Core	64,818	56,699	51,737	43,056	60,405
Wilshire Fairfax	8,446	9,294	9,188	8,790	9,890
Beverly Fairfax	8,627	9,371	11,725	8,547	13,619
Hollywood	18,096	15,337	23,517	21,509	23,416
Central Wilshire	7,815	5,308	3,149	1,256	5,642
Northeast-Downtown	2,228	5,228	764	1,256	3,852
East Los Angeles	8,069	4,967	743	159	0
Baldwin Hills-West Adams	8,728	5,813	2,131	1,053	1,915
Jefferson-University	2,809	1,381	520	486	2,071
Western Area	23,068	28,993	44,294	52,039	54,877
B.W.-C.H.-M.V.-C.C. ^a	9,853	13,124	20,596	21,840	15,244
Beverly Hills	10,929	6,563	7,705	10,050	8,890
Westwood-Brentwood	incl. above	5,038	9,112	10,299	22,626
Santa Monica	2,286	4,268	6,881	9,850	8,117
San Fernando Valley	10,165	22,827	40,997	51,286	72,136
North & West Valley	incl. above	3,776	7,975	10,287	13,537
Reseda-Encino	" "	3,767	9,992	14,113	14,043
Van Nuys-Sherman Oaks	" "	4,157	10,743	12,722	19,900
North Hollywd-Burbank	" "	6,456	10,007	10,405	16,168
Sunland-Glendale	" "	4,671	2,280	3,759	8,488
Eastern Area	2,067	4,859	9,350	8,305	11,893
San Gabriel Valley	1,553	4,345	7,700	7,000	9,665
Pasadena-Altadena	514	514	1,650	1,305	2,228
Southern Area	6,780	6,982	10,200	8,670	20,805
Westchester-Inglewood	2,075	2,139	4,010	1,890	2,862
South Los Angeles	3,498	3,386	3,780	3,420	8,590
Beach Cities & South	1,207	1,457	2,410	3,360	9,353
Total	106,898	120,360	156,578	163,356	220,116

Sources (2A, 2B, 2C): Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, January 1953; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Nov. 1959; Fred Massarik, *Jewish Population Indicator Reports I, II, III, IV, and Special Analysis Memo Number 4*, Jewish Federation Council Community Planning Department, mimeo, 1976; Bruce A. Phillips, *Analysis of the 1974 Jewish Population Indicator Reports*, Jewish Federation Council Community Planning Department, mimeo, 1976; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

^aBeverlywood, Cheviot Hills, Mar Vista, & Culver City

TABLE 2B. CHANGES IN DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND NAMED COMMUNITY, 1951-1979 (PERCENT)

Area & Community	Percent Change				
	1951-59	1959-70	1970-79	[1970-74	1974-79]
Urban Core	-12.5	-8.8	16.8	[-16.8	40.3]
Wilshire Fairfax	10.0	-1.1	7.6	[-4.3	12.5]
Beverly Fairfax	8.6	25.1	16.2	[-27.1	59.3]
Hollywood	-15.2	53.3	-0.4	[-8.5	8.9]
Central Wilshire	-32.1	-40.7	79.2	[-60.1	349.2]
Northeast-Downtown	134.6	-85.4	404.2	[64.4	206.7]
East Los Angeles	-38.4	-85.0	-100.0	[-78.6	-100.0]
Baldwin Hills-West Adams	-33.4	-63.3	-10.1	[-50.6	81.9]
Jefferson-University	-50.8	-62.3	298.3	[-6.5	326.1]
Western Area	25.7	52.8	23.9	[17.5	5.5]
B.W.-C.H.-M.V.-C.C. ^a	33.2	56.9	-26.0	[6.0	-30.2]
Beverly Hills	6.1	17.4	15.4	[30.4	-11.5]
Westwood-Brentwood	incl. above	80.9	148.3	[13.0	119.7]
Santa Monica	86.7	61.2	18.0	[43.1	-17.6]
San Fernando Valley	124.6	79.6	76.0	[25.1	40.7]
North & West Valley	incl. above	111.2	69.7	[29.0	31.6]
Reseda-Encino	" "	165.3	40.5	[41.2	-0.5]
Van Nuys-Sherman Oaks	" "	158.4	85.2	[18.4	56.4]
North Hollywd-Burbank	" "	55.0	61.6	[4.0	55.4]
Sunland-Glendale	" "	-51.2	272.3	[64.9	125.8]
Eastern Area	135.1	92.4	27.2	[-11.2	43.2]
San Gabriel Valley	179.8	77.2	25.5	[-9.1	38.1]
Pasadena-Altadena	0.0	220.8	35.0	[-20.9	70.7]
Southern Area	3.0	46.1	104.0	[-15.0	40.0]
Westchester-Inglewood	3.1	87.5	-28.6	[-52.9	51.4]
South Los Angeles	-3.2	11.6	127.2	[-9.5	151.2]
Beach Cities & South	20.7	65.4	288.1	[39.4	178.4]

^aBeverlywood, Cheviot Hills, Mar Vista, & Culver City

TABLE 2C. JEWISH POPULATION OF GEOGRAPHIC AREAS AND NAMED COMMUNITIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOS ANGELES JEWISH POPULATION, 1951-1979

Area & Community	1951	1959	1970	1974	1979
Urban Core	60.6	47.1	33.0	26.4	27.4
Wilshire Fairfax	7.9	7.7	5.9	5.4	4.5
Beverly Fairfax	8.1	7.8	7.5	5.2	6.2
Hollywood	16.9	12.7	15.0	13.2	10.6
Central Wilshire	7.3	4.4	2.0	0.8	2.6
Northeast-Downtown	2.1	4.3	0.5	0.8	1.7
East Los Angeles	7.5	4.1	0.5	0.1	0.0
Baldwin Hills-West Adams	8.2	4.8	1.4	0.6	0.9
Jefferson-University	2.6	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.9
Western Area	21.6	24.1	28.3	31.9	24.9
B.W.-C.H.-M.V.-C.C. ^a	9.2	10.9	13.2	13.4	6.9
Beverly Hills	10.2	5.5	4.9	6.2	4.0
Westwood-Brentwood	incl. above	4.2	5.8	6.3	10.3
Santa Monica	2.1	3.5	4.4	6.0	3.7
San Fernando Valley	9.5	19.0	26.2	31.4	32.8
North & West Valley	incl. above	3.1	5.1	6.3	6.1
Reseda-Encino	" "	3.1	6.4	8.6	6.4
Van Nuys-Sherman Oaks	" "	3.5	6.9	7.8	9.0
North Hollywd-Burbank	" "	5.4	6.4	6.4	7.3
Sunland-Glendale	" "	3.9	1.5	2.3	3.9
Eastern Area	1.9	4.0	6.0	5.1	5.4
San Gabriel Valley	1.5	3.6	4.9	4.3	4.4
Pasadena-Altadena	0.5	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.0
Southern Area	6.3	5.8	6.5	5.3	9.5
Westchester-Inglewood	1.9	1.8	2.6	1.2	1.3
South Los Angeles	3.3	2.8	2.4	2.1	3.9
Beach Cities & South	1.1	1.2	1.5	2.1	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

^aBeverlywood, Cheviot Hills, Mar Vista, & Culver City

TABLE 3. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLD HEADS IN LOS ANGELES BY YEAR OF SURVEY, 1951-1979 (PERCENT)

Years in Los Angeles	Year of Survey			
	1951	1959	1967	1979
0-5	61.7	12.3	14.2	13.9
6-10	22.8	15.1	6.9	12.9
11-15	[15.6]	25.9	16.0	[17.9]
16-20	[]	[46.7]	19.2	[]
21-30	[]	[]	26.2	26.7
30 +	[]	[]	23.9	28.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percentage in Los Angeles 10 years or more:	15.6	72.6	78.9	73.2

Sources: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, Jan., 1953; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Nov., 1959; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 4. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF JEWISH HOUSEHOLD HEADS IN LOS ANGELES BY COMMUNITY, 1979 (PERCENT)

Years in Los Angeles	Community						
	Beverly Fairfax W. Hollywood	Silverlake		Santa Monica		Venice	
		Los Feliz	Hollywood	Beverly Hills	Palisades Malibu	Mar Vista Culver	Cheviot W.L.A. Beverwood
0-5	20.0	20.8		11.2	26.3	26.9	9.9
6-10	6.0	8.5		6.5	18.6	10.7	12.6
11-20	18.2	23.3		14.4	17.5	18.2	15.0
21-30	19.5	7.6		36.0	14.6	27.4	29.3
30 +	35.5	39.8		31.8	23.0	16.8	33.1
Total	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Years in Los Angeles	North & West Valley	Central Valley		Encino Tarzana Sh. Oaks		North Hollywood		Southern Area		Eastern Area	
0-5	12.4	6.6		10.0		4.6		14.7		11.6	
6-10	15.8	18.2		16.6		24.8		11.4		3.4	
11-20	17.1	20.2		18.9		24.7		20.3		17.9	
21-30	26.3	39.6		28.3		33.9		29.9		37.0	
30 +	28.4	15.3		26.2		12.1		23.7		30.2	
Total	100.0	100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0	

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles*, 1980.

TABLE 5. PLACE OF BIRTH OF BORN JEWS 18 AND OVER BY YEAR OF SURVEY, 1951-1979 (PERCENT)

Place of Birth	Year of Survey			
	1951	1959	1967	1979
Los Angeles	8.3	11.8	not	14.1
Other U.S.	52.1	53.6	available	57.3
Foreign born	39.6	34.6		28.6
Total	100.0	100.0		100.0

Source: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Nov., 1959; Table 18 compares 1959 and 1951; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 6. PLACE OF BIRTH OF BORN JEWS 18 AND OVER BY AGE, 1979 (PERCENT)

Place of Birth	Age				
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+	All
New England	2.5	2.2	3.5	4.5	3.7
Mid-Atlantic	15.2	34.3	39.2	27.8	28.8
East North-Central	15.2	14.2	15.1	19.3	16.8
West North-Central	2.9	3.4	1.0	3.6	3.0
South Atlantic	2.9	3.0	0.5	3.2	2.6
E. & W. South-Central	1.5	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.7
Mountain	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.8
Pacific	0.0	0.7	0.5	0.2	0.3
Los Angeles	39.2	17.9	14.1	2.8	14.1
Other California	2.5	3.0	0.5	0.8	1.5
U.S. not specific	2.9	0.4	3.5	2.1	2.1
Foreign born	14.7	18.3	21.6	35.0	25.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 7. PLACE OF BIRTH OF BORN JEWS 18 AND OVER BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES, 1979 (PERCENT)

Place of Birth	Years in Los Angeles				
	5 or Less	6-10	11-20	21-30	30+
New England	5.5	7.6	1.6	2.0	3.2
Mid-Atlantic	29.5	36.2	41.9	24.1	25.1
East North-Central	13.3	21.6	14.2	16.3	17.6
West North-Central	4.4	2.1	0.7	2.8	3.7
South Atlantic	3.9	2.3	3.4	3.4	1.7
E. & W. South-Central	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.4	0.0
Mountain	1.1	0.5	0.0	0.5	1.1
Pacific	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.4	0.3
Foreign born	33.0	20.4	28.4	17.5	21.3
U.S. not specific	3.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.7
California	6.2	8.3	7.2	29.9	25.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 8. PLACE OF BIRTH OF WHITE AND JEWISH POPULATIONS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Place of Birth	All Whites ^a	Jewish Population Only		
		All Ages	Adults	Children
Born in California	41.2	29.9	16.0	73.6
Out of state	40.3	48.0	58.0	15.4
Northeast	(10.4)	(26.8)	(33.5)	(5.8)
North Central	(16.8)	(17.3)	(20.4)	(7.7)
South	(7.6)	(3.0)	(3.4)	(1.8)
Other Mountain & Pacific	(5.4)	(0.9)	(1.2)	(0.0)
Foreign born	18.5	22.1	25.6	11.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB-25; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

^aAll whites, including Hispanics and Jews, are incorporated in this tabulation.

TABLE 9. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY YEAR OF SURVEY, 1951-1979 (PERCENT)

Age	Year of Survey			
	1951	1959	1967	1979
0-4	8.2	10.0	7.1	4.3
5-9	7.7	10.4	7.4	5.5
10-14	5.8	8.7	10.3	6.3
15-19	5.3	6.4	8.3	7.2
20-24	4.9	3.5	4.5	6.2
25-29	6.8	5.0	3.9	10.4
30-34	8.0	8.0	4.7	9.2
35-39	11.0	8.6	7.7	8.1
40-44	9.1	8.1	8.9	5.3
45-49	7.1	7.0	6.0	6.8
50-54	6.4	6.5	5.0	6.8
55-59	6.2	5.2	5.0	7.5
60-64	5.3	4.4	4.2	5.3
65-69	[]	4.1	3.8	4.2
70-74	[6.9]	2.1	[]	3.1
75-79	[]	1.1	[8.4]	1.9
80 +	[]	0.8	[]	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, Jan. 1953; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, November 1959; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 10. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH POPULATIONS BY 5-, 10-, AND 15-YEAR COHORTS, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Age	5-Year Cohorts		Age	10- & 15-Year Cohorts	
	White	Jewish		White	Jewish
0-4	4.7	4.3	0-9	9.4	9.8
5-9	4.7	5.5	10-19	13.6	13.5
10-14	6.0	6.3	20-29	18.0	16.6
15-19	7.6	7.2	30-39	14.9	17.3
20-24	9.1	6.2	40-49	10.9	12.1
25-29	8.9	10.4	50-59	13.2	14.3
30-34	8.2	9.2	60-69	10.6	9.5
35-39	6.6	8.1	70+	9.6	6.9
40-44	5.4	5.3	Total	100.0	100.0
45-49	5.4	6.8			
50-54	6.3	6.8	0-19	23.0	23.3
55-59	6.8	7.5			
60-64	5.8	5.3	20-35	26.2	25.8
65-69	4.8	4.2	35-50	17.5	20.2
70-74	3.7	3.1	50-65	18.9	19.6
75-79	2.7	1.9	65+	14.4	11.1
80+	3.2	1.9	Total	100.0	100.0
Total	100.0	100.0			

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB-1; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*. Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 11. HOUSEHOLD TYPES, NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Household Type	White	Jewish
Married couple	50.1	57.6
With children	19.8	24.3
No children	30.4	33.3
Single-headed	49.9	42.4
With children	5.5	4.0
No children	44.4	38.4
Percent of all households that include children:	25.3	28.3

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, computed from Tables PB2, PB3, PB7, PB8, and PB18; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980.

TABLE 12. MARITAL HISTORY OF ALL EVER-MARRIED PERSONS, AGED 15-54, NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Marital History	White	Jewish
Never widowed or divorced	64.4	74.6
Widowed only	2.3	3.7
Ever divorced	33.3	21.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB23; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study*, 1979.

TABLE 13. JEWISH HOUSEHOLD TYPES BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA, 1979 (PERCENT)

Household Type	Geographic Area					
	Urban Core	Western Area	S.F. Valley	Southern Area	Eastern Area	All Areas
Married couple with children	11.4	16.3	37.4	22.5	29.5	24.3
Married couple no children	29.7	36.4	33.2	36.9	29.2	33.3
Single parent	1.8	4.3	3.8	12.5	2.7	4.0
Never married	25.4	23.6	7.7	16.6	16.2	17.2
Widow(er)	16.5	7.7	9.1	3.5	12.5	10.2
Sep./div.	15.1	11.8	8.8	8.1	10.0	11.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 14. JEWISH HOUSEHOLD TYPES BY COMMUNITY, 1979 (PERCENT)

Household Type	Community						
	Beverly Fairfax W. Hollywood	Silverlake Los Feliz Hollywood	Beverly Hills	Santa Monica Palisades Malibu	Venice Mar Vista Culver	Cheviot W.L.A. Bevwood	Westwood Brentwood
Married couple with children	13.7	0.0	35.1	20.4	6.7	7.9	13.3
Married couple no children	27.0	43.3	40.3	23.9	38.2	37.4	41.3
Single parent	2.2	0.0	0.0	8.6	5.9	2.6	4.3
Never married	22.3	41.0	9.2	25.7	34.2	30.3	19.7
Widow(er)	18.1	8.5	11.0	8.6	0.0	10.4	7.3
Sep./div.	16.7	7.2	4.5	12.9	15.0	11.3	14.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Household Type	Encino					All Areas
	North & West Valley	Central Valley	Tarzana Sh. Oaks	North Hollywood	Southern Area	
Married couple with children	53.0	29.7	21.5	26.7	22.5	24.3
Married couple no children	30.5	35.4	26.4	42.5	36.9	33.3
Single parent	1.2	8.3	3.8	3.5	12.5	4.0
Never married	4.0	6.5	17.8	8.6	16.6	17.2
Widow(er)	5.0	7.6	14.9	15.5	3.5	10.2
Sep./div.	6.3	12.5	15.5	3.2	8.1	11.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 15. JEWISH FAMILY-CYCLE STAGE BY COMMUNITY, 1979 (PERCENT)

Family-Cycle Stage	Community							
	Beverly Fairfax W.Hollywood	Silverlake Los Feliz Hollywood	Beverly Hills	Santa Monica Palisades Malibu	Venice Mar Vista Culver	Cheviot W.L.A. Bevwood	Westwood Brentwood	
Children								
Under 6 only	7.4	0.0	2.7	2.1	2.1	1.7	0.0	
6-13	5.3	0.0	23.4	19.3	9.9	8.0	6.6	
14-17 only	3.5	0.0	9.9	7.5	3.3	1.0	9.2	
No Children								
Head under 40	26.7	49.1	12.3	39.7	55.6	37.8	38.8	
Head over 40	57.2	50.9	51.7	31.4	29.1	51.5	45.4	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Family-Cycle Stage	North & West Valley	Central Valley	Encino Tarzana Sh. Oaks	North Hollywood	Southern Area	Eastern Area	All Areas	
Children								
Under 6 only	10.0	17.7	0.0	12.2	5.3	4.7	6.3	
6-13	36.2	14.9	11.4	13.8	20.4	18.1	15.6	
14-17 only	8.0	6.1	15.1	5.2	7.9	7.1	6.4	
No Children								
Head under 40	14.8	22.5	21.6	22.4	31.0	34.3	28.6	
Head over 40	30.9	38.7	51.8	46.4	35.4	35.9	43.1	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 16A. MARITAL STATUS OF JEWS BY 10-YEAR COHORTS, 1967 AND 1979 (PERCENT)

Marital Status	Cohort and Year			
	20-29		30-39	
	1967	1979	1967	1979
Never married	50.9	58.8	6.2	16.1
Married	43.6	34.0	87.8	70.5
Widow(er)	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.8
Sep./div.	5.5	7.2	3.9	12.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Marital Status	40-49		50-59	
	1967	1979	1967	1979
Never married	4.8	3.7	1.0	0.9
Married	86.5	81.2	91.1	83.1
Widow(er)	2.0	1.6	4.2	8.2
Sep./div.	6.8	13.6	3.7	7.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Marital Status	60 +		All Ages	
	1967	1979	1967	1979
Never married	3.5	2.2	19.7	18.2
Married	68.7	61.9	69.3	64.2
Widow(er)	22.7	28.2	6.6	8.1
Sep./div.	4.4	7.7	4.4	9.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968, Table 5; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979*.

TABLE 16B. MARITAL STATUS OF JEWS BY 5- AND 10-YEAR COHORTS, 1979
(PERCENT)

Marital Status	Cohort			
	18-24	25-29	30-34	35-39
Never married	80.1	38.0	23.0	8.3
Married	12.6	54.8	63.5	78.5
Widow(er)	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8
Sep./div.	7.3	7.2	12.7	12.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Marital Status				
	40-49	50-59	60-69	70 +
Never married	3.7	0.9	1.4	3.3
Married	81.2	83.1	72.1	48.4
Widow(er)	1.6	8.2	19.7	39.5
Sep./div.	13.6	7.8	6.8	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 17. INTERMARRIAGE STATUS OF SPOUSES OF CURRENTLY MARRIED BORN JEWS BY AGE AND SEX, 1979 (PERCENT)

Status of Spouse	Age and Sex of Born Jew					
	18-29		30-39		40-49	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Born Jew	70.4	60.2	82.8	88.5	90.1	88.7
Convert	3.4	4.6	2.7	0.7	6.1	0.9
Non-Jew	26.2	35.3	14.5	10.8	3.9	10.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Status of Spouse	50 +		All Ages	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Born Jew	90.8	92.4	87.3	85.2
Convert	2.0	1.6	3.1	1.7
Non-Jew	7.0	6.0	9.6	13.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 18. INTERMARRIAGE STATUS OF MARRIED COUPLES WITH AT LEAST ONE BORN-JEWISH SPOUSE, BY AGE OF RESPONDENT, 1979 (PERCENT)

Status of Couple	Age of Respondent ^a				All Ages
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50+	
Born Jew-born Jew	44.8	76.5	80.6	83.9	75.5
Born Jew-convert	6.3	2.6	6.1	3.6	4.2
Born Jew-non-Jew	48.9	20.8	13.3	12.5	20.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Conversion rate ^b	11.4	11.1	31.4	22.4	17.3

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe intermarriage rates by age in Tables 17 and 18 do not correspond exactly. Table 18 is based only on the age of the respondent, Jew or non-Jew. Table 17 includes the ages of all Jewish spouses, males and females, either of whom may have been counted as the respondent in Table 18.

^bMarriages to converts as a percentage of all exogamous marriages (i.e., marriages to converts + marriages to non-Jews).

TABLE 19. INTERMARRIAGE RATE (BORN JEW MARRIED TO NON-JEW) BY YEAR OF SURVEY, 1951-1979

	Year of Survey			
	1951	1959	1967	1979
Percentage of Households with Intermarried Couple	4.8	6.3	5.4	11.7

Sources: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, Jan. 1953; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Nov. 1959; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968; Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 20. EDUCATION OF NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH POPULATIONS BY AGE AND SEX, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Education	Males					
	White			Jewish		
	25-44	45-64	65+	25-44	45-64	65+
Elementary	2.2	7.8	25.8	0.5	0.9	17.9
Some h.s.	6.7	12.3	17.6	1.4	3.2	7.1
H.S. grad.	25.5	31.3	26.5	7.8	20.6	32.1
Some college	29.5	21.4	15.1	20.7	19.3	10.7
College grad.	36.1	27.2	15.0	69.6	56.0	32.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<u>Jewish/White Ratio^a</u>						
Some college				1.4	1.5	1.4
Some college & college grad.				1.9	2.1	2.1
Education	Females					
	White			Jewish		
	25-44	45-64	65+	25-44	45-64	65+
Elementary	2.2	6.8	25.6	0.4	2.7	19.4
Some h.s.	8.1	13.8	18.0	0.7	4.1	6.8
H.S. grad.	35.9	43.7	32.5	19.9	34.5	44.3
Some college	29.3	22.3	14.7	28.5	32.3	17.0
College grad.	24.4	13.4	9.2	50.5	26.4	12.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<u>Jewish/White Ratio^a</u>						
Some college				2.1	2.0	1.4
Some college & college grad.				1.5	1.6	1.2

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB48; Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

$$^a \text{Jewish/White Ratio} = \frac{\% \text{ of Jews}}{\% \text{ of whites}}$$

TABLE 21. OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED JEWISH MALES BY YEAR OF SURVEY, 1951-1979 (PERCENT)

Occupational Category	Year of Survey			
	1951	1959	1967	1979
Professional & semiprofessional	15.3	24.9	35.4	33.7
Proprietors, managers, officials	35.5	30.5	23.5	28.8
Clerical and sales occupations	28.3	24.2	20.8	21.5
Skilled, crafts, and unskilled	19.2	17.5	16.6	13.6
Service occupations	1.7	2.9	3.8	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles*, Los Angeles Jewish Community Council, Jan. 1953; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1959*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Nov. 1959; Fred Massarik, *A Report on the Jewish Population of Los Angeles, 1968*, Research Service Bureau, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1968; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study*, 1979.

TABLE 22. OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH POPULATIONS BY SEX: SUMMARY, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Occupational Category ^a	Males		Females	
	White	Jewish	White	Jewish
Managerial-excl. retail props.	16.8	21.0	11.4	11.6
Professional	16.5	31.5	15.4	35.7
Retail-mgr./prop.	1.0	7.8	0.5	2.7
Technicians	3.6	2.2	2.8	0.3
Sales-excl. retail superv.	10.9	18.2	12.1	13.7
Administrative support	7.8	3.3	36.2	26.5
Service	6.8	4.2	12.0	4.6
Skilled, unskilled, & craft	36.4	13.6	9.2	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Summary Tape File #4, PB57; Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study*, 1979.

^aFull and part-time employed males and females.

TABLE 23. OCCUPATIONS OF NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH POPULATIONS BY SEX: DETAILED, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Occupational Category ^a	Males		Females	
	White	Jewish	White	Jewish
<u>Executive, Administ., & Managerial</u>				
Public administration	0.2	1.1	0.1	2.7
Manufacturing	4.1	3.3	1.2	0.6
[Retail, self-employed]	0.3	2.6	0.2	0.6
Retail, salaried	1.6	1.1	1.1	0.9
Other	7.1	8.6	5.2	5.2
Management-related	3.9	6.6	3.8	2.1
<u>Professional</u>				
Architects	0.3	3.1	0.0	0.3
Engineers	4.1	0.0	0.3	0.0
Surveyors	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.3
Nat. sci., math, computer sci.	0.9	1.3	0.5	0.3
Health, diagnosis	1.6	7.7	0.3	0.9
Health, assessment	0.5	1.3	3.3	3.7
Teachers, elem. & second.	1.5	1.3	5.1	13.1
Other teach. & librarians	1.3	1.1	1.8	3.4
Social scientists	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.6
Social, rec. & relig. wrkrs.	0.6	0.4	0.7	5.5
Lawyers & judges	1.6	7.0	0.4	1.5
Wrtr-Artst-Entrtnr-Athlte	3.6	4.0	2.7	6.1
<u>Technicians</u>				
Health, excl. nurses	0.3	0.7	0.8	0.3
Lic. nurses	0.0	1.5	0.7	0.0
Other	3.3	0.0	1.3	0.0
<u>Sales</u>				
[Supervisor, self-employed]	0.7	5.1	0.3	2.1
Supervisor, Salaried	1.5	3.5	0.9	2.7
Representatives:				
-finance	3.2	4.0	2.8	5.5
-commodities, excl. retail	2.5	3.1	0.9	0.6
Workers:				
-retail	2.7	5.5	4.5	2.1
-non-retail	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.0

Continued on next page

TABLE 23—(Continued)

Occupational Category ^a	Males		Females	
	White	Jewish	White	Jewish
Cashiers	0.6	0.2	2.6	1.8
Sales-related	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.9
<u>Administrative Support</u>				
Supervisors	1.1	0.9	1.9	1.2
Computer operators	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.9
Secretaries & typists	0.2	0.9	12.6	16.5
Bookkeepers & accts.	0.5	0.2	4.8	4.6
Financial processors	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.0
Mail & message distrib.	0.9	0.0	0.5	0.0
Material recording	2.0	0.4	1.7	0.3
Other	2.6	0.0	13.3	3.0
<u>Service</u>				
Household	0.1	1.3	0.6	0.3
Police-firefighters	0.9	0.7	0.1	0.0
Guards	0.9	0.9	0.3	0.0
Other protective	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Food	2.0	0.4	5.0	1.2
Health	0.3	0.0	2.2	0.3
Building cleaners	1.6	0.4	0.6	0.6
Personal	0.8	0.0	3.2	2.1
<u>Farming, Fishing, etc.</u>				
Farm mgrs.	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.6
Other farm	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
Related agriculture	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.0
Forest & logging	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fishing, hunting, trapping	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Craft & Repair</u>				
Auto mechanics	1.6	1.8	0.0	0.0
Other mechanics	3.9	0.2	0.3	0.0
Carpenters	1.5	0.7	0.0	0.0
Other construction	4.7	2.4	0.2	0.0
Extractors	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

Continued on next page

TABLE 23—(Continued)

Occupational Category ^a	Males		Females	
	White	Jewish	White	Jewish
<u>Precision Production</u>				
Supervisors	2.7	0.2	0.7	0.0
Metal workers	2.0	0.0	0.2	0.3
Plant & syst. operators	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	1.3	0.0	0.9	1.5
<u>Operators</u>				
Machine excl. precision	3.6	1.1	1.8	1.2
Fabricators, assembl.	1.5	0.4	1.0	0.6
Product inspectors	0.5	0.0	0.6	0.0
<u>Transport & Material Movers</u>				
Vehicle operators	3.8	1.1	0.4	0.3
Other transport	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Material movers	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.0
<u>Handlers, Helpers, & Laborers</u>				
Helpers	3.6	0.7	1.8	0.0
Construct. laborers	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Handlers	1.4	0.0	0.4	0.3
Cleaners	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0
Misc. manual	1.5	0.0	0.6	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB57; Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aFull- and part-time employed males and females.

TABLE 24. LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION OF NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND JEWISH FEMALES BY FAMILY AND MARITAL STATUS, 1979-1980 (PERCENT)

Family and Marital Status of Female	White	Jewish
Married, husband present		
With own children 0-5 yrs.	41.9	42.2
With own children 6-17 yrs.	59.8	60.4
Without own children ^a	46.9	52.4
Other marital status		
With own children 0-17 yrs.	77.7	80.5
Without own children ^a	54.4	57.4

Sources: Summary Tape File #4, PB23; Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^a"Children" refers to children under 18 only.

TABLE 25. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Percent of Households	Particular Type of Affiliation	Percent of Households
<u>Three</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>Synagogue</u> (current)	25.1
<u>Two</u>	<u>12.0</u>		
Syn. & org.	(7.2)		
Syn. & Fed.	(2.2)	One or more Jewish	
Org. & Fed.	(2.6)	<u>organizations</u>	26.1
<u>One</u>	<u>26.8</u>	Federation	
Syn. only	(10.9)	<u>(as a giver)</u>	14.0
Org. only	(11.5)		
Fed. only	(4.4)		
<u>None</u>	<u>56.3</u>		
Total ^a	100.0		

OVERLAP AMONG TYPES OF AFFILIATIONPercent of synagogue members who

Belong to a Jewish organization	47.8
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Give to Federation	27.9
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Percent of Jewish organization members who

Belong to a synagogue	45.8
-----------------------	------

Give to Federation	28.2
--------------------	------

Percent of Federation givers who

Belong to a synagogue	50.0
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Belong to a Jewish organization	52.9
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Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 26. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY AGE OF RESPONDENT, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Age of Respondent			
	18-35	36-50	51-65	65 +
Synagogue member (current)	20.0	32.8	26.6	28.6
Member of Jewish organization	13.0	25.8	36.9	44.7
Gives to Federation	3.7	17.0	24.1	20.1

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 27. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY AGE OF RESPONDENT, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Age of Respondent			
	18-35	36-50	51-65	65 +
<u>Three</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>8.8</u>	<u>6.3</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>13.3</u>	<u>12.8</u>	<u>17.4</u>
Syn. & org.	(7.1)	(7.0)	(6.1)	(9.8)
Syn. & Fed.	(0.6)	(4.0)	(2.9)	(2.2)
Org. & Fed.	(1.2)	(2.3)	(3.8)	(5.4)
<u>One</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>44.0</u>
Syn. only	(11.0)	(12.8)	(8.0)	(11.8)
Org. only	(4.5)	(7.1)	(19.8)	(26.0)
Fed. only	(1.3)	(4.1)	(8.6)	(6.2)
<u>None</u>	<u>73.6</u>	<u>56.1</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>32.3</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 28. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Household Type					
	Married Couple		Single Household Head			
	With Children	No Children	Single Parent	Never Married	Widow/ Widower	Sep./ Div.
Synagogue member (current)	44.1	23.5	19.8	14.6	23.3	15.3
Member of Jewish organization	31.1	31.4	21.3	7.2	44.9	15.3
Gives to Federation	21.5	19.6	4.0	2.5	12.4	6.6

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 29. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Household Type					
	Married Couple		Single Household Head			
	With Children	No Children	Single Parent	Never Married	Widow/ Widower	Sep./ Div.
<u>Three</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>1.6</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>11.6</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>12.2</u>	<u>8.3</u>
Syn. & org.	(12.3)	(5.5)	(7.9)	(2.7)	(10.1)	(5.0)
Syn. & Fed.	(4.9)	(1.8)	(2.5)	(0.6)	(1.0)	(0.8)
Org. & Fed.	(3.3)	(4.3)	(0.0)	(0.6)	(1.1)	(2.5)
<u>One</u>	<u>33.1</u>	<u>28.1</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>16.0</u>	<u>47.1</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Syn. only	(19.7)	(7.1)	(7.1)	(10.8)	(9.4)	(6.6)
Org. only	(7.6)	(14.1)	(13.8)	(3.9)	(32.2)	(7.4)
Fed. only	(5.8)	(6.9)	(0.0)	(1.3)	(5.5)	(1.7)
<u>None</u>	<u>38.9</u>	<u>53.6</u>	<u>67.3</u>	<u>80.0</u>	<u>36.0</u>	<u>74.5</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 30. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY FAMILY-CYCLE STAGE, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Family-Cycle Stage				
	Children			No Children	
	Under 6 Only	6-13	14-17 Only	Head under 40	Head 40 +
Synagogue member (current)	30.7	44.3	44.1	13.0	24.8
Member of Jewish organization	25.5	26.9	42.6	6.2	36.9
Gives to Federation	9.7	15.8	35.7	1.5	19.1

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 31. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY FAMILY-CYCLE STAGE, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Family-Cycle Stage				
	Children			No Children	
	Under 6 Only	6-13	14-17 Only	Head under 40	Head 40 +
<u>Three</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>19.9</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>6.3</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>17.2</u>	<u>20.5</u>	<u>18.5</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>13.5</u>
Syn. & org.	(7.5)	(15.3)	(7.8)	(3.0)	(7.0)
Syn. & Fed.	(2.2)	(5.2)	(5.6)	(0.0)	(2.2)
Org. & Fed.	(7.5)	(0.0)	(5.1)	(0.0)	(4.3)
<u>One</u>	<u>32.8</u>	<u>32.7</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>11.1</u>	<u>34.5</u>
Syn. only	(21.3)	(19.5)	(12.1)	(8.4)	(7.8)
Org. only	(11.5)	(6.3)	(10.9)	(1.9)	(20.2)
Fed. only	(0.0)	(6.9)	(5.2)	(0.8)	(6.5)
<u>None</u>	<u>50.1</u>	<u>43.2</u>	<u>33.4</u>	<u>85.3</u>	<u>45.8</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 32. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY INTERMARRIAGE STATUS, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Born Jew Married to		
	Born Jew	Convert	Non-Jew
Synagogue member (current)	41.1	10.2	7.9
Member of Jewish organization	27.2	36.9	1.5
Gives to Federation	11.9	30.2	0.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 33. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY INTERMARRIAGE STATUS, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Born Jew Married to		
	Born Jew	Convert	Non-Jew
<u>Three</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>0.0</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Syn. & org.	(15.9)	(0.0)	(1.5)
Syn. & Fed.	(4.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Org. & Fed.	(3.0)	(20.0)	(0.0)
<u>One</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>6.4</u>
Syn. only	(19.1)	(0.0)	(6.4)
Org. only	(6.3)	(6.7)	(0.0)
Fed. only	(2.8)	(0.0)	(0.0)
<u>None</u>	<u>46.8</u>	<u>63.1</u>	<u>92.1</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 34. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Number of Years Respondent in Los Angeles				
	Less than 6	6-10	11-20	21-30	31 +
Synagogue member (current)	13.0	18.7	33.5	29.7	27.4
Member of Jewish organization	9.9	20.4	28.8	25.1	37.2
Gives to Federation	6.5	8.1	14.6	13.1	21.1

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 35. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN LOS ANGELES, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Number of Years Respondent in Los Angeles				
	Less than 6	6-10	11-20	21-30	31 +
<u>Three</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>7.8</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>8.1</u>	<u>11.9</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>10.3</u>	<u>11.7</u>
Syn. & org.	(5.7)	(8.6)	(11.9)	(6.0)	(5.4)
Syn. & Fed.	(2.2)	(1.5)	(3.1)	(1.0)	(3.1)
Org. & Fed.	(0.2)	(1.8)	(3.0)	(3.3)	(3.2)
<u>One</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>16.8</u>	<u>28.5</u>	<u>28.8</u>	<u>37.5</u>
Syn. only	(5.7)	(6.9)	(14.6)	(15.9)	(8.8)
Org. only	(3.5)	(7.9)	(10.0)	(9.3)	(21.6)
Fed. only	(4.2)	(2.0)	(3.9)	(3.6)	(7.1)
<u>None</u>	<u>78.4</u>	<u>68.4</u>	<u>48.9</u>	<u>55.7</u>	<u>43.0</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 36. TYPES OF AFFILIATION BY COMBINED HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1979 (PERCENT)

Type of Affiliation	Combined Household Income			
	Less than \$20,000	\$20,000- \$29,000	\$30,000- \$49,000	\$50,000 and over
Synagogue member (current)	20.4	21.2	33.0	34.0
Member of Jewish organization	21.9	15.9	29.7	27.9
Gives to Federation	8.1	4.1	21.2	26.9

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

TABLE 37. PATTERNS OF AFFILIATION BY COMBINED HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1979 (PERCENT)

Number of Different Types of Affiliation	Combined Household Income			
	Less than \$20,000	\$20,000- \$29,000	\$30,000- \$49,000	\$50,000 and over
<u>Three</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>9.8</u>
<u>Two</u>	<u>7.9</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>16.6</u>
Syn. & org.	(5.9)	(6.9)	(9.3)	(2.4)
Syn. & Fed.	(0.7)	(1.1)	(0.4)	(7.9)
Org. & Fed.	(1.3)	(0.5)	(6.5)	(6.3)
<u>One</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>18.4</u>	<u>27.3</u>	<u>21.6</u>
Syn. only	(9.8)	(10.5)	(15.0)	(10.4)
Org. only	(11.7)	(7.5)	(4.5)	(8.3)
Fed. only	(2.5)	(0.4)	(7.8)	(2.9)
<u>None</u>	<u>64.4</u>	<u>71.1</u>	<u>49.7</u>	<u>52.0</u>
Total ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bruce A. Phillips, Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, 1979.

^aThe total refers to the underlined percentages. The percentages in parentheses are subtotals under the patterns of combined affiliations.

TABLE 38. MEAN AFFILIATION SCORE BY SELECTED VARIABLES

Mean Affiliation Score ^a			
<u>Age</u>		<u>Household Type</u>	
18-35	0.37	Married couple w/children	1.00
36-50	0.71	Married couple, no children	0.71
51-65	0.89	Single-parent family	0.46
65 +	0.98	Never married	0.24
		Widow/widower, sep./div.	0.86
<u>Family-Cycle Stage</u>		<u>Household Income</u>	
<u>Children</u>			
Under 6 only	0.67	Under \$20,000	0.51
6-13	0.85	\$20,000-\$29,000	0.42
14-17 only	1.25	\$30,000-\$49,000	0.80
		\$50,000 and over	0.84
<u>No Children</u>			
Head under 40	0.19		
Head 40 +	0.83		
<u>Number of Years in L.A.</u>		<u>Jewish Status of Spouse</u>	
5 or less	0.30	Born Jew	0.98
6-10	0.49	Convert	1.05
11-20	0.78	Non-Jew	0.18
21-30	0.65		
30 +	0.84		

^aThe mean affiliation score is computed from a score of "3" if the household has all three kinds of affiliation (i.e., synagogue membership, organizational membership, and Federation giving), a "2" if it has two out of three kinds of affiliation, a "1" if it has a single affiliation, and a "0" if it has no affiliation.

TABLE 39. MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUATION FOR AFFILIATION

Variable	Correlation Coefficient (Simple R)	Beta	R-Square	F-Test	Signifi- cance
MARRIAGE	0.365	0.375	0.132	95.35	.001
AGE	0.276	0.180	0.180	66.86	.001
KIDCYCLE	0.241	0.172	0.211	54.15	.001
MARRIED	0.234	-0.138	0.218	42.27	.001
INCOME	0.195	0.112	0.227	35.54	.001
WIDOW	0.086	0.095	0.232	30.41	.001
LAYEARS	0.152	0.064	0.235	26.51	.001

TABLE 40. JEWISH HOUSEHOLD TYPES IN 4 CITIES, 1979-1984 (PERCENT)

Household Type	Los Angeles (1979)	Philadelphia (1984)	New York (1981)	Chicago (1981)
Married couple w/children	24.0	26.0	30.0	36.0
Single-parent family	4.0	4.0	5.0	n/a

Sources: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, Overview for Regional Planning*, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980, p. 10; Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia, *Summary Report of the Jewish Population Study of Greater Philadelphia*, June 1985, p. 18; Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population, 1981*, p. 4; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *The Jewish Population of Greater New York: A Profile*, 1984, p. 15.

TABLE 41. JEWISH AGE DISTRIBUTION IN 4 CITIES, 1979-1984 (PERCENT)

Age (by Decade)	Los Angeles (1979)	Philadelphia (1984)	New York (1981)	Age (by Life-Cycle Stage) ^a	Chicago (1981)	Los Angeles (1979)
0-9	9.8	9.0	11.0	0-17	[21.0]	[20.4]
10-19	13.5	14.0	12.0		[]	[]
20-29	16.6	15.5	17.0	18-39	[35.0]	[36.8]
30-39	17.3	13.5	14.0		[]	[]
40-49	12.1	13.5	12.0	40-64	[30.0]	[31.7]
50-59	14.3	14.0	11.0		[]	[]
60-69	9.5	12.0	12.0	65 +	[15.0]	[11.1]
70+	6.9	9.5	11.0			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	Total	100.0	100.0

Sources: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Population Study, Overview for Regional Planning*, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980, p. 7; Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia, *Summary Report of the Jewish Population Study of Greater Philadelphia*, June 1985, p. 13; Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population, 1981*, p. 3; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *The Jewish Population of Greater New York: A Profile*, 1984, p. 19.

^aBased on different reporting method in Chicago study.

TABLE 42. INTERMARRIAGE RATE (BORN JEW MARRIED TO NON-JEW) IN 3 WESTERN CITIES, 1979-1983

Age of Household Head	Percentage of Households with Intermarried Couple		
	Los Angeles (1979)	Phoenix (1983)	Denver (1981)
18-29	48.9	60.3	66.0
30-39	20.8	25.8	40.0
40-49	13.3	23.7	13.3

Sources: Bruce A. Phillips, *Denver Jewish Population Study*, Allied Jewish Federation of Denver, 1982, p. 47; Bruce A. Phillips and William S. Aron, *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study*, Jewish Federation of Greater Phoenix, 1984, p. 11.

TABLE 43. AFFILIATION RATE IN 4 CITIES, 1979-1984

Type of Affiliation	Percentage of Affiliated Households			
	Los Angeles (1979)	Philadelphia (1984)	New York (1981)	Chicago (1981)
Synagogue member	25.1	41.0	41.0	44.0
Member of Jewish organization	26.1	70.0	n/a	34.0
Gives to Federation	14.0	n/a	26.0	n/a

Sources: Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning*, Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1980; Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia, *Summary Report of the Jewish Population Study of Greater Philadelphia*, June 1985, p. 25 (includes data for other communities); Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population, 1981*, p. 18; Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, *The Jewish Population of Greater New York: A Profile*, 1984, pp. 23, 31.

California Jews: Data from the Field Polls

AS CALIFORNIA GOES—according to the common wisdom—so goes the rest of America. This is true not only in the cultural and political spheres but also in terms of demographic patterns. Such trends as decreased and delayed marriage, increased divorce and remarriage, childless marriage, high geographic mobility, and low institutional religious participation first became evident in California. It is natural to wonder how the sizeable Jewish population of that state fits into the picture. Are California Jews like other Californians—setting the pace for the rest of American Jewry in social-cultural and demographic developments?

According to the most recent estimates, the Jewish population of California numbers over 790,000, qualifying it to be the second-largest Jewish "state" in the country.¹ At present, one out of every seven Jews in the United States lives in California. Given the significant upswing in Jewish migration to the Sunbelt in recent years, that proportion is bound to increase.

The bulk of the Jewish population lives in southern California, primarily in metropolitan Los Angeles. With just over half a million Jews,² Los Angeles emerges as the second-largest Jewish community both in the United States and in the world. It is home to the second-largest Israeli population outside of Israel and one of the largest Russian-Jewish communities outside of the Soviet Union. While Jews constitute less than 4 percent of the state's population, they can significantly affect the outcome of statewide (and thus national) elections, and they have high visibility in the media.

Methods

The data selected for the present study come from Field Polls, which have been conducted statewide in California since 1947.³ Use of the early polls (up to 1958)

Note: This project was aided by a Social and Behavioral Science Dean's Award, California State University Dominguez Hills, and a grant from the American Jewish Committee. Cooperation and help were extended by Mark DiCamillo of the Field Institute and Lynn Anderson of the Computer Center, CSUDH.

¹AJYB, Vol. 85, 1985, p. 180.

²Ibid., p. 183.

³To study American Jews, social scientists have turned increasingly to the use of general survey data, such as that provided by the Gallup Poll or the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. General surveys are considered to produce more representative samples than studies directed solely at the Jewish population (which may overcount affiliated, and undercount nonaffiliated, Jews). However, the number of Jews even in a large national sample is too small to be useful. To overcome this difficulty, at least four separate investigators have employed the technique of aggregating responses across several studies in order to create

presents certain problems in that they were conducted infrequently, suffered from small sizes, and used an abbreviated, irregular list of demographic questions, which sometimes omitted religion. In the late 1950s the situation took a positive turn: sampling procedures were improved, the number of questions was increased, and the demographic items became more standardized. Since 1960, polling has been conducted four times a year during nonelection years and six times a year during election years, with minor deviations.

Like most major polls, Field uses primarily random-digit telephoning within geographical clusters (proportionate to telephone and population density), reaching a sample of about 1,150 (California) respondents 18 years of age and older. Recent research has been increasingly accepting of telephone polling, even though it does eliminate people without phones, as well as those who are homeless or in institutions.⁴ Many of these individuals belong to the lower socioeconomic classes; in California, many are foreign born, particularly Hispanics. The resultant bias produces a telephone sample that has higher socioeconomic status, with more "Anglos" (including Jews), more American-born, and more citizens than the general population. (In election years, a few polls also screen out people who admit to not being registered to vote.)

The biases, however, are mitigated by several factors. First, census data are available to weight against. Second, the Field organization has incorporated adjustments into the sampling and weighting to ensure the fit of age, sex, and region within California. Last—and in the present context, most importantly—the distortions are much smaller for Jews than for other Californians because Jews have higher incomes, are better educated, and are more likely to be American-born citizens and registered to vote.

The data cited in this article are from 1958 through 1984. Data are either not available or are without religious identification (with up to one exception per year) for the years 1959, 1965–1968, and 1973. The total number of polls is 106, averaging 5 per year for those years in which data are available. The median Jewish subsample is 43, compared with a total median sample of 1,073 per poll. Since demographic change tends to be relatively slow, and the small subsample size is a critical issue, polls are generally aggregated over three-to-four-year periods, with some adjustments made to compensate for uneven subsample sizes and inaccessible polls. The

a respectable Jewish sample. These studies are, in chronological order: Bernard Lazerwitz, "A Comparison of Major United States Religious Groups," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, Sept. 1961, pp. 568–579; John Shelton Reed, "Needles in Haystacks: Studying Rare Populations by Secondary Analysis of National Sample Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1975–76, pp. 514–522; Steven M. Cohen, "The American Jewish Family Today," *AJYB*, Vol. 82, 1982, pp. 136–154; Alan M. Fisher, "The National Gallup Polls and American Jewish Demography," *AJYB*, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 111–126.

⁴Robert M. Groves and Robert L. Kahn, *Surveys by Telephone: A National Comparison with Personal Interviews* (New York, 1979) and James H. Frey, *Survey Research by Phone* (Beverly Hills, 1983).

aggregated Jewish samples of 550–950 yield an approximate error margin of ± 5.4 to ± 2.6 percentage points. (In comparison, the average Field Poll—like most major media polls—has an average error margin of approximately ± 3.3 percentage points.)⁵

Even though the error margin is relatively large for demographic studies—which means that the data can be regarded only as rough indicators—it needs to be stressed that the Field Polls provide a rich source of data on California Jews. The Field sampling methodology is superior to—less biased than—that of almost all Jewish community studies, most of which have also employed telephone interviews.⁶ In addition, because the Field data allow for religious identification, it is possible to compare Jews with non-Jewish Californians as two mutually exclusive populations.

The sociodemographic findings covered here fall into four basic categories: place of residence; achieved status (education, income, occupation); marital status and family size; and ascribed status (race, gender, age). The first data section presents various comparisons of California Jews with Jews nationwide (the 1970–1971 National Jewish Population Study and Gallup Poll studies), as well as with New York Jews (the 1981 Greater New York Jewish Population Survey), in order to examine regional differences. The next section compares Jews and non-Jews in California in the early 1980s. A third section looks at trends in California over the last 20 years. Finally, there is a brief summary discussion of the data including projections for the immediate future.

Comparative Jewish Perspectives

Findings from the Field Poll have been specially aggregated for two separate time periods in order to compare them with the 1970–1971 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) and the 1981 New York study; where appropriate and available, national Gallup Poll data about Jews have also been introduced.⁷ Some of the differences among the four studies are attributable to differences in response categories. In Table 1, for example, the lower level of graduate education shown by Field

⁵The error margins, based on a significance level of .05, are only approximate, since they depend upon both exact proportions and sampling methods. The standard formula of $s.e. = 1.96\sqrt{p(1-p)/n}$ applies to purely random sampling and is minimized as the distribution moves from 50-50 to 100-0.

⁶For a review of communal studies, see Gary Tobin and Alvin Chenkin, "Recent Jewish Community Population Studies: A Roundup," *AJYB*, Vol. 85, 1985, pp. 154–178; Sidney Goldstein, "Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," *AJYB*, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 3–59; and Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," *AJYB*, Vol. 72, 1971, pp. 3–88.

⁷NJPS data are from Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," *AJYB*, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 264–306; New York data from Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, "The Social Characteristics of the New York Area Jewish Community, 1981," *AJYB*, Vol. 84, 1984, pp. 128–163; Gallup data from Fisher, *op. cit.*

reflects the inclusion of a small number of respondents too young (18-20) to have finished advanced degrees.

ACHIEVED STATUS

In the period 1969-1972, California Jews were not dramatically different from Jews across the country in achievement: a slightly smaller percentage of California Jews had a high-school education or less and a smaller percentage had achieved graduate degrees (Table 1). On the other hand, a larger percentage of California Jews had some college, undoubtedly a reflection of the extensive statewide system of two-year community colleges.

By the early 1980s, California Jews had achieved significantly higher educational levels than Jews across the country (Table 2). Even if the data overstate education, it is clear that relatively few California Jews had less than a high-school degree, and the large majority (81 percent) had at least some college. At the highest level, postgraduate study, the distribution is similar to that of New York Jews.

TABLE 1. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF JEWS IN CALIFORNIA (1969-1972) AND NATIONAL (1970-1971) POLLS (PERCENT)

Education	California ^a	NJPS ^{b,c}
Less than high school	16.0	15.9
High-school graduated ^d	24.1	30.6
Some college ^d	31.8	20.4
College graduate	15.3	14.5
M.A. and beyond ^e	12.8	18.6
Total ^f	100.0 (N=752)	100.0 (N=c.7,500)

Sources: California Field Polls; NJPS (recalculated), AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p. 278.

^aBased on respondents 21 and older for 1969-70, and 18 and older for 1970-72.

^bBased on respondents aged 25 and older.

^cThe category for no response eliminated and the numbers recalculated as a percentage of legitimate responses.

^dThe original NJPS category of "other" (1.6 percent) is divided in two and half (0.8) added here.

^eThe original NJPS category of professional degree (6.4 percent) is included here.

^fErrors in column total due to rounding.

TABLE 2. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF JEWS IN CALIFORNIA (1980-1982), NEW YORK (1981), AND NATIONAL (1979) POLLS (PERCENT)

Education	California	New York	Nation
High school graduates and lower	20	30	44
Some college	35	17	56
College degree	23	32	
Graduate degree	23	21	
Total ^a	100 (N = 745)	100 (N = c. 4,500)	100 (N = 991)

Sources: California Field Polls; Greater New York Jewish Population Study, AJYB, Vol. 84, 1984, p. 156; National Gallup Polls, AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 123.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

Generally parallel findings occur for another measure of personal achievement, income. One must be careful, however, about aggregating income in the late 1970s and very early 1980s, because of high inflation rates and high unemployment, which made yearly differences greater than those in more stable periods. Other problems in the Field Poll findings are the lack of one standardized set of income categories and a change in minimum respondent age.

In 1970 the income of California Jews was only moderately larger than that of all American Jews in the Gallup data, and almost equal to that shown in the NJPS figures. By the early 1980s the Jews of California were remarkably similar in income to the Jews of New York and, according to Gallup data, were far ahead of Jews nationwide (Table 3). While individual community studies show Los Angeles Jews as not differing much from Jews in other large communities,⁸ the Gallup data may well be the more accurate because not just Jews, but California and New York non-Hispanic whites overall, made more money than other Americans.

Differences in the incidence of poverty among New York and California Jews and those elsewhere in the country, as shown in Table 3, may be overstated, due both to the bias of telephone polling and variance in the cost of living. At the upper levels, however, the geographical differences likely reflect not only sampling differences and higher cost of living in the Los Angeles and New York areas but the greater job opportunities and related higher educational and occupational levels of Jews in those cities.

Comparable results obtain for occupation. California Jews in 1970 had higher occupational status—a greater percentage of professionals and a smaller percentage

⁸Tobin and Chenkin, op. cit., p. 169.

TABLE 3. HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF JEWS IN CALIFORNIA (1980-1982), NEW YORK (1981), AND NATIONAL (1979) POLLS (PERCENT)

Income	California	New York	Nation
Less than \$10,000	12	11	25
\$10,000-19,999	17	16	25
\$20,000-29,999	19	20	} 49
\$30,000+	52	53	
Total ^a	100 (N=664)	100 (N=c. 4,500)	100 (N=991)

Sources: California Field Polls; Greater New York Jewish Population Study, AJYB, Vol. 84, 1984, p. 158; National Gallup Polls, AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 125.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

of salespeople/clerks—than did Jews in both the NJPS and Gallup studies, and the differences increased a little in the early 1980s.

MARITAL STATUS AND FAMILY SIZE

While the proportion of married California Jews in the early 1970s closely matched that of Jews in the national Gallup data, Jews in the NJPS were significantly more likely (79:68) to be married (Table 4).

Some of the difference undoubtedly results from the sampling strategy of the NJPS, which, by starting with known Jewish families, found an inflated proportion of marrieds. Much of the difference in marital rates is real, however, reflecting the fact that Californians were less likely than other Americans to be married at the time and more likely never to have married. (Examination of the combined categories of divorced/separated and widowed reveals no important differences.) A comparison of marital status among California and other Jews in 1981, using both the NJPS and New York data as standards, shows the differences persisting: a smaller percentage of California Jews were married and a larger percentage had never married.

Since California Jews were less likely to marry, they were more likely to live alone or with friends. Comparison of average family or household size across studies is made difficult by a lack of identical questions, the use of different categories, and the availability of only partially published data. However, taking all the difficulties into account, a comparison of figures indicates that household size for California Jewish families has been consistently smaller—smaller than for Jewish families nationwide in 1970 (NJPS); and smaller than for New York families in 1981, if the adjusted figure (2.78) based on similar categories is employed (Table 5).

TABLE 4. MARITAL STATUS OF JEWS IN CALIFORNIA (1970-1972) AND NATIONAL (1970-1973) POLLS (PERCENT)

Marital Status	California ^a	NJPS (1970-71) ^b	Nation (1973) ^c
Never married	16.7	6.2	19.9
Married	67.8	78.6	67.6
Separated/ divorced	0.7 4.2	} 5.1	0.3
Widowed	10.7	10.0	} 12.2
Total ^d	100.0 (N=600)	100.0 (N=c. 7,500)	100.0 (N=571)

Sources: California Field Polls; NJPS (recalculated), AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p. 275; National Gallup Polls, AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 114.

^aBased on respondents 18 and older (N=489) and 21 and older (N=111).

^bBased on head of household. The category for "no response" (0.4 percent) eliminated and the figures recalculated as a percentage of legitimate responses.

^cBased on respondents 18 and older.

^dErrors in column total due to rounding.

TABLE 5. MEAN HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF NEW YORK JEWS (1981), CALIFORNIA JEWS, AND CALIFORNIA NON-JEWS (1980-1982)

Household Size	California Jews ^{a,b}	California Non-Jews ^b	New York Jews ^c	New York Jews ^a
	2.54 (N=648)	2.87 (N=15,662)	2.49 (N=c. 4,500)	2.78 (N=c. 4,500)

Sources: California Field Polls; Greater New York Jewish Population Study, AJYB, Vol. 84, 1984, p. 141.

^aBoth Jewish and non-Jewish household members counted for Jewish respondents. Calculation for New York estimated by $0.66K(J)$, where K is the proportion of households (including non-Jews/Jews only) found in the Washington, D.C. community study (2.7/2.3) and J is the mean size for New York households with only Jews.

^bFamilies with more than 6 members counted as having 7.77 members.

^cOnly Jewish household members counted.

Confirmation of the California figure can be found in the 1979 community study of Los Angeles.⁹

ASCRIBED STATUS

Neither the NJPS nor the New York study provides information about race or Hispanic subethnicity. The Gallup Poll, which does include such information, shows a very low (about 0.5 percent) but consistent figure for nonwhite (primarily black) Jews, and this matches the Field Polls.

Gender produces fewer surprises. Because it is relatively easy to control for in sampling and weighting, the male-female ratio regularly hovers around 49–51 percent in all the major surveys.

Since the Field Polls provide no systematic accounting for people under 18 (under 21 before 1970), age distribution is shown for adults only (Table 6). Comparison with the NJPS is complicated by the use of different respondent categories, but in 1970 all three studies of Jews (NJPS, Gallup, and Field) showed a notably similar age distribution. By the 1980s, however, the relative age distribution had changed noticeably. A picture compiled from the Gallup Polls, New York data, and other recent community studies—as well as projections from earlier ones—shows that California (adult) Jews were younger: a larger percentage were under age 30 and a smaller percentage were over age 65. (This difference can be seen, also, in a comparison of the Los Angeles and other community studies.)¹⁰ While Table 6

TABLE 6. AGES OF JEWS IN CALIFORNIA (1980–1982), NEW YORK (1981), AND NATIONAL (1979) POLLS (PERCENT)

Age	California	New York	Nation
18–29	27	24	22
30–49	39	31	34
Over 50	35	45	43
Total ^a	100 (N = 743)	100 (N = c. 4,500)	100 (N = 991)

Sources: California Field Polls; Greater New York Jewish Population Study, AJYB, Vol. 84, 1984, p. 149; National Gallup Polls, AJYB, Vol. 83, 1983, p. 120.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

⁹Bruce A. Phillips, *Los Angeles Jewish Community Survey: Overview for Regional Planning* (Planning and Budgeting Department, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 1980).

¹⁰See Tobin and Chenkin, *op.cit.*, and Goldstein, *op. cit.* (1971 and 1981), as well as individual community studies, especially that of Los Angeles—Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

probably magnifies the differences at the extremes by 1 or 2 percentage points—because of the particular years selected—the differences are still significant. The explanation is probably related to migration dynamics, i.e., a relatively high movement of young people to California in the 1970s and 1980s.

Contemporary California: Jews and Non-Jews

PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Within California, the geographical distribution of Jews is heavily weighted toward two regions, Los Angeles–Orange counties and the San Francisco–Bay Area (Table 7). These two areas contain more than eight out of ten Jews in the state, six of whom live in the greater Los Angeles area.

The AJYB allocations for city and metropolitan areas, as shown in Table 7, have been redistributed according to the Field configuration. Because the Field Poll is broken down into so many (10) categories, each one contains a smaller number of people, thus increasing the margin of error. (In order to increase the sample size, this is the only table which includes data from 1985.) At the same time, for the AJYB there are questions about two subareas in the Los Angeles basin which may have been double counted.¹¹

While both sources find overwhelming concentrations of Jews in Los Angeles–Orange counties and the San Francisco–Bay area, there are noticeable differences. The Field data report Jews slightly more dispersed, with more Jews in San Francisco and fewer in Los Angeles than in the AJYB estimates. The difference probably reflects both migration dynamics and sampling bias. Jews who move to largely non-Jewish areas tend to be more marginal than those moving to Jewishly identified regions, e.g., Los Angeles. Whereas the methods employed in community studies—organizational membership lists, personal references, and Jewish name indexes—make it easier to sample publicly identified and affiliated Jews in Jewish areas, the less stratified random-dialing techniques of the Field Poll are as likely to reach a Jew in a mountain cabin as one in the middle of the Fairfax ghetto—provided that each has one telephone number and neither denies being Jewish.

The AJYB updated several of its population counts in the mid-1980s, bringing them closer to the Field data than they had been in 1981. Based on a number of factors—too many to be analyzed here—it appears that the AJYB figures are more accurate, especially for Los Angeles–Orange counties. They are not exact, however, and where the Field data differ, correction needs to be made in the direction of the latter.

¹¹For a comprehensive overview, see Jack Diamond, "A Reader in the Demography of American Jews," AJYB, Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 251–319.

TABLE 7. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1980-1985) (PERCENT)

Region ^a	Jews, 1980-85 (Field)	Jews, 1984 (AJYB)	Non-Jews, 1980-85 (Field)	State Population, 1980 (Census)
Oregon				
Border	0.2	0.0	0.7	1.0
Sacramento				
Valley	2.0	0.9	5.3	5.1
Northern				
Sierras	0.6	0.0	1.6	2.3
San Francisco-				
Bay Area	22.5	17.1	25.4	21.9
Monterey-				
Coast	1.3	0.4	3.1	2.8
San Joaquin				
Valley	1.1	0.6	7.0	8.7
Santa Barbara-				
Ventura	3.7	1.3	4.5	3.5
Los Angeles-				
Orange ^b	59.5	74.2	38.1	39.8
San Diego	6.1	4.3	8.1	7.9
Riverside-				
San Bernadino-				
Desert ^b	3.0	1.3	6.3	7.0
Total ^c	100.0 (N = 1,220)	100.0	100.0 (N = 31,923)	100.0

Sources: California Field Polls; AJYB, Vol. 85, 1985, p. 170; U. S. Census, *California: General Population Characteristics*, Part 6, pp. 17-18.

^aComposition of the counties as spelled out in "California Field Poll Codebook," April 1984, p. 90.

^bAJYB figure for the Pomona Valley (3,500) is divided into Los Angeles-Orange (2,900) and San Bernadino (600).

^cErrors in column total due to rounding.

As the distribution makes clear, Jews were not scattered randomly throughout the state; nor did they live in rural regions. California Jews lived primarily in urban areas with sizeable Jewish populations.

On the related item of housing—not shown in the tables—the Field Polls indicate that California Jews were nearly as likely as non-Jews (61:63) to own their own homes. In the past, the gap had been larger—close to 8 percentage points.

ACHIEVED STATUS

In matters pertaining to personal achievement, the differences are consistently sharp, although the exact figures are distorted by the sampling procedure. In the early 1980s, only one out of five California Jews had no college experience, compared with one out of three non-Jews (Table 8). Jews were also significantly more likely than others to have extended their education beyond the four-year baccalaureate.

The high educational attainment of Jews makes it likely that they will be well represented among professionals and will enjoy relatively high income. This is borne

TABLE 8. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981–1984) (PERCENT)

Education	Jews	Non-Jews
5th grade or less	0.8	2.4
Some high school	1.8	7.0
High-school graduate	16.1	24.5
Trade school	1.7	2.6
Some college	31.6	36.6
4-year-college graduate	17.4	12.8
Some graduate school	5.9	4.3
M.A.	12.7	5.7
More than M.A.	12.2	4.0
(More than B.A.)	(30.8)	(14.0)
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 901)	100.0 (N = 22,433)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

out, in fact, by the data (Table 9). By the early 1980s, about three-fifths of employed Jewish household heads worked primarily as professionals (44 percent) or as managers (17 percent). Combining all levels of labor and service jobs yields only about 12 percent of employed Jews (compared with 34 percent of non-Jews). Slightly more than one-third of employed Jewish household heads worked for themselves, double the figure for non-Jews (Table 10).

TABLE 9. OCCUPATIONS OF WORKING CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981-1984) (PERCENT)

Occupation ^a	Jews	Non-Jews
Professional	44.1	29.5
Managerial	16.7	17.3
Clerical	7.6	10.4
Sales	19.2	9.3
Skilled labor	6.4	15.9
Semi-skilled labor	1.7	7.4
Service	2.7	7.3
Farm and unskilled labor	1.5	2.9
Total ^b	100.0 (N = 657)	100.0 (N = 15,795)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aBased only on chief wage earner.

^bErrors in column total due to rounding.

TABLE 10. SELF-EMPLOYMENT OF WORKING CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981-1984) (PERCENT)

Employment Status ^a	Jews	Non-Jews
Self-employed	36.4	19.7
Work for other	63.6	80.3
Total	100.0 (N = 662)	100.0 (N = 15,915)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aBased on chief wage earner.

In line with Jewish educational and occupational attainment, Jewish family income was significantly higher than that of other Californians (Table 11). The superior earning power of Jews was not a function of the presence of more wage earners per family. In the early 1980s a direct question on the number of wage earners produced the following results: Jewish households were slightly more likely than non-Jewish households to have one and particularly two breadwinners, but were less likely to have more than two—reflecting smaller Jewish household size. (See Table 18.)

Although there are no direct data on the subject of working women, related data indirectly suggest that Jewish women were more likely than non-Jewish women to be employed. Jewish households were smaller, and fewer of them consisted of married couples—yet more Jewish households had two working adults. This is most likely explained by a large proportion of working women, an inference that is further reinforced by the considerably higher educational levels of Jewish women compared with non-Jewish women.¹²

At the lower end of the income scale, relative differences between Jews and non-Jews were smaller than in the highest income category. About 10 percent of California Jewish households reported an income of \$10,000 or less, compared with 14 percent of other Californians. However, since poor, foreign-language-speaking, and institutionalized individuals are all underrepresented in telephone surveys, the figures for both Jews and non-Jews should probably be increased by at least 3–4 percentage points.

TABLE 11. HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981–1984) (PERCENT)

Income	Jews	Non-Jews
Less than \$7,000	5.3	6.6
\$7,000–\$9,999	4.9	7.8
\$10,000–\$14,999	5.7	9.7
\$15,000–\$19,999	8.6	13.3
\$20,000–\$29,999	20.8	23.8
More than \$30,000	54.6	38.8
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 853)	100.0 (N = 21,383)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

¹²Alan M. Fisher and Curtis K. Tanaka, "Jewish Demography in California: The Use of Aggregated Survey Data," in *Papers in Jewish Demography 1985* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

MARITAL STATUS AND FAMILY SIZE

Differences in marital status between Jews and non-Jews were small, although significant and in the same direction found in the Gallup studies: Jews were more likely never to have been married and slightly less likely to be currently married (Table 12). Since California Jews were not younger than other Californians, these differences cannot be attributed to age.

Rates for divorce, separation, and widowhood are similar. One-seventh of California adults were separated or divorced. (Since people who had been divorced and were currently married counted as married, the figures for "divorced" and "separated" are only partial indicators of the total incidence of divorce.)

The notion of widespread singledom in California has some basis in fact. Indeed, there were higher proportions of one-person households and single-parent families in California than in the rest of the nation. Still, among all Californians, married adults significantly outnumbered the unmarried. Among Jews, although a smaller percentage were married or had ever been married, the majority were in fact married.

In the early 1980s, about one-fifth of Jewish households consisted of only one person, variously defined as divorced, separated, widowed, but primarily never-married (Table 13). The addition of single parents raises the number of one-adult households to one-quarter of all Jewish households. (This figure is not shown in the table, in which "two persons" may be a parent and child or two adults.) Furthermore, almost six out of ten California Jewish households consisted of no more than one or two people—primarily couples (married and unmarried), but also single

TABLE 12. MARITAL STATUS OF ADULT CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1983-1984) (PERCENT)

Marital Status ^a	Jews	Non-Jews
Never married	25.4	21.1
Married	54.6	57.7
Separated/ divorced	14.0	13.8
Widowed	6.1	7.4
Total ^b	100.0 (N = 394)	100.0 (N = 9,876)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aBased on respondents 18 and older.

^bErrors in column total due to rounding.

TABLE 13. HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981-1984)
(PERCENT)

Number of Persons per Household	Jews	Non-Jews
1	21.4	18.0
2	38.3	33.2
3	18.0	18.7
4	13.2	17.2
5	6.2	7.8
6	1.7	3.0
7 or more	1.1	2.1
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 809)	100.0 (N = 19,763)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

parents with one child and unrelated roommates. Not only were Jewish households significantly smaller overall than those of non-Jews, but the sampling bias against the poor and the foreign-born suggests that the real differences were even greater than they appear.

Married couples with at least one child at home—the traditional family—constituted a distinct minority, both among Jews and other Californians, and represented a smaller percentage than in the past. Although there is no single measure of the total number of children living at home, a partial picture can be obtained by looking at numbers of children in three age groupings: 0-5, 6-12, 13-17 (Table 14). For each age category, more than four-fifths of all California households (including Jews) showed no children at all. (An indirect measure of the declining Jewish birthrate is the fact that a slightly smaller percentage had very young children at home than had children aged 6-12, and a smaller percentage had 6-12-year-olds than had teenagers.) For all three age groups, Jews were more likely than non-Jews to have no children at home, and for those who did have children, Jews were more likely than others to have only one.

ASCRIBED STATUS

In matters of ascribed status, the Field findings are weighted for one measure (gender), are completely one-sided for a second (race), and are expected for the third (age).

TABLE 14. NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN CALIFORNIA JEWISH AND NON-JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS, BY AGES OF CHILDREN (1981-1984) (PERCENT)

Number of Children	Children's Ages, Jewish Households		
	0-5	6-12	13-17
0	90.4	88.0	84.5
1	8.4	8.3	11.4
2	1.2	3.5	3.5
3	0.0	.2	.5
4	0.0	0.0	0.0
5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 809)	100.0 (N = 809)	100.0 (N = 809)
Number of Children	Children's Ages, Non-Jewish Households		
	0-5	6-12	13-17
0	83.5	81.6	82.5
1	11.3	12.1	11.9
2	4.4	5.2	4.4
3	.7	.9	1.0
4	.1	.2	.2
5	0.0	.1	0.0
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 19,714)	100.0 (N = 19,683)	100.0 (N = 19,614)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

The distribution of gender within the Jewish community is not apparently much different from the rest of the population, but this is one of the only variables for which the sampling-error margin precludes any confidence in the findings.

As is commonly known, almost all Jews are white—almost 98 percent, according to the polls of the early 1980s. Among California Jews, 0.4 percent were Asian, 0.6 percent black, and 1.2 percent "other." Since Eskimos and Native Americans are not plentiful in the Jewish community, "other" probably signifies primarily the offspring of interracial marriages. It is noteworthy that both the Field and Gallup Polls have found small but consistent traces of nonwhite Jews. Since California is one of the most racially heterogeneous states in the country, it is not surprising that the figures are higher there.

A separate question turns up a small proportion (3.4 percent) of California Jews who claim Latin descent, a larger number than in the past. This probably reflects the increased antisemitism and economic instability in some Latin American countries, leading to emigration.

For age, the California findings of the early 1980s duplicate the general pattern found across the country, but with more moderate differences: a smaller percentage of young (adult) Jews and a larger percentage of older ones than in the population at large (Table 15). In the middle of the age spectrum, differences are minimal. (See also Table 19.) This is explainable by the declining size of Jewish families, i.e., more people who have never married and fewer children for married couples, hence a smaller proportion of young people. This is partly balanced by an immigration weighted toward younger people.

TABLE 15. AGES OF ADULT CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1981-1984)
(PERCENT)

Age ^a	Jews	Non-Jews
18-20	5.1	5.7
21-29	20.1	21.6
30-39	21.6	23.6
40-49	15.4	15.2
50-59	14.7	13.8
60-69	13.5	12.4
70+	9.4	7.8
(60+)	(22.9)	(20.2)
Total ^b	100.0 (N=901)	100.0 (N=22,349)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aBased only on population 18 and older.

^bErrors in column total due to rounding.

Change Over Two Decades

ACHIEVED STATUS

How have California Jews and other Californians changed over the last quarter of a century? The most dramatic change has been in educational attainment. The proportion of California Jewish adults who were college graduates or higher doubled—from 24 percent in the 1958-1961 period to 48 percent in the early 1980s (Table 16). The percentage having at least some college experience rose from 49 to 79 in

TABLE 16. EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF CALIFORNIA JEWS (1958-1984) (PERCENT)

Education	1958-61	1962-64	1968-72	1974-77	1978-80 ^a	1981-84 ^a
Less than 8th grade	13.9	8.0	7.6	3.1	1.3	0.8
Some high school	11.5	6.6	8.2	5.6	2.5	1.8
High-school graduate	25.8	26.6	23.5	23.1	17.0	17.8
Some college	25.0	22.8	33.6	26.4	33.9	31.0
College graduate	15.3	23.2	13.7	23.1	16.9	17.4
Post-graduate work	8.3	12.8	13.4	18.8	28.5	30.7
Total ^b	100.0 (N=503)	100.0 (N=561)	100.0 (N=801)	100.0 (N=576)	100.0 (N=629)	100.0 (N=901)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aTrade school included as high-school graduate.

^bErrors in column total due to rounding.

the same time span. By 1982 the proportion of Jews going on to graduate school was greater than the proportion that had finished college 20 years earlier.

The proportion of non-Jewish adults in California with at least some college rose from 38 to 63 percent—almost proportional to the Jewish increase—and the proportion of college graduates increased from 15 to 27 percent.

Changes in occupation and income follow those in education. The proportion of Jews working as professionals rose from 25 percent (1958-1961) to 44 percent (1981-1984), with some leveling off between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The most significant decreases were for managers and clerical workers, attributable largely to increasing education and a focus on the professions. There were few physical laborers in the early 1960s, and even fewer in the early 1980s. (See Table 9.)

For non-Jewish Californians, the pattern of change closely parallels that of Jews, including a rise in the proportion of professionals. For many years the proportion of non-Jews who were professionals was between 60 and 67 percent of the comparable figure for Jews. The fact that this proportion was higher in the 1980s than in the 1960s suggests a possible trend toward less differentiation.

The proportions of Jews working for others and those working for themselves remained generally stable. The proportion of self-employed individuals was about 37 percent from the early 1960s on. Among non-Jewish Californians, there was a

slight increase in the percentage of self-employed from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, but the figure (15–20 percent) always remained lower than that for Jews.

A noteworthy change that occurred among Jews between 1972 and 1982 was in the number of wage earners (Table 17). The proportion of households without any wage earner declined (from 23 to 16 percent), as did the proportion of households with only one wage earner (from 49 to 43 percent). There was a complementary increase in the number of households with two or more working people, from 28 to 42 percent. The wage-earner trend for other Californians was similar, though the percentage of non-Jewish families with no working member remained the same over the years.

The increasing number of working couples—combined with higher educational levels and a rise in vocational status—led to much higher levels of income. Although part of this increase obviously reflected inflation, real income rose strikingly. Whereas in the late 1960s about two-fifths of Jews had a family income of over \$15,000, by the early 1980s more than one-half earned above \$30,000.

A comparative study of income produces mixed findings. From 1969 to 1984 the proportion of Jews in the highest income category (which increases to \$40,000 in 1981) was about double the proportion of other Californians, although there was a slight decline over time. Keeping the top category at \$30,000 (see Table 11), however, the relative proportion decreases considerably, from 204 to 144 (with 100 as parity). At the lowest income levels the figures are much closer. According to Table 11, for example, the relative proportion of Jews making less than \$7,000 per year was almost equal (0.80) to the comparable figure for non-Jews. The persistence over time of a poor Jewish element is linked to the relatively high (and growing) percentage of elderly within the community (though this percentage was lower in California for both Jews and non-Jews than elsewhere).

TABLE 17. NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS IN CALIFORNIA JEWISH HOUSEHOLDS (1971–1984) (PERCENT)

Number of Wage Earners	1971–72	1974–77	1978–81	1982–84
0	22.8	18.8	14.2	15.8
1	49.0	54.4	49.1	42.6
2	25.1	24.4	32.2	34.5
3	3.1	2.4	4.6	7.1
Total ^a	100.0 (N = 382)	100.0 (N = 463)	100.0 (N = 696)	100.0 (N = 707)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

MARITAL STATUS AND FAMILY SIZE

The picture with regard to marital status is somewhat blurred; in the past the question appeared irregularly in the Field Poll, and the statewide findings for 1970 differ from the census by 5 percentage points. By contrast, in the 1980s the figures corresponded more closely.

Jews match and even slightly surpass other Californians in the percentage increase in those never-married as well as in the percentage decrease in those currently married. (Dramatic changes in Jewish marital rates can be seen by comparing Tables 4 and 12.) Rates for widows remain about the same, whereas those for the separated and divorced increase.

Changes in household or family size are harder to detect than changes in marital status because the ranges are narrow. Californians in general start at a low level, and the 1970 findings are biased by use of a minimum age of 21 rather than 18. Nevertheless, there was a small but noticeable diminution in the number of people living at home with family. In the 1969-1972 period, 35 percent of Jewish households had at least four family members, whereas ten years later the figure was 23 percent (Table 18). During the same period, the proportion of single-person families increased gradually from 17 to 21 percent. The modal two-person household climbed from 33 percent in 1969-1972 to a relatively stable 38 percent from 1975 onward.

The proportion of Jewish households with any child younger than six dropped from 13.2 percent in 1970-1972 to 9.6 percent in 1981-1984, while the proportion of those with more than one young child dropped from 4.9 to 1.2 percent. Jewish

TABLE 18. HOUSEHOLD SIZE OF CALIFORNIA JEWS (1969-1984) (PERCENT)

Number of Persons per Household	1969-72	1974-77	1978-80	1981-84
1	16.6	19.0	22.4	21.4
2	32.7	36.9	41.0	38.3
3	15.7	14.9	14.2	18.0
4	20.7	18.4	14.8	13.2
5	10.5	6.3	4.8	6.2
6	2.8	3.0	2.0	1.7
7	0.9	1.5	0.8	1.1
Total ^a	100.0 (N=667)	100.0 (N=463)	100.0 (N=393)	100.0 (N=809)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aErrors in column total due to rounding.

families were not the only ones becoming smaller, however. Similar patterns obtain for California in general.

ASCRIBED STATUS

For the state as a whole—Jews excepted—dramatic changes in racial composition were brought about by the immigration of large groups of Koreans, Hong-Kong Chinese, and Vietnamese. The proportion of whites (including Latinos) in the Field statewide sample dropped from 95 percent in 1960 to 88 percent in the early 1980s, while for Jews it remained almost exactly the same—99 to 98 percent. There was no noticeable change with regard to gender for either group.

Changes in age distribution reflect the singular dynamics of California's population. According to census data for the United States as a whole, the proportion of adults (18+) aged 65 and over jumped from 13.7 to 16.0 percent between 1960 and 1984. In California, however, the increase was from 13.6 to 14.0 percent—one-sixth of the increase for the country as a whole.

The Field findings resemble census figures in that age is weighted against them and the error margin is narrowed. In order to facilitate observation over time, the initial (Field) age divisions have been kept, with 21 as the minimum and senior status set at age 60 and above. Fluctuations—which arise even in the three-year time periods—have been moderated by combining two such periods. Because the findings in the available polls from 1969 through 1976 present a disconcerting interruption in the flow from the earlier period to the mid-1980s, we treat the middle period as containing some minor sampling aberrations, although there are some consistent developments as well. The most striking change in age distribution is the increase in the percentage of people in their 20s (Table 19). Also noteworthy is the relatively modest increase in adults (21+) aged 60 and above—for Jews from 20.9 to 22.2 percent and for non-Jews from 19.9 to 20.9 percent. Like other Californians, Jews, as a group, have not appreciably aged. This is due primarily to migration of mostly younger people, from other parts of the United States and from overseas (including Israel, the Soviet Union, and Iran).

Future Trends

California is a trendsetter, a place where change starts and then spreads. While this has been less true in Jewish life, where New York City is still the pivot, the signs of change are there: New York is losing Jewish population, while California is gaining; New York Jews are becoming older and many of them poorer, while California Jews, on the whole, are maintaining their relative youthfulness and becoming wealthier.

For several of the demographic characteristics examined in this article, California Jews are more like other Jews than other Californians. They are more likely to live in cosmopolitan areas; are more highly educated, of higher vocational status, have

TABLE 19. AGES OF CALIFORNIA JEWS AND NON-JEWS (1958-1984) (PERCENT)

Age	Jews		
	1958-64	1969-76 ^a	1977-84
21-29	16.5	19.9	22.4
30-39	24.6	17.5	25.2
40-49	22.1	19.2	15.4
50-59	15.9	18.0	14.7
60+	20.9	25.3	22.2
Total ^b	100.0 (N=1,314)	100.0 (N=1,628)	100.0 (N=1,477)
Age	Non-Jews		
	1958-64	1968-76 ^a	1977-84
21-29	17.1	22.4	23.5
30-39	24.9	21.3	24.4
40-49	22.0	19.2	16.2
50-59	16.1	16.5	14.9
60+	19.9	20.7	20.9
Total ^b	100.0 (N=26,551)	100.0 (N=40,463)	100.0 (N=36,208)

Source: California Field Polls.

^aData for 1973 are missing.

^bErrors in column totals due to rounding.

higher incomes, and are more likely to be self-employed; they are also more likely to be single or to have smaller families. Since these traits also characterize the Jews who are currently moving to California, they are likely to persist in the near future.

But the Jews do not live in a vacuum; demographically, they have not escaped the currents of California life. There is no single demographic trait for which Jews have moved in a direction different from other Californians. Thus, increasing educational levels result not only from an influx of educated migrants but also from a higher educational system that is open to all Californians. The same factors that have created stress for non-Jewish marriages have led to fewer successful Jewish marriages. Even in racial composition Jews have not been insulated from societal change, acquiring a small but growing number of black and Asian Jews, or some mixture thereof, as well as Hispanic Jews.

The future is likely to bring more of the same for both Jews and non-Jews in California. Immigration of Anglos, which had slowed in the late 1970s, will continue, especially for Jews, centering upon the young and upwardly mobile, but also including some of the elderly. Jews will continue to succeed in socioeconomic terms, being disproportionately represented among the most highly educated and economically comfortable segments of California society.

It may perhaps be that California has passed the peak of a demographic upheaval like that which occurred on the East Coast in the 30 years prior to 1920. When the process is finished, the California Jewish community will be more numerous and powerful than ever before. After that, the numbers will depend primarily on rates of birth and assimilation, and prosperity will continue to be tied to education and the general economic condition of the state.

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Jewish Population in the United States, 1985

THE JEWISH POPULATION in the United States in 1985 is estimated to be 5.835 million. This figure is approximately the same as that reported for 1984, and reflects the absence of demographic factors making for population increase.

The basic population units are the fund-raising areas of local Jewish federations, which may represent one county or an aggregate of several counties. In Table 3, those communities shown with two asterisks have indicated changes in their Jewish populations in 1985; those with a single asterisk have submitted current estimates, but have indicated no changes in numbers. While less than a quarter of all communities have supplied population estimates for 1985, the total population of the responding communities accounts for more than 90 percent of the estimated total population of Jews in the United States in 1985.

The state and regional totals shown in Table 1 and Table 2 are derived by summing individual community estimates, shown in Table 3, and then making three adjustments. First, communities of less than 100 are added. Second, duplications within states are eliminated. Third, communities falling within two or more states (e.g., Washington, D.C., and Kansas City, Missouri) are distributed accordingly.

In almost every instance, local estimates refer to "Jewish households," i.e., households in which one or more Jews reside. As a consequence, non-Jews are included in the count, their percentage of the total being estimated (based on the 1970 National Jewish Population Study and a number of current studies) as between 6 and 7 percent. Assuming this proportion, the number of individuals in "Jewish households" who identify themselves as Jewish in 1985 would be approximately 5.425 million.

Based on recent studies, three communities reported significant changes from their 1984 estimates. Atlanta and Phoenix showed increases: Atlanta from 33,500 to 50,000; Phoenix from 35,000 to 50,000. Philadelphia lowered its estimate from 295,000 to 240,000. These changes, which are reflected in the state and regional totals, are part of the continuing trend toward geographical redistribution that has been evident over the past decade. The Jewish population in the Northeast is decreasing as a proportion of the total Jewish population, while the South's and the West's proportions are increasing.

ALVIN CHENKIN

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1985

<i>State</i>	<i>Estimated Jewish Population</i>	<i>Total Population*</i>	<i>Estimated Jewish Percent of Total</i>
Alabama	9,400	3,990,000	0.2
Alaska	960	500,000	0.2
Arizona	68,285	3,053,000	2.2
Arkansas	2,975	2,349,000	0.1
California	793,065	25,622,000	3.1
Colorado	48,565	3,178,000	1.5
Connecticut	105,400	3,154,000	3.3
Delaware	9,500	613,000	1.6
District of Columbia	24,285	622,823	3.9
Florida	570,320	10,976,000	5.2
Georgia	58,570	5,837,000	1.0
Hawaii	5,550	1,039,000	0.5
Idaho	505	1,001,000	0.1
Illinois	262,710	11,511,000	2.3
Indiana	21,335	5,498,000	0.4
Iowa	5,570	2,910,000	0.2
Kansas	11,430	2,438,000	0.5
Kentucky	12,775	3,723,000	0.3
Louisiana	17,405	4,462,000	0.4
Maine	9,350	1,156,000	0.8
Maryland	199,415	4,439,000	4.5
Massachusetts	249,370	5,798,000	4.3
Michigan	86,125	9,075,000	0.9
Minnesota	32,240	4,162,000	0.8
Mississippi	3,130	2,598,000	0.1
Missouri	64,690	5,008,000	1.3
Montana	645	824,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,865	1,606,000	0.5
Nevada	18,200	911,000	2.0
New Hampshire	5,980	977,000	0.6
New Jersey	430,570	7,515,000	5.7
New Mexico	5,155	1,424,000	0.4
New York	1,915,145	17,735,000	10.8

<i>State</i>	<i>Estimated Jewish Population</i>	<i>Total Population*</i>	<i>Estimated Jewish Percent of Total</i>
North Carolina	14,990	6,165,000	0.2
North Dakota	1,085	686,000	0.2
Ohio	138,935	10,752,000	1.3
Oklahoma	6,885	3,298,000	0.2
Oregon	11,050	2,674,000	0.4
Pennsylvania	353,045	11,901,000	3.0
Rhode Island	22,000	962,000	2.3
South Carolina	8,095	3,300,000	0.2
South Dakota	635	706,000	0.1
Tennessee	19,445	4,717,000	0.4
Texas	78,655	15,989,000	0.5
Utah	2,850	1,652,000	0.2
Vermont	2,465	530,000	0.5
Virginia	60,185	5,636,000	1.1
Washington	22,085	4,149,000	0.5
West Virginia	4,265	1,952,000	0.2
Wisconsin	31,190	4,766,000	0.7
Wyoming	310	511,000	0.1
U.S. TOTAL	**5,834,655	236,031,000	2.5

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

*Resident population, July 1, 1984, provisional. (Source: *Provisional Estimates of the Population of Counties: July 1984*, Bureau of the Census, series P-26, No. 84-52-C, March 1985.)

**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which previously reported Jewish populations of 1,800 and 510, respectively.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1985

<i>Region</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Percent Distribution</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>Percent Distribution</i>
Northeast:	49,728,000	21.1	3,093,330	53.0
New England	12,577,000	5.3	394,555	6.8
Middle Atlantic	37,151,000	15.7	2,698,760	46.3
North Central:	59,118,000	25.0	663,810	11.4
East North Central . .	41,602,000	17.6	540,300	9.3
West North Central . .	17,516,000	7.4	123,515	2.1
South:	80,667,000	34.2	1,100,295	18.9
South Atlantic	39,541,000	16.8	949,625	16.3
East South Central . .	15,028,000	6.4	44,750	0.8
West South Central . .	26,098,000	11.1	105,915	1.8
West:	46,538,000	19.7	977,220	16.8
Mountain	12,554,000	5.3	144,515	2.5
Pacific	33,984,000	14.4	832,710	14.3
TOTALS	236,031,000	100.0	5,834,655	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1985
(ESTIMATED)

<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>
ALABAMA					
Anniston	100	Eureka	250	Tulare & Kings County (incl. in Fresno)	
*Birmingham	4,500	Fontana	165	Vallejo	400
Dothan	205	*Fresno	2,000	Ventura County	6,000
Gadsden	180	Kern County	850		
Huntsville	550	Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)		COLORADO	
*Mobile	1,250	*Long Beach	13,500	Colorado Springs	1,000
**Montgomery	1,650	*Los Angeles Metropoli- tan Area	500,870	**Denver	46,800
Selma	210	Merced	100	Pueblo	375
Tri-Cities*	150	Modesto	260		
Tuscaloosa	315	Monterey	1,500	CONNECTICUT	
ALASKA		Oakland (incl. in Alameda & Contra Costa Counties)		*Bridgeport	18,000
Anchorage	600	Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)		Bristol	250
Fairbanks	210	*Orange County	60,000	Colchester	525
ARIZONA		*Palm Springs	4,950	*Danbury (incl. New Mil- ford)	3,500
**Phoenix	50,000	Pasadena (also incl. in Los Angeles Metropol- itan Area)	2,000	**Greenwich	5,000
*Tucson	18,000	Petaluma	800	*Hartford (incl. New Britain)	26,000
ARKANSAS		Pomona Valley ^c	3,500	Lebanon	175
Fayetteville	120	Riverside	1,200	Lower Middlesex County (incl. in New London) ^d	
Ft. Smith	160	*Sacramento	8,500	Manchester (incl. in Hartford)	
Hot Springs (incl. in Little Rock)		Salinas	350	Meriden	1,400
**Little Rock	1,400	San Bernardino	1,900	Middletown	1,300
Pine Bluff	175	**San Diego	35,000	Milford (incl. in New Haven)	
Southeast Arkansas ^b	140	*San Francisco	80,000	Moodus	150
Wynne-Forest City	110	*San Jose	18,000	*New Haven	22,000
CALIFORNIA		San Luis Obispo	450	New London	3,500
*Alameda & Contra Costa Counties	35,000	San Pedro	300	Newtown (incl. in Danbury)	
Antelope Valley	375	Santa Barbara	3,800	*Norwalk	4,000
Bakersfield (incl. in Kern County)		Santa Cruz	1,000	Norwich	2,500
El Centro	125	Santa Maria	200	Putnam	110
Elsinore	250	Santa Monica	8,000	Rockville (incl. in Hartford)	
		Santa Rosa	750	*Stamford	12,000
		*Stockton	1,500		
		Sun City	800		

<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>
Torrington.....	450	Tallahassee.....	1,000	Quincy.....	200
Valley Area*.....	700	*Tampa.....	10,500	Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
Wallingford.....	440			*Rockford.....	975
**Waterbury.....	2,700	GEORGIA		**Southern Illinois ^b .	900
Westport.....	2,800	Albany.....	525	*Springfield.....	1,100
Willimantic.....	400	Athens.....	250	Sterling-Dixon.....	110
Winsted.....	110	**Atlanta.....	50,000	Waukegan.....	1,200
DELAWARE		*Augusta.....	1,500		
*Wilmington (incl. rest of state).....	9,500	Brunswick.....	120	INDIANA	
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		*Columbus.....	1,000	Anderson.....	105
*Greater Washing- ton ^c	157,335	Dalton.....	235	Bloomington.....	300
FLORIDA		Fitzgerald-Cordele .	125	Elkhart (incl. in South Bend)	
*Boca Raton- Delray.....	40,000	Macon.....	900	Evansville.....	1,200
Brevard County .	2,250	*Savannah.....	2,600	**Ft. Wayne.....	1,170
*Daytona Beach..	2,000	Valdosta.....	145	Gary (incl. in Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region)	
**Fort Lauderdale ..	110,000	HAWAII		**Indianapolis..	11,000
Fort Pierce.....	270	Hilo.....	100	*Lafayette.....	600
Gainesville.....	1,000	Honolulu.....	5,000	Marion.....	170
*Hollywood.....	60,000	Kona.....	150	**Michigan City....	450
*Jacksonville.....	6,800	Kuail.....	100	Muncie.....	175
Key West.....	170	Maui.....	200	**Northwest Indiana-Calumet Region ^d	3,000
Lakeland.....	800	IDAHO		Richmond.....	110
**Lee County (incl. Ft. Myers).....	3,000	Boise.....	120	Shelbyville.....	140
Lehigh Acres.....	125	ILLINOIS		*South Bend.....	1,900
*Miami.....	253,340	Aurora.....	400	Terre Haute.....	450
*Orlando.....	15,000	Bloomington.....	125		
*Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton).....	45,000	*Champaign- Urbana.....	2,000	IOWA	
Pensacola.....	725	*Chicago Metropolitan Area.....	248,000	Cedar Rapids.....	330
Port Charlotte....	150	Danville.....	240	Council Bluffs.....	245
**Sarasota.....	8,500	Decatur.....	350	Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
St. Augustine.....	100	East St. Louis (incl. in So. Ill.)		**Des Moines.....	3,200
*St. Petersburg (incl. Clearwater)....	9,500	Elgin.....	830	Dubuque.....	105
		Galesburg (incl. in Peoria)		Fort Dodge.....	115
		*Joliet.....	800	Iowa City.....	750
		Kankakee.....	260	Mason City.....	110
		**Peoria.....	1,500	Muscatine.....	120
		**Quad Cities ^e	1,750	Ottumwa.....	150

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**Sioux City	785	MASSACHUSETTS		MICHIGAN	
Waterloo	450	Amherst	750	Ann Arbor (incl. all	
KANSAS		Athol	110	Washtenaw	
Topeka	500	Attleboro	200	County)	3,000
*Wichita	1,000	Beverly	1,000	Battle Creek	245
KENTUCKY		*Boston (incl.		Bay City	650
**Lexington	2,000	Brockton)	170,000	Benton Harbor	650
*Louisville	9,200	Fall River	1,780	*Detroit	70,000
Paducah	175	Fitchburg	300	**Flint	2,765
LOUISIANA		*Framingham	10,000	*Grand Rapids	1,500
Alexandria	700	Gardner	100	Iron County	160
**Baton Rouge	1,400	Gloucester	400	Iron Mountain	105
Lafayette	600	Great Barrington	105	Jackson	375
Lake Charles	250	Greenfield	250	Kalamazoo	1,000
**Monroe	425	Haverhill	1,650	*Lansing	2,100
*New Orleans	12,000	Holyoke	1,100	Marquette	
**Shreveport	1,200	Hyannis	1,200	County	175
MAINE		**Lawrence	3,600	Mt. Clemens	420
Augusta	215	*Leominster	750	Mt. Pleasant	100
Bangor	1,300	Lowell	2,000	Muskegon	235
Southern Maine (excl.		*Lynn (incl. Beverly,		*Saginaw	400
Portland)	950	Peabody, and		South Haven	100
Calais	135	Salem)	19,000	MINNESOTA	
**Lewiston-Auburn	500	Medway (incl. in Fra-		Austin	125
*Portland	5,500	mingham)		*Duluth	1,100
Waterville	300	Milford (incl. in Fra-		Hibbing	155
MARYLAND		mingham)		**Minneapolis	23,000
Annapolis	2,000	Mills (incl. in Framing-		Rochester	240
*Baltimore	92,000	ham)		*St. Paul	7,500
Cumberland	265	*New Bedford	2,700	Virginia	100
Easton Park Area	100	Newburyport	280	MISSISSIPPI	
Frederick	400	North Berkshire	675	Biloxi-Gulfport	100
Hagerstown	275	Northampton	700	Clarksdale	160
Hartford County	500	Peabody	2,600	Cleveland	180
Howard County	4,000	*Pittsfield (incl. all Berk-		Greenville	500
Montgomery and		shire County)	3,100	Greenwood	100
Prince Georges		Plymouth	500	Hattiesburg	180
County'	99,500	Salem	1,150	**Jackson	700
Salisbury	300	Southbridge	105	Meridian	135
		*Springfield	11,250	Natchez	140
		Taunton	1,200	Vicksburg	260
		Webster	125		
		*Worcester	10,000		

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MISSOURI		Flemington	875	NEW MEXICO	
Columbia	350	Gloucester		*Albuquerque	4,500
Joplin	115	County"	165	Las Cruces	100
**Kansas City	19,000	Hoboken	350	Santa Fe	300
Kennett	110	**Jersey City	4,000		
Springfield	230	**Middlesex		NEW YORK	
St. Joseph	343	County°	39,350	*Albany	12,000
*St. Louis	53,500	Millville	240	Amenia	140
		*Monmouth		Amsterdam	595
MONTANA		County	33,600	Auburn	315
Billings	160	Morris-Sussex Counties°		Batavia	165
		(incl. in Essex County)		Beacon	315
NEBRASKA		Morristown (incl. in		*Binghamton (incl.	
Lincoln	750	Morris County)		all Broome	
*Omaha	6,500	Mt. Holly	300	County)	3,000
		Newark (incl. in Essex		Brewster (also incl. in	
NEVADA		County)		Danbury, Ct.)	300
*Las Vegas	17,000	New Brunswick (incl. in		*Buffalo	18,500
Reno	1,200	Raritan Valley)		Canandaigua	135
		North Hudson		Catskill	200
NEW HAMPSHIRE		County°	7,000	Corning	125
Claremont	130	*North Jersey'	32,500	Cortland	440
Concord	350	**Ocean County	9,000	Dunkirk	150
Dover	425	**Passaic-Clifton	7,800	Ellenville	1,450
Keene	105	Paterson (incl. in North		*Elmira	1,100
Laconia	150	Jersey)		Geneva	300
*Manchester	3,000	Perth Amboy (incl.		*Glens Falls	800
Nashua	450	in Middlesex County)		Gloversville	535
Portsmouth	1,000	Plainfield (incl. in Union		Herkimer	185
		County)		Highland Falls	105
NEW JERSEY		Princeton	2,600	Hudson	470
*Atlantic City		Salem	230	Ithaca	1,000
(incl. Atlantic		**Somerset County° 4,300		Jamestown	185
County)	12,000	Somerville (incl. in Som-		*Kingston	3,000
Bayonne	4,500	erset County)		Liberty	2,100
*Bergen County° 100,000		Toms River (incl. in		Loch Sheldrake-	
Bridgeton	375	Ocean County)		Hurleyville	750
*Camden'	28,000	Trenton'	8,500	Monroe	400
Carteret	300	*Union County	32,000	Monticello	2,400
Elizabeth (incl. in Union		**Vineland°	3,290	Mountandale	150
County)		Wildwood	425	*New York City	
Englewood (incl. in		Willingboro (incl. in		Metropolitan	
Bergen County)		Camden)		Area	1,742,500
*Essex County°. 111,000				New Paltz	150

<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>
Newark	220	Hendersonville . . .	105	OREGON	
**Newburgh-		High Point	400	Corvallis	140
Middletown . . .	8,950	Raleigh	1,375	Eugene	1,500
**Niagara Falls . . .	600	Rocky Mount	110	**Portland	8,950
Norwich	120	Whiteville Zone* . .	160	Salem	200
Olean	140	Wilmington	500		
Oneonta	175	Winston-Salem . . .	440	PENNSYLVANIA	
Oswego	100			Aliquippa	400
Parksville	140	NORTH DAKOTA		Allentown	4,980
Pawling	105	Fargo	500	*Altoona	580
Plattsburg	275	Grand Forks	100	Ambridge	250
Port Jervis	560			Beaver (incl. in	
Potsdam	175	OHIO		Pittsburgh)	
Poughkeepsie . . .	4,900	*Akron	6,000	Beaver Falls	350
*Rochester	19,600	**Canton	2,750	Berwick	120
**Rockland		*Cincinnati	22,000	Bethlehem	960
County	60,000	*Cleveland	70,000	Braddock	250
Rome	205	*Columbus	15,000	Bradford	150
Saratoga Springs . .	500	*Dayton	6,000	Brownville	150
Schenectady	5,400	East Liverpool . . .	300	Butler	300
Sharon Springs . . .	165	Elyria	275	Carbon County . . .	125
South Fallsburg . .	1,100	Hamilton	560	Carnegie	100
*Syracuse	9,000	Lima	168	Central Bucks	
Troy	1,200	Lorain	1,000	County	400
*Utica	2,100	Mansfield	600	Chambersburg	340
Walden (incl. in New-		Marion	150	Chester	2,100
burgh-Middletown)		Middletown	140	Coatesville	305
Warwick	100	New Philadelphia . .	140	Connellsville	110
Watertown	250	Newark	105	*Delaware Valley	
White Lake	425	Piqua	120	(Lower Bucks	
Woodbourne	200	Portsmouth	120	County)*	23,000
Woodridge	300	Sandusky	150	Donora	100
		Springfield	340	Easton	1,300
NORTH CAROLINA		**Steubenville . . .	200	Ellwood City	110
**Asheville	1,100	*Toledo	6,300	**Erie	855
**Chapel Hill-		Warren	500	Farrell	150
Durham	2,400	Wooster	200	Greensburg	300
*Charlotte	4,000	**Youngstown . . .	5,000	*Harrisburg	6,500
Fayetteville (incl. all		Zanesville	350	Hazleton	481
Cumberland				Homestead	300
County)	500	OKLAHOMA		Indiana	135
Gastonia	220	Muskogee	120	*Johnstown	550
Goldsboro	120	**Oklahoma City . .	2,325	Kittanning	175
**Greensboro . . .	2,500	*Tulsa	2,900		

<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>	<i>State and City</i>	<i>Jewish Population</i>
Lancaster.....	1,800	**Columbia.....	2,000	Wharton.....	170
Lebanon.....	425	Florence.....	350	Wichita Falls.....	260
Lock Haven.....	140	Greenville.....	600		
McKeesport.....	2,000	Orangeburg		UTAH	
Monessen.....	100	County.....	105	Ogden.....	100
Mt. Pleasant.....	120	Spartanburg.....	295	**Salt Lake City..	2,750
New Castle.....	400	Sumter.....	190		
New Kensington...	560			VERMONT	
*Norristown.....	1,500	SOUTH DAKOTA		Bennington.....	120
North Penn.....	200	**Sioux Falls.....	125	Burlington.....	1,800
Oil City.....	165			Rutland.....	350
Oxford-Kennett		TENNESSEE		St. Johnsburg.....	100
Square.....	180	*Chattanooga....	2,000		
**Philadelphia Metropol-		Johnson City ^a	210	VIRGINIA	
itan Area....	240,000	Knoxville.....	1,350	Alexandria (incl. Falls	
Phoenixville.....	340	**Memphis.....	10,000	Church, Arlington	
**Pittsburgh.....	45,000	**Nashville.....	5,120	County, and urban	
Pottstown.....	700	Oak Ridge.....	240	Fairfax County)33,550	
Pottsville.....	500			Arlington (incl. in	
*Reading.....	2,800	TEXAS		Alexandria)	
Sayre.....	100	Amarillo.....	300	Charlottesville.....	800
*Scranton.....	3,400	**Austin.....	3,800	Danville.....	180
Sharon.....	330	Baytown.....	300	Fredericksburg....	140
State College.....	450	Beaumont.....	400	Hampton (incl. in	
Stroudsburg.....	410	Brownsville.....	160	Newport News)	
Sunbury.....	200	*Corpus Christi..	1,200	Harrisonburg.....	115
Uniontown.....	240	*Dallas.....	22,000	Hopewell.....	140
Upper Beaver.....	500	De Witt County ^a ..	150	Lynchburg.....	275
Washington (incl. in		**El Paso.....	4,700	Martinsville.....	135
Pittsburgh)		*Ft. Worth.....	3,600	*Newport News (incl.	
Wayne County....	210	Galveston.....	630	Hampton).....	2,575
West Chester.....	300	*Houston.....	28,000	*Norfolk (incl. Virginia	
**Wilkes-Barre...	4,200	Laredo.....	420	Beach).....	11,000
Williamsport.....	415	Longview.....	185	Petersburg.....	600
*York.....	1,600	Lubbock.....	350	*Portsmouth (incl.	
		McAllen.....	295	Suffolk).....	1,100
RHODE ISLAND		Odessa.....	150	*Richmond.....	8,000
*Providence (incl. rest of		Port Arthur.....	260	**Roanoke.....	710
state).....	22,000	*San Antonio....	9,000	Williamsburg.....	120
		Texarkana.....	100	Winchester.....	110
SOUTH CAROLINA		Tyler.....	450		
*Charleston.....	3,500	**Waco.....	385	WASHINGTON	
				Bellingham.....	120

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Bremerton (incl. in Seattle)		Parkersburg	155	Manitowoc	115
*Seattle	19,500	Weirton	150	*Milwaukee	23,900
*Spokane	1,000	Wheeling	650	Oshkosh	150
Tacoma	750			**Racine	375
		WISCONSIN		Sheboygan	250
WEST VIRGINIA		Appleton	250	Superior	165
Bluefield-Princeton .	250	Beloit	120	Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee)	
Charleston	1,075	Eau Clair	120	Wausau	155
Clarksburg	205	Fond du Lac	100		
*Huntington	450	*Green Bay	280		
Morgantown	200	**Kenosha	240	WYOMING	
		*Madison	4,500	Cheyenne	255

*Denotes estimates submitted in current year.

**Estimates submitted in current year; represents change from previous estimate.

¹Florence, Sheffield, Tuscumbia.

²Towns in Chicot, Desha, Drew Counties.

³Includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, Upland.

⁴Centerbrook, Chester, Clinton, Deep River, Essex, Killingworth, Old Lyme, Old Saybrook, Seabrook, Westbrook.

⁵Ansonia, Derby-Shelton, Oxford, Seymour.

⁶Greater Washington includes urbanized portions of Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, in Maryland; Arlington County, Fairfax County (organized portion), Falls Church, Alexandria, in Virginia.

⁷Rock Island, Moline (Illinois); Davenport, Bettendorf (Iowa).

⁸Towns in Alexander, Bond, Clay, Clinton, Crawford, Edwards, Effingham, Fayette, Franklin, Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Lawrence, Mascoupin, Madison, Marion, Massac, Montgomery, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Randolph, Richland, St. Clair, Saline, Union, Wabash, Washington, Wayne, White, Williamson Counties.

⁹Includes Crown Point, East Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Munster, Valparaiso, Whiting, and the Greater Calumet region.

¹⁰Towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, Talbot Counties.

¹¹Allendale, Elmwood Park, Fair Lawn, Franklin Lakes, Oakland, Midland Park, Rochelle Park, Saddle Brook, Wykoff also included in North Jersey estimate.

¹²Includes Camden and Burlington Counties.

¹³Includes Morris & Sussex Counties & contiguous areas in Hudson, Somerset & Union Counties.

*Includes Clayton, Paulsboro, Woodbury. Excludes Newfield; see Vineland.

*Includes in Somerset County, Kendall Park, Somerset; in Mercer County, Hightstown.

*See footnote (m).

*Includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, Woodcliff.

*Includes Paterson, Wayne, Hawthorne in Passaic County, and nine towns in Bergen County. See footnote (k).

*Excludes Kendall Park and Somerset, which are included in Middlesex County.

*Includes Mercer County in New Jersey; and Lower Makefield, Morrisville, Newtown, and Yardley in Pennsylvania.

*Includes in Cumberland County, Norma, Rosenheim, Vineland; in Salem County, Elmer; in Gloucester County, Clayton, Newfield; in Cape May County, Woodbine.

*Elizabethtown, Fairmont, Jacksonville, Lumberton, Tabor City, Wallace, Warsaw, and Loris, S.C.

*Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Pennel, Warrington, Yardley. Also includes communities listed in footnote (u).

*Includes Kingsport and Bristol (including the portion of Bristol in Virginia).

*Includes communities also in Colorado, Fayette, Gonzales, and La Vaca Counties.

Israel

Political Affairs

N EARLY ALL OF 1984 was taken up with the elections to the 11th Knesset and surrounding events: the opposition's successful attempts to bring down the government; the precampaign selection of party lists; the actual campaign, culminating in the July 23rd election; and, finally, protracted interparty negotiations which produced a government unlike any that coalition-rich Israel had ever seen. By the time this last event had occurred, the year was three-quarters over.

TOWARD AN ELECTION

Early in the year the Labor Alignment, encouraged by polls that showed it well ahead of the ruling Likud party, intensified its efforts to topple the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. The government coalition, reeling under the double burden of an economy threatening to lurch out of control and continuing guerrilla warfare in Lebanon, was also wracked by personal feuding within the two main components of the Likud bloc, Herut and the Liberal party. This state of affairs was reflected in the polls, which showed the prime minister trailing former president Yitzhak Navon as the "person most suited" to lead the country; more concretely, it seriously hampered the government's day-to-day functioning. Thus, in mid-January the coalition lost three Knesset votes in one week, including one on an issue central to the Likud government's ethos: a motion regarding a freeze on settlements in the administered areas.

On January 25 the government coalition barely survived three no-confidence motions. These grew out of threats by the Tami party, whose three votes were crucial for the coalition, to bolt unless its demands were met. The ethnic-oriented Tami party (which was back to full strength after its leader, MK Aharon Abuhatzira, had served a three-month jail sentence on fraud charges) was making political capital of a recently issued report showing the spread of poverty in the country. Essentially, Tami wanted greater social benefits for the large, low-income families which presumably formed its constituency, and was not deterred in its demands by the Treasury's near bankruptcy. In the event, Tami fell into line—having wrung

secret economic pledges from the finance minister and other coalition leaders—and the government survived.

The unsavory spectacle surrounding this affair led Minister Without Portfolio Mordechai Ben-Porat to threaten resignation. At the January 29 cabinet meeting, Ben-Porat pledged to support the government in principle, but said that he would judge each issue "on its own merits." With Tami making waves, and the support of Ben-Porat and former finance minister MK Yigael Hurvitz (who abstained on the no-confidence motion) wavering, the coalition, with an ostensible majority of 64-56, found itself in a precarious position.

PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN

On March 22 the Knesset voted on a motion for the agenda, submitted by the Alignment, calling for the dissolution of parliament and early elections. Labor had played its hand well. Tami, riding high, so it believed (the voters were to judge differently), on the crest of the social-welfare concessions it had extracted from the Treasury, and stung by reports that the party's Swiss patron, Nessim Gaon, had been refused financial concessions by that same Treasury, announced that it would vote for the Alignment bill. Not even the hurried return of a parliamentary delegation from Argentina in the midst of a key mission (see "Israel and World Jewry") could help the government stave off defeat, since both MK Ben-Porat and MK Yitzhak Berman (Likud-Liberal), another maverick, had also decided to cast their votes with the opposition. An 11th-hour maneuver by the Likud—getting the House Committee to approve a secret ballot—was ruled out by Speaker Menahem Savidor after consultation with the attorney general. (Savidor was later dropped by the Liberals from their Knesset list for his pains.) Reinforced by the coalition defectors, the opposition pushed through the vote 61-58. The one uncast vote belonged to former prime minister Menachem Begin, who continued to remain in seclusion.

About a week later Prime Minister Shamir met with Labor party leader Peres and the two agreed on July 23 as election day. Peres came under criticism from within Labor and from the left-of-center parties for having consented to this date, the conventional wisdom (which proved to be correct) being that a late July poll would cost the Labor Alignment and its natural allies votes, since supporters of this bloc constituted a disproportionate number of the Israelis who went abroad during the summer.

As the traditional parties geared up for the campaign, they were joined by some new faces, whose impact was to be considerable. On the eve of the crucial Knesset vote, Ezer Weizman, a highly popular former air force commander who had served as defense minister in the first Begin government and had played a key role in bringing about the peace treaty with Egypt, announced that he was forming a centrist party. Weizman believed that he could better the performance of Yigael Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) in 1977, and, by siphoning off

votes from both the Likud and the Alignment, emerge as a major Knesset force. Two other new lists formed around this time: the Sephardi Torah Guardians (Shas), an ultra-Orthodox religious (rather than ethnic) list that had already scored impressive gains in municipal elections in Bnei Brak and Jerusalem and was to prove a surprise factor in the Knesset elections as well, challenging the Ashkenazi hegemony in the religious-political sphere; and the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), an Arab-Jewish list (50-percent representation for each nationality) that was also to do well, its primary challenge being to the long-established Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, Israel's Communist party, and like it drawing its votes almost exclusively from Israel's Arab citizens.

In the Labor party, victory was considered virtually a foregone conclusion, given the economic crisis—labor unrest, runaway inflation, and panicky economic behavior by a public fearful of drastic postelection measures—and the seemingly unresolvable situation in Lebanon, where Israeli casualties mounted, with nothing to show in return. For Labor, then, the unstated slogan was “don't rock the boat.” Thus, on March 30 both Yitzhak Navon and Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres's former arch rival in the party, announced that they would not contest the party leadership.

The Likud's precampaign road was less smooth. Although Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, who had mounted a fairly strong challenge to Shamir for the Herut party leadership the previous September, following Menachem Begin's resignation, announced (April 4) that as a “personal sacrifice” in the interest of party unity he would not contest the top spot, Minister Without Portfolio Ariel Sharon proved less altruistic. (Sharon had been forced to resign as defense minister in February 1983 following the publication of the Kahan Commission of Inquiry report into the massacre at two Beirut refugee camps the previous September.) On April 12 Sharon obtained a surprising 42.2 percent of the vote in Herut's Central Committee against Shamir. However, a month later, when the Central Committee met to finalize the party's list, the second slot (after Shamir) went to David Levy, followed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens. Sharon was placed fourth.

Two events in May seriously harmed Herut's image. One was a squabble with its Likud partner, the Liberal party, regarding the order of candidates on the final combined list. The second was former prime minister Begin's decision not to stand in the honorary 120th slot on the Likud list. Begin was also evasive about whether he would campaign on behalf of the party. (In the event, he did not, although he did make a donation to the Likud's campaign chest.)

No fewer than 26 lists were initially approved by the Central Elections Committee after the May 31 registration deadline had passed. Thirteen of them were entirely new, including Ezer Weizman's Yahad party; Shas; the PLP; Morasha (headed by Rabbi Haim Druckman, who had earlier broken with the National Religious party); Yigael Hurvitz's Ometz list; and the “Lova Eliav for the Knesset” list, headed by a former Labor-party secretary-general who had quit the party when he felt that Labor was swinging too far rightward. (Eliav could not be dissuaded from running by the argument that he would not obtain enough votes for a Knesset seat and would

only draw off votes from the dovish left—which is precisely what transpired, in an election where every vote made a difference.)

Some of the lists were very narrowly focused, such as the Tenants Protection League, the Organization for the Disabled, and a one-man list—the Movement for the Abolition of the Income Tax. Also running was former MK Shmuel Flatto-Sharon, who was sentenced by the Supreme Court, at the end of June, to 18 months' imprisonment (of which 15 months were suspended), following his appeal of a lower-court conviction on charges stemming from electoral offenses, including bribery, in the 1977 election campaign, when he was elected to the Knesset. Even though the start of his jail sentence was deferred by 45 days, Flatto-Sharon's hope of staying out of prison under parliamentary immunity regulations was dashed when he failed even to cross the election threshold, placing 23rd out of the 26 lists.

Uncertainty about the final lists resulted when, on June 1, the legal adviser to the Defense Ministry announced that Defense Minister Arens was considering outlawing the newly founded PLP under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945. The PLP viewed this threat as retaliation for efforts by the Labor Alignment and two other parties to have Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach list disqualified on the grounds that its platform was racist. Although Arens finally decided not to outlaw the PLP, the Defense Ministry announced that after having made a "detailed examination" of the facts, it was "convinced" that the PLP harbored "subversive elements" and that "central people" on it identified with "enemies of the state." Encouraged by these charges, the Likud and its allies, notably the Tehiya party, requested the Central Elections Committee to disqualify the PLP. On June 17 the committee (composed of representatives of all the parties with seats in the outgoing Knesset) voted 18-10, with seven abstentions, to disqualify Kach; the committee's chairman, Supreme Court justice Gavriel Bach, voted for disqualification, as did some of the Likud representatives. The following day, in tit-for-tat fashion, the committee voted 17-12, with four abstentions (Bach among them), to disqualify the PLP as well. Both lists petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn the decision, and on June 28 five justices ruled unanimously that both parties could take part in the elections.

THE CAMPAIGN

With memories of the stormy and traumatic 1981 election campaign still vivid, the Likud and the Alignment, prodded by Justice Bach, on June 11 signed an agreement to run a fair, clean campaign. Barred were "physical violence, threats of violence or incitement to violence," references to people's national or ethnic origin or religious affiliation, "degrading" caricatures, and organized attempts to disrupt election rallies. The Alignment, being given as many as 55 seats by the polls at this stage, with another 11 going to parties of the left and center, proceeded on the assumption that a heated campaign would only play into the hands of the Likud. This proved to be sound reasoning, as the Alignment's unwillingness to be drawn into the kind of invective-laden rhetoric that had marked the two previous elections hampered the

Likud's ability to get its campaign off the ground. With the economy and the Lebanon war ruled out as issues for it to run on, and the Jewish settlement theme set back by the arrest of the Jewish terrorist organization that had operated in the territories, the Likud turned, as in the past, to *ad hominem* attacks on Shimon Peres. Peres's image as an opportunistic wheeler-dealer, a cliché of Israeli political folklore, was mercilessly played up, particularly in television commercials. In a subtle variation on this theme, the Likud claimed that "the neighborhoods"—meaning the low-income groups of oriental origin—had been imbued with a "new pride" during the Likud's years in power because the Likud had put an end to "Mapai protectionism."

Hoping to attract disaffected Likud supporters, Labor opted for a "soft-sell" approach. However, by trying to avoid giving offense to voters on the Right, the campaign team opened itself to charges of hiding the real issues of the election. Whether the tactic ultimately swayed any Likud voters is moot. What cannot be gainsaid is that it alienated potential Labor voters, as manifested in the swing to center and left-of-center parties in traditional Labor strongholds, notably the kibbutzim.

ELECTION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The biggest losers in the campaign were the pollsters. So unanimous were they in their predictions of a substantial Alignment victory that even though the gap between the two major parties narrowed perceptibly at the very end of the campaign—as "floating" voters cast anchor and errant Likud supporters decided to "come home"—the actual result of the vote took everyone by surprise. (See table below.) Voters reacted to the lackluster campaigns of the two major parties by turning to the smaller lists, where the issues were clearly enunciated. The upshot was that the Alignment and the Likud, which between them accounted for 95 seats in the outgoing 10th Knesset, were reduced to 85 seats in the newly elected parliament; concomitantly, there was a 50-percent increase in the number of lists represented in the Knesset, from 10 in 1981 to no fewer than 15 three years later.

ELECTIONS TO THE 11TH KNESSET (July 23, 1984) AND 10TH KNESSET (June 30, 1981)

	1984	1981
Eligible voters	2,654,613	2,490,140
Valid votes cast ^a	2,073,321	1,937,366
Valid votes cast for parties not qualifying ^a	58,978	99,903
Valid votes counting in allocation of seats ^b	2,014,343	1,837,463
Quota per Knesset seat ^b	16,786	15,312

Party	Popular Vote (%)		Net Gain or Loss	Knesset Seats		
	1984	1981		1984	1981	Net Gain or Loss
Alignment	724,074 (34.9)	708,536 (36.6)	-(1.7)	44	47	-3
Likud	661,302 (31.9)	718,941 (37.1)	-(5.2)	41	48	-7
Tehiya-Tzomet	83,037 (4.0)	44,700 (2.3)	+(1.7)	5	3	+2
National Religious ...	73,530 (3.5)	95,232 (4.9)	-(1.4)	4	6	-2
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality .	69,815 (3.36)	64,918 (3.46)	-(0.1)	4	4	—
Sephardi Torah Guardians	63,605 (3.06)	— —	—	4	—	+4
Shinui	54,747 (2.6)	29,837 (1.5)	+(1.1)	3	2	+1
Citizens Rights and Peace Movement ..	49,698 (2.4)	27,921 (1.4)	+(1.0)	3	1	+2
Yahad	46,302 (2.2)	— —	—	3	—	+3
Progressive List for Peace	38,012 (1.8)	— —	—	2	—	+2
Agudat Israel	36,079 (1.7)	72,312 (3.7)	-(2.0)	2	4	-2
Morasha	33,287 (1.6)	— —	—	2	—	+2
Tami	31,103 (1.5)	44,466 (2.3)	-(0.8)	1	3	-2
Kach	25,907 (1.2)	5,128 (0.3)	+(0.9)	1	—	+1
Ometz	23,845 (1.15)	— —	—	1	—	+1
Lova Eliav for the Knesset	15,348 (0.7)	— —	—	—	—	—
Organization for the Disabled	12,329 (0.6)	— —	—	—	—	—
Renewal (Mordechai Ben-Porat)	5,876 (0.3)	— —	—	—	—	—
Immigration and Youth	5,794 (0.27)	— —	—	—	—	—
Shiluv	5,499 (0.26)	— —	—	—	—	—
Atzma'ut	4,887 (0.2)	4,710 (0.2)	—	—	—	—
Tenants Protection League	3,195 (0.15)	— —	—	—	—	—
Flatto-Sharon	2,430 (0.1)	10,823 (0.6)	-(0.5)	—	—	—
Movement to Abolish Income Tax	1,472 (0.07)	503 (0.03)	+(0.04)	—	—	—
Homeland	1,415 (0.07)	— —	—	—	—	—
Amcha	733 (0.035)	460 (0.02)	+(0.015)	—	—	—

^aOnly lists receiving at least 1 percent of the valid votes cast—i.e., 20,733 in 1984—are entitled to share in the allocation of seats.

^bThe quotient for one Knesset seat is the number of valid votes cast for the lists qualifying—i.e., 2,014,343 in 1984—divided by 120 (the number of Knesset seats). Thus the quotient in 1984 was 16,786.

Because coalition arithmetic was so complex, with neither major party able to put together a narrow-based coalition, pundits termed the election results "inconclusive." Yet from a long-term perspective, the electorate had spoken very conclusively indeed. Primarily, the vote demonstrated that in the years since 1977 the Likud had carved out a solid electoral base on which it could rely even if its immediate record was uninspiring. At the same time, the results ruled out the possibility that Yitzhak Shamir could consolidate his position as undisputed leader of Herut and heir to Menachem Begin. Challenges to his position within Herut, such as that by Sharon prior to the election, were bound to intensify. In the other political camp, Labor's attempt to project itself as all things to all people proved untenable. Patently, the party would have to stake out its own ground more precisely if it wished to retain the support of its ideological constituency.

What also emerged conclusively from the election—the handwriting had been on the wall for a long time—was the radicalization of the Israeli polity. This was manifested most strikingly on the Right, where Tehiya increased its strength significantly, and where Rabbi Meir Kahane, having failed in several previous attempts, won a Knesset seat. Since Kahane had run on an unabashedly racist platform—several of his television ads were disqualified by Justice Bach because they were of an inflammatory nature—his election confirmed the worst fears of those who had been warning against growing trends of "Jewish fascism" in the country. Further confirmation came on the day after his election, when Kahane and about 200 of his followers staged a "victory march" through the streets of Jerusalem. As they moved through the Old City, they vandalized Arab-owned shops, keeping up a constant shout of "Death to the Arabs!" and "Arabs out!"

Although condemned by all shades of political opinion, Kahane (who summed up his credo when he told reporters after the elections that "the Torah is above and beyond the laws of the state," and that his first act in the Knesset would be to submit a bill aimed at expelling all of the country's Arabs) had obviously touched a responsive chord among certain sections of the populace. Although Kahane received only about 1.2 percent of the vote overall, 2.5 percent of the votes cast in the army went to him. Moreover, as public opinion analyst Hanoch Smith pointed out in the *Jerusalem Post*, not only did Kahane draw fully 3.3 percent of the votes cast in small development towns, he did almost as well in religious moshavim—where the population is overwhelmingly of Asian/African origin—and in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Even in certain fairly large towns, such as Beersheba and Ashkelon, he polled 2 percent of the vote. By contrast, Kahane had almost no support in older cities and neighborhoods where the population is largely of Western (and Ashkenazi) origin. It seemed obvious to many observers that the residents of the development towns, being estranged from the reigning political culture and resentful of the persistent economic and social gap between themselves and Israelis of European origin, were ripe for the appeal of a demagogue offering a convenient scapegoat. Now that Kahane had been "legitimized" by being elected to the Knesset, the likelihood was that some who had previously hesitated to vote for him for

fear of wasting their ballots would give him the nod at the next opportunity. Postelection polls did in fact show Kahane capable of winning as many as five seats. (See also "Political and Religious Extremism.")

A somewhat analogous phenomenon occurred among Israeli Arabs. Here the shift was to the potent ideology of nationalism. According to a voting analysis published in *Ha'aretz*, Arab turnout at the polls increased by about 8 percent as compared with 1981, from 68 to 76 percent. That this substantial rise could be attributed almost entirely to the appearance of the Progressive List for Peace was evident in the dramatic change in outcome. Three years earlier, in 1981, nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the Arab vote had gone to parties clearly identified as Zionist, while the remaining 37 percent went to the Communist list. In 1984 a majority of the country's Arab voters (52 percent) opted for non-Zionist lists—the Communists and the PLP.

A combination of factors seemed to have come into play in this area: an ongoing sense of disaffection vis-à-vis the country's governing establishment, particularly among young Arabs; the cumulative effect of contact between Israeli Arabs and the Palestinian population across the pre-1967 "green line"; and an echoing response, again chiefly among the young, to the growing nationalism among Israel's Jewish population. Nor can the Israeli Arabs' blatant disappointment in the Labor party be overlooked; Labor placed only one Arab in a "safe" position on its list, with Mapam adding one more in the combined Alignment list. This evidence of Labor's "take them for granted" attitude toward its traditional supporters helped account for the drastic falloff in votes for the Alignment in the Arab sector. In 1984 Labor obtained less than one-quarter of the Arab vote (23 percent), as compared with 41 percent (29 percent directly and 12 percent via affiliated Arab lists) three years earlier. In the Knesset, then, the two lists that were oriented toward, and drew their strength from, the Arab population (notwithstanding the presence of Jews on them) obtained six seats, two more than in 1981. Analysts suggested that such a trend could, if continued, give Arab lists control of up to 10 percent of the Knesset within the foreseeable future. Indeed, some maintained that it was precisely the fear of such a development within the Jewish political and security establishments that accounted for the abortive attempts, first by the Defense Ministry and then by the right-wing and religious parties, to force the PLP out of the election campaign.

Whatever the case, the election was held in an atmosphere of intensifying nationalism, at times spilling over into xenophobia among Jews and Arabs both, and fueled to a degree in both nations by religious revivalism.

FORMING A COALITION

The vote had produced a virtually unprecedented situation, with neither of the two large parties able to form a narrow-based coalition without engaging in severe political contortions. Theoretically, the Labor Alignment could have created a coalition with the support—even tacit—of the Communists and the PLP. However,

a majority in the Alignment itself, along with a good number of the potential participants in such a coalition—the religious lists in particular—viewed those two parties with unfeigned abhorrence, a posture which could only confirm the country's Arabs in their sense of alienation from the mainstream.

On August 1, the day after the Central Elections Committee published the official results of the vote, President Chaim Herzog began meeting with delegations of the lists elected to the Knesset in order to determine whom to charge with the task of forming a government. (Breaking with precedent, the president refused to invite Meir Kahane for consultations because, according to an official statement, the president would "not countenance insults to the feelings and honor of many minority citizens—civilians and soldiers, Moslems, Druze, and Christians.") On August 5 Shimon Peres, as the head of the largest Knesset faction, was named to form the new government. The president urged the creation of a "government of national unity," citing—as Peres also did in accepting the nomination—the economic situation and the need to mend social and political rifts in the nation.

With almost two weeks of intensive, unofficial give-and-take already behind him, Peres now embarked on the formal government-making process, which was to take 40 more arduous, crisis-ridden days. (By law, the person entrusted with forming the government has 21 days in which to accomplish this task, although the president may grant him an additional 21 days if he deems it necessary.) Adding to Peres's problems, the Likud let it be known that while it would agree to enter into talks on a possible unity government, it would simultaneously proceed with efforts to form a government under its own leadership. The Likud took this step, which both flouted the constitutional process and showed contempt for the president's decision, in the not unreasonable belief that despite its second-place finish and 14-percent decrease in Knesset representation (from 48 seats to 41), its prospects of forming a government were equal to if not better than the Alignment's. It was axiomatic that, overall, the religious parties found the Likud a more congenial coalition partner than Labor, and it was assumed that Ezer Weizman would, whether out of opportunism or nostalgia, support a Likud-led coalition as well.

The Alignment, too, paralleled its unity-government efforts with (legitimate) attempts to form a government on its own, courting the National Religious party in particular. The NRP had been reduced to 4 seats, down from 6 in 1981 and 12 in 1977. The fact that the religious vote was so fragmented, with six parties (including Tami and Kach) splitting 13 Knesset seats, made the coalition talks all the more difficult, since each list had its own set of demands, and all of them sought to outdo one another in winning "achievements" for the religious camp.

At all events, on August 9 Likud and Alignment leaders met at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem to explore the possibility of forming a national unity government. However, this and subsequent meetings were generally viewed as merely a public relations ploy intended to satisfy the president and the growing popular sentiment for a unity government, at the same time concealing intensive behind-the-scenes efforts by each party to form a narrow-based coalition. In the meantime, the 11th

Knesset was formally inaugurated on August 13 with the traditional presidential speech. As some 2,000 persons demonstrated outside the Knesset building against Meir Kahane and called for the enactment of a law barring racism in Israel, the president told the new parliament that its test would lie in how firmly it shored up democracy and safeguarded the "principles of justice and the supremacy of the law" in the country.

It was only in the third week of Peres's first 21-day period that the Likud began to negotiate in earnest, spurred by the dropping of a bombshell by Ezer Weizman into the desultory unity talks. Bitterly disappointed at having won only three seats, but mollified somewhat by his emergence as coalition kingmaker, Weizman announced on August 20 that he and MK Yigael Hurvitz would refuse to participate in a narrow-based Likud-led coalition. A formal parliamentary cooperation agreement signed two days later by Weizman and Peres, which all but brought the Yahad list into the Alignment, still did not assure the Alignment of being able to form its own government, but the loss of the four seats controlled by Weizman and Hurvitz did rule out a Likud government.

On August 24 Peres and Shamir met privately—the first in a series of such conversations—to consider the avenues open to them. The unstated bond between them was forged by their desire to break the political impasse without resort to new elections, since both men were keenly aware that their future political careers were on the line. Peres, having already led his party to two previous defeats, would not be given a fourth chance. Nor would Shamir, at age 68, and with David Levy and Ariel Sharon breathing down his neck, get another opportunity to lead either his party or the country.

With these developments as a backdrop, on August 26 Shimon Peres requested and was granted a further three weeks to form a government.

The Likud having moved to block any possible remaining Alignment option of forming a narrow-based government by signing a parliamentary agreement-in-principle with the two-man ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel party—as it was to do shortly thereafter with the party largely responsible for halving the Agudah's Knesset representation, Shas—Peres and Shamir met on August 29 for the third time in three days and managed to overcome the outstanding major obstacles to the formation of a national unity government. They decided on a rotating premiership that would change hands at the midpoint of the 50-month government, with Peres to hold the post first (the Likud having come to terms with the inevitable in this regard). They further agreed that the defense portfolio would be held by Labor's Yitzhak Rabin for the entire tenure of the national unity government, this being a *sine qua non* for Peres, who had to deliver the Defense Ministry to Rabin or see the feud between them, now quiescent, erupt again.

Yet it was only after another full week of talks and three more Peres-Shamir meetings (September 4, 5, 6) that the final details of the unprecedented agreement were hammered out. In the interim, David Levy and Ariel Sharon once more asserted themselves in Herut, forcing Shamir to inject an entirely new element into

the negotiations. This was a demand that the unity government establish no fewer than 28 settlements in the territories, settlements which the outgoing government had approved but which were still on paper only. Peres balked at this, and only a threat by the NRP that it would seriously consider entering a narrow-based Labor government was able to budge the Likud. So the fifth week of the coalition negotiations ended, their protracted nature in stark counterpoint to the urgency demanded by the deteriorating economic situation and the casualty-ridden stalemate in Lebanon.

Resentment was expressed in both parties over the proposed allocation of ministries. Labor members were dismayed by the assignment of the major economic portfolios to the Likud, especially by the awarding of the industry and trade portfolio to Ariel Sharon, architect of the Lebanon war, who would, ironically, secure "public rehabilitation" under a Labor prime minister. In the Likud there was anger that the coveted defense portfolio would remain in Alignment hands for the entire 50-month span of the government. The other major portfolio, foreign affairs, would continue to be held by Shamir, who would also serve as "vice prime minister" for the first 25 months, at which time he and Peres would switch posts.

Shamir survived another mutiny in his party's ranks, though not without a further erosion of authority, when Levy and Sharon demanded a secret ballot by the Herut Central Committee to choose Herut's ministers, rather than leave the selection in Shamir's hands. Peres, on August 10, obtained a 70-percent majority in Labor's Central Committee vote on forming a national unity government. However, the price he paid was heavy. Mapam's Central Committee, declaring that the proposed government would prove incapable either of solving the "burning" socioeconomic issues facing the country or of advancing the peace process, on August 9 voted almost unanimously to dissolve the Labor Alignment, which had been created prior to the 1969 elections. On the same day, maverick MK Yossi Sarid bolted the Labor party and joined the Citizens Rights and Peace Movement.

Just as the coalition agreement seemed to have been settled, Ariel Sharon precipitated a new crisis. He insisted that the Likud honor its agreement with Shas by ensuring that that party receive the religious affairs portfolio; this in the face of an identical Alignment pledge to the NRP. Finally, after almost nonstop negotiations in the sixth and final week left to Peres, he and Shamir decided in the early morning hours of September 13 that both the religious affairs and interior portfolios—the latter also demanded by the NRP—would be entrusted to the prime minister for a month, during which period an acceptable solution would be sought.

The agreement, which was at last signed by six representatives each from the Likud and the Alignment in the afternoon of September 13, spelled out the technical arrangements for the national unity government. Its first principle stipulated not only an equal number of cabinet ministers from each party but "creation of a balance when other factions join, such that neither camp achieves a majority over the other," with the NRP representative in the cabinet considered to belong to neither "camp" and thus effectively having the tie-breaking vote. The highly personal nature of the

THE NATIONAL UNITY CABINET

(installed on September 14, 1984)

Prime Minister	Shimon Peres (Alignment-Labor)
Vice Prime Minister & Minister of Foreign Affairs	Yitzhak Shamir (Likud-Herut)
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Education and Culture	Yitzhak Navon (Alignment-Labor)
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Construction and Housing	David Levy (Likud-Herut)
Agriculture	Aryeh Nachamkin (Alignment-Labor)
Communications	Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui)
Defense	Yitzhak Rabin (Alignment-Labor)
Economy and Planning	Gad Ya'akobi (Alignment-Labor)
Energy and Infrastructure	Moshe Shahal (Alignment-Labor)
Finance	Yitzhak Modai (Likud-Liberals)
Health	Mordechai Gur (Alignment-Labor)
Immigrant Absorption	Ya'akov Tzur (Alignment-Labor)
Industry and Trade	Ariel Sharon (Likud-Herut)
Interior	Shimon Peres ^a
Justice	Moshe Nissim (Likud-Liberals)
Police	Haim Bar-Lev (Alignment-Labor) ^b
Religious Affairs	Shimon Peres ^a
Science and Development	Gideon Patt (Likud-Liberals)
Tourism	Avraham Sharir (Likud-Liberals)
Transport	Haim Corfu (Likud-Herut)
Without Portfolio	Moshe Arens (Likud-Herut)
	Yosef Burg (NRP) ^a
	Yigael Hurvitz (Ometz)
	Yitzhak Peretz (Shas) ^a
	Yosef Shapira (Morasha) ^c
Minister in the Prime Minister's Office	Ezer Weizman (Alignment-Yahad)

^aPrime Minister Peres held the interior and religious affairs portfolios until December 24, when Yitzhak Peretz and Yosef Burg took them over, respectively, following Knesset approval.

^bThe Ministry of Police was formally separated from the Interior Ministry by Knesset vote on September 24.

^cNot a Knesset member.

accord was pointed up by another key clause which stated that if either Peres or Shamir proved "unable to perform his task for any reason," the party involved would choose someone to take his place "with the agreement of the other side" (emphasis added). The implication was that if "the other side" were to refuse its assent, the agreement would be rendered null and void. Because of the unwieldy size

of the cabinet—no fewer than 25 ministers would eventually be part of that body—and to smooth ruffled feathers, the coalition agreement provided for the creation of a so-called inner cabinet, consisting of five Likud and five Alignment ministers, which would be empowered to decide on “policy, defense, and settlement issues.” As for the innovative rotation of the premiership, the agreement stipulated that

Mr. Shimon Peres will resign from his post as prime minister [under Israeli law, the prime minister's resignation is tantamount to the resignation of the entire government] toward the end of the first 25 months of the government's tenure, and the Alignment and the Likud will together recommend to the president to charge Mr. Yitzhak Shamir with the task of forming a government. The new government will be established at the conclusion of the first 25 months.

All ministers other than Peres and Shamir would retain their portfolios for the full four-year term of the 11th Knesset. Since the coalition was not dependent on the religious parties for a Knesset majority, the normally vexatious religious issue was resolved in the laconic declaration that “the preservation of the status quo on religious matters will be ensured.”

With respect to policy, the new government's “basic guidelines” included “continuing and extending the peace process in the region; consolidating the peace with Egypt; and withdrawing the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from Lebanon while ensuring the security of the northern settlements”; a reaffirmation that “Jerusalem, Israel's eternal capital, is one indivisible city under Israeli sovereignty”; a call to Jordan to enter peace negotiations and a pledge by the government to “consider proposals raised by Jordan in the negotiations”; and opposition to the establishment of “an additional Palestinian state” in the Gaza Strip or “in the area between Israel and Jordan,” as well as to any negotiations between Israel and the PLO. As for the highly contentious issue of the territories, there would be “no change in the sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District except with the consent of the Alignment and the Likud.” Settlements already established would have their “existence and development” assured, while “five [or] six settlements will be established within a year.”

In the crucial economic sphere, the goals included curbing inflation and renewing economic growth, *inter alia* “by reducing the proportion of public and administrative services.” Also to be reduced were public expenditure and private consumption. A “socioeconomic agreement” was to be worked out with the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor). Section 26 added, almost as an afterthought, that the government's economic policy would be “based on a comprehensive program,” something conspicuously lacking in earlier attempts to heal the economy.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

In the evening hours of September 13, the new Speaker of the Knesset, the Alignment's Shlomo Hillel (elected to the post the previous day by a vote of 60-46

over the Likud's Meir Cohen-Avidov), called on Shimon Peres to present his new government and its basic guidelines for a vote of confidence. Although the outcome of that vote was a foregone conclusion, an atmosphere of tense expectancy prevailed as Peres took the podium. This was generated not only by curiosity about the new hybrid government but also by the fact that, when all was said and done, a Labor government was taking the reins of power again after seven years. There was admiration, too, which cut across party lines, for the tenacity shown by Shimon Peres, who had finally achieved the post he had coveted openly ever since Golda Meir's resignation as prime minister following publication of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry report in 1974.

Taking as his theme the need for reconciliation at home and conciliation with Israel's neighbors in the region, Peres pledged to introduce "a new and beneficent style" of government that would try to overcome the divisions in the country. The first of the "pressing and demanding" challenges confronting the government, he said, was the "crisis in the economy." This would be dealt with, he promised, "not by imposing harsh measures but by maintaining a constant dialogue" between Histadrut, private employers, farmers, and government. Regarding Lebanon, the objective was "to guarantee the safety of the Galilee settlements and to bring our soldiers home."

Peres called on King Hussein to enter negotiations with Israel, "in order to attain genuine peace," and said his government would endeavor to resolve amicably its differences with Egypt. Reaffirming that "the friendship of the American people is very precious" to Israel, Peres expressed the hope for continued "mutual trust and close cooperation" between Israel and the United States. The prime minister-designate called on Moscow to renew its diplomatic relations with Israel and to "open its gates to our people." Elsewhere in the international arena, he said, Israel would pursue its diplomatic efforts in Africa, improve ties with Europe and Latin America, and "we shall once again knock on great China's door."

Yet, Peres continued, it was domestically that "our principal effort must be made." The urgent task was "to root out enmity, violence, incitement, discrimination, and intolerance in our good land." The government would devote special efforts to education and would seek to inculcate the principle of mutual respect based on the equality of all citizens before the law. The country's Arab and Druze minorities would be helped to further their development, Peres pledged. Finally, referring to the relations between Israel and the Diaspora, he declared: "We believe that the place of every Jew is ultimately in the homeland of our people; but we also believe that Israel has an interest in the fate of every Jew and every Jewish Diaspora wherever it may be."

A lively debate, lasting until well after midnight, was followed by a vote of confidence of 89-18 and one abstention. Thus, on Friday, September 14, 1984, Shimon Peres, 61, became Israel's eighth prime minister. The national unity government commanded the support of no fewer than 97 of the 120 Knesset members, the

Alignment (now reduced to 40 seats, including Yahad's 3) and the Likud (41) having been joined in the coalition by the NRP (4), Shas (4), Shinui (3), Morasha (2), Agudat Israel (2), and Ometz (1).

The first meeting of the new cabinet, on September 16, was devoted largely to procedural matters and only partially to the economic situation, but a second meeting four days later, lasting eight hours, was entirely given over to that subject. (See "Economic Developments.") The remainder of the year is best described as a breaking-in period for the new government. Foreign Minister Shamir, under growing pressure within his own party as Peres began to assert himself in the premiership, declared on October 25 that the Likud was remaining in the government "with teeth gritted." About a week later a group of Likud ministers met in what was intended to be the inaugural gathering of a permanent forum to parallel Labor's so-called *sarenu* ("our ministers") group—reminiscent of Golda Meir's "kitchen cabinet"—which met faithfully once a week to discuss the political situation in general and to coordinate positions for the Sunday cabinet meeting. At the Likud meeting, which turned out to be the first and last of its kind, the ministers averred that Peres was going "too fast" on certain foreign policy issues, notably the dispute with Egypt regarding Taba and his intentions vis-à-vis the West Bank.

More serious than these rumblings of discontent was a full-fledged crisis that began to simmer in late November and erupted in December, threatening to topple the government. At issue was the division of the interior and religious affairs portfolios between the NRP and Shas, which was to have been resolved within one month of the government's installation but was allowed to drag on. Shas leader MK Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz actually submitted his resignation from the government in protest at the delay—with the Likud, which was committed to backing Shas, threatening to follow suit—but withdrew it when Peres announced on November 30 that Shas would receive the interior portfolio. However, a new crisis arose when the NRP demanded that certain of the functions (and budgets) of the Interior Ministry—its traditional preserve—be transferred to the Religious Affairs Ministry. Shas balked at this, the NRP was adamant, and Rabbi Peretz had in fact resigned by the time a compromise solution was worked out. Under the compromise, 60 percent of the budgets for the country's religious councils would be channeled through the Interior Ministry and the remainder through the Religious Affairs Ministry. Thus, on December 24 Yitzhak Peretz was confirmed by the Knesset as minister of the interior and Yosef Burg as minister of religious affairs. The national unity government had survived its first crisis.

A poll conducted at year's end, marking Prime Minister Peres's first 100 days in office, gave him a 42-percent popularity rating, up from 18 percent on the eve of the elections and nearly four times the rating enjoyed by Yitzhak Shamir. In an interview in *Ha'aretz* on December 18, Peres said the Likud had shown "mismanagement" of both the economy and the peace process during its years in power. Peres told the interviewer, "I believe in a modern economy which will bring us economic independence, and I believe we have what to talk about with the Arabs.

I want a different governing style: one without hatred, a cultured style, with responsibility." He was, he confessed, "an optimist."

Economic Developments

With the Shamir government unable to implement its own budget-paring decisions and the country plunged into an election atmosphere and campaign for over half of 1984, followed by nearly two months of virtual political paralysis, it was only toward the end of September, after the formation of the national unity government, that a concerted effort was begun to check Israel's rapid descent into economic chaos.

During the first quarter of the year a veritable war of attrition was waged within the government itself over the budget, with the leadership vacillating and ministers wrangling over proposed budget cuts. A growing crisis of public confidence in the entire economic system was fueled by this and other factors: widespread labor unrest as wages, even though ostensibly index-linked, failed to keep pace with spiraling inflation, and a mid-January report of the National Insurance Institute confirming statistically that poverty in the country was increasing. On February 22 the government presented a budget of IS 4.36 trillion (approximately \$32 billion at the time) that called for a 7-percent drop in the standard of living, upped the cost of government services, and provided for a personnel cut of 5,000 from the bloated public-service sector. By the time the Knesset passed the budget bill (March 28) it had already voted to dissolve itself, and it was clear that in an election year many budget clauses would not be implemented.

On May 17 a new two-year cost-of-living-increment accord was signed by employers and the Histadrut. Taking into account Israel's new inflationary reality, the agreement stipulated that the increment would henceforth be paid on a monthly, rather than on a quarterly, basis if the consumer price index climbed by at least 12 percent in any one month (as it did ten times in 1984). A special payment was provided for in the event of a one-month inflation rate of 25 percent or more. The agreement was finalized two days after the announcement of the second-highest monthly inflation rate in Israel's history (at that time)—20.6 percent for April. During the first quarter of the year the government raised the prices of subsidized basic goods by some 30 percent and introduced measures—among them a reduction of one-third (to \$2,000) in the amount of foreign currency Israelis going abroad could purchase—to help stem the rapid depletion of the country's foreign currency reserves.

A momentary bright light in the economic gloom came in May when some 600 persons, including 400 from 20 foreign countries, gathered for the Jerusalem Economic Conference, organized by Minister of Economic Coordination Ya'acov Meridor. Some of the international community's leading industrialists, financiers, and businessmen were present, and, according to Meridor, over 100 contacts for joint ventures were established.

In June the battered dam holding back massive government spending burst in several places in a replay, albeit in more muted fashion, of the 1981 "election economics" foisted on the country by then finance minister Yoram Aridor. With the Likud well behind in the polls, the cabinet approved wage increases for sections of the civil service, along with various other benefits, at a cost to the Treasury of nearly IS 30 billion. Nevertheless, as the election campaign entered its final stage, the country was wracked by a series of strikes and slowdowns involving tens of thousands of workers in the public services. Further complicating the situation were rumors that a major devaluation of the shekel was in the offing immediately after the elections and that restrictive measures would be introduced on the dollar-linked "Patam" accounts that Israelis were allowed to maintain. These fears triggered a massive buying of foreign currency by the public, legally and on the black market, with the result that Israel's foreign currency reserves plunged by at least \$350 million in June alone. The gap between the shekel's official dollar rate and the black-market rate soared to nearly 40 percent, allowing for profiteering on a vast scale.

On July 2, three weeks before election day, the Knesset met in special session and passed into law a bill to protect the public's savings, aiming in this manner both to stem the foreign currency drain by putting an end to speculative behavior and to gain electoral points. Not one vote was cast against the measure. Also passed were a bill granting various education, employment, and housing benefits to discharged soldiers following their compulsory military service, and an amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance granting tax breaks to certain groups. A few days earlier a two-year wage agreement signed between the Histadrut and the government, granting a 15-percent pay rise, had effectively put a halt to labor disputes involving some 240,000 workers. Finally, with just one week to go before election day, the Histadrut and the private-sector associations also signed a new wage accord.

No sooner were the elections over than the government imposed additional levies on Israelis going abroad and barred foreign currency transfers to dependents residing abroad. Although the governor of the Bank of Israel, Moshe Mandelbaum, declared that "urgent" economic action was required, only patchwork attempts were made to deal with the economy during the lengthy coalition negotiations, including freezes on hiring in the public sector and on government contracts. Mandelbaum's own credibility was called into question when it was revealed that the Bank of Israel had engaged in a "bookkeeping maneuver" to conceal the fact that in the immediate preelection period the country's foreign currency reserves were depleted by nearly \$700 million, or double the officially announced figure. This, coupled with a record "injection" into the economy—the traditional euphemism in Israel for printing money—of IS 95 billion, or about \$360 million, in the month of July, attested to the fact that the government had to all intents and purposes lost control of the economy.

In September it was announced that unemployment had risen to 6 percent (about 85,000 persons), that yet another money-printing record had been set (IS 135 billion) in August, and that the month had also seen a further \$200-million drop in the

foreign currency reserves. With only about \$2 billion remaining in the coffers, or \$1 billion below the "red line" level, it was clear that the crisis moment had arrived: Israel's economic viability now depended on an emergency dollar injection from the United States. It was not an auspicious moment for a new government to take office.

At its very first meeting (September 16) the new cabinet authorized Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai to trim the budget by \$1 billion immediately. Four days later the cabinet held a special eight-hour meeting at which the finance minister explained his plans for economic recovery. The initial measures decided on at the cabinet meeting of September 23 (following a 9-percent shekel devaluation on September 17) included a drastic price hike of 18 to 55 percent on subsidized basic commodities. While this was a major step toward the phasing out of subsidization, it was harshly criticized for being implemented just days before the Jewish New Year and the onset of the fall holidays. Other actions announced (though these required Knesset approval) included a tax on automobiles and luxury pleasure craft, an education fee, a tax on the monthly child allowance, and a levy on certain pensions. Price control was imposed on a range of goods, though only after—indeed, because—manufacturers had already raised their prices inordinately in anticipation of just such controls. In an interview with the *Jerusalem Post*, Prime Minister Peres said the nation had to be made aware of "our painful economic reality," which had come to pass because "we have been living well beyond our means." He expressed the hope that "within a year" the worst would be over and Israel would be embarked on "a future of growth and development."

On October 2 the cabinet met in another special session and placed a six-month import ban on about 50 "luxury items," among them ovens, large refrigerators, air conditioners, cars, soft and hard drinks, most furniture, and certain cosmetics. In addition, with Israel's foreign currency reserves having fallen by a further \$323 million in September, and now sufficient for no more than 40 days of essential imports of raw materials and other goods, the amount of foreign currency Israelis could take abroad was halved, to \$1,000. Adoption of these latest measures, coming just a few days before Prime Minister Peres left for the United States on October 7, enabled him to present a more convincing case to administration leaders, who were urging Israel to take more stringent steps. (See also "Foreign Relations.")

One day after the prime minister's return from the United States, the announcement that the September consumer price index had risen by 21.4 percent—the highest increase in the country's history (at that time)—sent the Ministerial Economic Committee into a round of intensive deliberations. A special task force, set up by the finance minister to make recommendations for curbing inflation, submitted its proposals. Some commentators compared the economic situation in Israel to that of the Weimar Republic in the early 1920s. The skyrocketing inflation, now poised on the brink of hyperinflation, meant that wages were worth 20 percent less in real terms than they had been just three months earlier.

In what many observers viewed as a symptomatic case, the long-established Haifa-based Ata textiles plant, employing some 3,000 workers, announced that it

was virtually bankrupt and would have to shut its doors. As furious workers, many of whom had been with the company for 30 or even 40 years, demanded a government bailout, the Histadrut said it would give them its full backing as part of its efforts to combat incipient unemployment. Prime Minister Peres threw his weight behind efforts to find a buyer for the firm, which was losing \$1 million each month, because, as he said, the company was "a byword in Israel."

The major economic breakthrough of 1984 came at the beginning of November (following a further 24-percent price increase in subsidized staples), when the private-sector employers and the government signed an agreement on a so-called package deal (November 2), to which the Histadrut appended its signature the following day. After approving the final terms of the accord at its November 4 session, the cabinet announced that a three-month freeze on all goods and services was in effect as of that day. Emergency regulations were invoked under which prices had to be displayed in shekels and could not be raised above a fixed level. Penalties for violators included a prison term of up to three years and a stiff fine. All prices that had been quoted in dollars were frozen at the shekel rate of November 2 (\$1 = IS 527) for the three-month period. A complicated set of calculations for the forthcoming cost-of-living increments (based on the assumption that the December inflation rate would be below 12 percent) meant that January 1985 wages, paid at the beginning of February, would be eroded by a further 20 percent in real terms as compared with October salaries. A follow-up committee was set up to ensure that what was officially known as the Agreement to Stabilize the Economy was fully implemented. The hope was that the three-month respite, aimed at dealing a death blow to inflation, which was running at an annualized rate approaching 1,000 percent, would enable the government to take the next essential step, one which had proved the bane of previous economic amelioration plans: effecting a deep cut in the state budget.

As the package deal staggered through its first week, marked by confusion, bureaucratic bungling, and criticism that Prime Minister Peres was moving too gradually in the face of the urgent crisis, preliminary budget-trimming negotiations got under way between the Treasury and the ministries. Peres rejected calls by economics professors for a \$2-billion budget cut, pointing out that nearly half of the budget was already earmarked for debt servicing (Israel was now defraying both interest and principal on its loans), leaving no more than \$11.6 billion to finance all government operations. As for the ministers, balk as they might at cuts in their domains, they could hardly remain sanguine in the face of the announcement (on November 15) that the consumer price index had risen by a staggering 24.4 percent in October, sending annualized inflation into the 1,300-percent range.

In the meantime, price stabilization efforts began to have an impact—of which the psychological aspect was not the least important—especially as they were backed up by quick trials for violators of the emergency regulations. At the same time, police cracked down on black-market dealers in foreign currency in Tel Aviv,

and new regulations were issued to prevent Israelis from conducting foreign currency transactions with the numerous "money changers" operating legally in East Jerusalem.

However, efforts to lop even \$550 million from the budget (down from the originally proposed \$1 billion) hit a snag, largely due to the resistance of Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who told the cabinet that the Treasury's demand for a further \$150-million cut in defense spending, above the \$300 million already agreed on, would endanger the country's security. Calls to scrap the prodigiously expensive Lavi jet-fighter project were rejected on the grounds that virtually all the current funding came from the United States, and that dropping the project would throw thousands of engineers out of work and jeopardize the future of Israel's sophisticated technological industries. Strong opposition to any trimming of their budgets was also voiced by the ministers of health, education, labor, and housing. Finally, on November 30, the cabinet decided on a total budget cut of no more than \$375 million, of which \$100 million would come from the defense budget. Since this was less than the rock-bottom \$395-million figure recommended by a ministerial committee composed of Modai, Ya'akobi, Weizman, and Arens, the disgruntled finance minister, Modai, signaled his protest by refusing to take part in the vote. Defense Minister Rabin, who abstained, told Israel Television that the IDF's ability to defend the country in war would be impaired, ongoing security needs would suffer, and army reserve stocks were liable to fall to the level of the eve of the Yom Kippur War. It was decided to reopen discussion of the defense budget in a cabinet meeting to be held at general-staff headquarters.

But even as the ministers haggled, the public was responding favorably to a state of affairs that had not been seen for nearly a decade: a situation of stable prices, quoted in shekels, and one which, as the deputy director-general of the Ministry of Industry and Trade told the *Jerusalem Post*, seemed to have done away with "the dreaded buy-today-because-tomorrow-it-will-cost-more syndrome that has been plaguing us for too long." The November inflation rate, though still extremely high, showed a downward trend—19.5 percent. Looking ahead, the prime minister urged a "year-long stabilization of wages and prices."

In December the country registered the first monthly single-digit rise in the consumer price index in well over a year—3.7 percent. Overall, however, 1984 saw an inflation rate of no less than 444.9 percent, more than double the previous high set just one year earlier. During the year the shekel was once again devalued against the dollar at a rate higher than that of the consumer-price-index increase, this time by nearly 50 percentage points (492.6 percent), the highest of any foreign currency. On the bright side, a decrease was registered in the balance-of-payments deficit, down by 5.5 percent as compared with 1983. However, the country's gross foreign debt remained over \$20 billion, while foreign currency reserves tumbled dangerously by year's end to below the \$2-billion mark. The GNP registered zero growth in fixed prices, and work productivity actually fell by 1 percent, following stability in the previous two years.

On the personal level, private consumption was down by 6 percent in 1984, following increases of 7 percent in each of the two preceding years. The level of per capita consumption in 1984 declined by 3 percent, only the second time since 1950 that such a phenomenon had occurred (the previous instance was in 1980). The most dramatic falloff occurred in the sphere of durable goods, where purchases were off by fully one-third; purchases of private automobiles fell by 42 percent. All told, the standard of living in Israel declined by some 7.5 percent in 1984, with unemployment approaching 7 percent at the end of the year.

Thus, as the economy seemed to be cooling down in the final quarter, there was place for guarded optimism. Indeed, not even the release on December 31 of the long-awaited state comptroller's report on the bank-shares collapse of 1983—a report highly critical of the country's banking and financial establishment—could undermine the feeling that, after a period of drift and deterioration, the Israeli economy was embarked on the road to recovery, however painful that road might turn out to be for the individual Israeli.

The War in Lebanon

It was only at the tail end of 1984, following the installation of the new government, that a serious new effort was launched to break the impasse in Lebanon and to find a way, in accordance with the national unity government's basic guidelines, of "withdrawing the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from Lebanon while ensuring the security of the northern settlements." Although Israeli casualties tapered off during the year, thanks largely to the September 1983 pullback to the Awali River line, on average nearly one IDF soldier was killed every week in Lebanon in 1984. In addition, the year saw the emergence of intense Shi'ite resistance to the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon.

Indeed, the rise of this new element was acknowledged at the year's very outset, with a concentrated Israel Air Force (IAF) bombing (January 4) of a Syrian-backed Shi'ite terrorist base near Baalbek. At the same time, efforts were under way by the IDF's liaison unit to cultivate relations with the Shi'ites in the south, who comprised some 80 percent or more of the population in the area immediately north of Israel. As it turned out, however, this move was a case of too little and too late. Israel's almost exclusively Christian orientation in Lebanon had caused bitter hostility on the part of the Shi'ites, who were now being tagged as the emerging power in Lebanon's Byzantine military-political complex. In the meantime, U.S. special envoy Donald Rumsfeld met on January 6 with Prime Minister Shamir as part of his efforts to try to effect a disengagement-of-forces agreement in Lebanon. However, American resolve vis-à-vis Lebanon had become the victim of Washington's vacillating policy, and the efforts of Rumsfeld and, later, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy proved singularly ineffectual.

On January 14 Major Sa'ad Haddad, commander of the Israeli-backed Christian militia in southern Lebanon, died of cancer, aged 46. Hospitalized for a period at

Rambam Hospital in Haifa, Haddad was sent home at the beginning of the year when the disease reached an irreversible point. Prime Minister Shamir, who attended Haddad's funeral in his home village of Marjayoun along with other Israeli leaders and ranking security personnel, termed him "a great patriot and a true friend of Israel." On April 14, following behind-the-scenes negotiations with Israel, Antoine Lahad, 55, who held the rank of major general when he retired from the Lebanese army in 1983, formally took command of Haddad's 1,200-man force. Lahad, a Christian, launched a drive to double the strength of the militia and to recruit more Shi'ites into it. The new commander's background held out hope that the militia could be incorporated into the Lebanese army as part of a scenario in which Beirut would take responsibility for the south. (Haddad, a defector from the Lebanese army, had been anathema in Beirut.)

Domestic opposition to the war was highlighted by the announcement on January 20 that a suspect had been arrested in the killing of Emil Grunzweig at a 1983 Peace Now demonstration in Jerusalem. (See *AJYB*, Vol. 85, 1985, pp. 281-282.) Police Minister Yosef Burg and ranking police officers told a press conference that the arrest of Yona Avrushmi, 28, on suspicion of having thrown the grenade that took the life of Grunzweig and wounded ten others, marked the end of a year-long investigation, "the most complicated and most intensive" ever conducted by the Israel Police. In a demonstration commemorating the first anniversary of the incident, some 50,000 people marched through Jerusalem to the spot where the murder had occurred. On February 10, exactly one year after the killing, Avrushmi was formally charged in a Jerusalem court with having murdered Grunzweig "in cold blood" and "with malice aforethought." (Avrushmi denied all the charges against him when the trial opened on March 27. As the trial proceeded, it became clear that the suspect had acted alone; he had been enraged by what he considered to be "unpatriotic" actions of the Israeli Left in general, and Peace Now in particular. By year's end the court had recessed and a verdict was being awaited.)

As political disagreement in Israel over the Lebanon war continued unabated, U.S. president Ronald Reagan announced a decision in February to evacuate the marine detachment stationed in Beirut. This move further weakened Israel's position by enhancing Syrian prestige, which in turn enabled Damascus to exert greater leverage on Lebanese president Amin Gemayel. On February 9, two days after the Reagan announcement, three Katyusha rockets landed near Metullah in the Galilee panhandle. No one was hurt, but inhabitants of the area went to their bomb shelters for the first time since the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in June 1982. The following day the IAF struck again at terrorist bases in Lebanon.

Another in the series of Israel-United States policy disagreements over Lebanon developed when Washington signaled Jerusalem that for the sake of saving the Gemayel government—in the face of mounting Syrian political and other pressure on Beirut—Israel should make no objection if Lebanon decided to abrogate its May 17, 1983, accord with Israel, to which Washington itself was also a signatory. Prime Minister Shamir implicitly criticized this U.S. message as well as the U.S. decision

to leave Lebanon when he told Israel Radio (February 11): "There may be some in the United States who believe that Gemayel has no choice but to give in to Syrian aggression. But such a view is the result of weakness or error. I believe that the United States knows, as we do, that aggression is not enfeebled when one gives in to it." Shamir, who warned Lebanon that its abrogation of the agreement would also release Israel from its commitments, also shrugged off the significance of the Katyusha attack, explaining that "what we have prevented, and will continue to prevent, are the systematic barrages of Katyusha and rocket fire which used to occur." This was actually a modification of former prime minister Begin's blanket assertion that no more Katyushas would ever again fall on Galilee.

Israel itself could do no more than issue a verbal condemnation when, on March 5, Lebanon finally succumbed to Syrian pressure and abrogated the May 1983 agreement. Syria, a statement issued by the Prime Minister's Office read, had forced Lebanon "to surrender to a *diktat* which is tantamount to a death sentence on Lebanese independence." As for Israel, the statement continued, it had no recourse but to come up with its own "suitable means for protecting its security," Lebanon having reneged on its international commitments.

A few days later, expectations of an imminent IDF pullback were raised by Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, who told Israel Radio that such a move was needed in order to end the present state of affairs in which the IDF was "stuck in the midst of a hostile civilian population." However, the anticipation generated by Levy's remarks proved premature, and the situation he had described continued to take its toll: 11 soldiers were wounded on March 4 (one of whom later died) when three separate bomb blasts rocked the port of Sidon. In the days following, two civilian workers of the public works department were killed in ambushes while engaged in road work for the IDF in southern Lebanon. Two others had been killed earlier in the year. At home, the Knesset rejected by a vote of 42-33 a Mapam motion for the agenda calling for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the entire course of the Lebanon war. The motion was submitted following the publication of two best-selling books by leading Israeli journalists: *Israel's Lebanon War* by Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, and *Operation Peace for Galilee* by Shimon Shiffer. Their message, backed up by a wealth of newly revealed details, was, as Mapam MK Ya'ir Tzaban put it, that the Lebanon war had been "conceived in deceit and born in duplicity."

On April 7 the IAF struck at a base of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine at Bahamdoun in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Jerusalem earlier that week. According to army sources, the base had been used by terrorists who were connected with the attack, in which one person was killed and 47 wounded. (See also "Terrorism.") In the meantime, after two more Katyushas hit Israeli territory, landing near the border kibbutz of Misgav Am, IDF artillery shelled PLO bases in the eastern Beka'a Valley for the first time in a year.

In what seemed to be turning into an annual spring ritual, the Syrian media in April began to sound warnings about an alleged imminent Israeli preemptive strike,

throwing in charges of U.S. collusion for good measure. One explanation adduced for the rash of Syrian pronouncements was an apparent power struggle under way in Damascus. In any event, Prime Minister Shamir told the Reuters news agency on April 24 that Israel was not contemplating any military operations against Syria, nor was any Syrian buildup of forces discernible. However, he added, in view of the fact that the two countries had fought five wars since 1948, the IDF would continue its vigilance.

One week later (May 1), Syrian troops in Lebanon seized three members of the Israeli liaison unit at Dbaiyeh, north of Beirut. The three, who had evidently driven their car into Syrian-held territory by mistake, were initially branded "saboteurs" and "spies" by the Syrians and taken to Damascus for interrogation. Jerusalem breathed a bit easier when Syria announced that the three would be treated "as prisoners of war according to the Geneva international conventions." (Coincidentally or not, it was not long after this incident that Lebanon asked Israel to close the Dbaiyeh office. After some initial resistance to the move by Israel the office was shut down on July 25—yet another Syrian triumph and the loss, for Israel, of a key site for monitoring developments in Lebanon.) The three errant Israelis were not returned until June 28, as part of an overall Israeli-Syrian prisoner exchange. Israel received at the same time three soldiers captured by the Syrians during the fighting in Lebanon in the summer of 1982, including an air force pilot. The Syrians also transferred five coffins to Israel, two of which were found to contain the remains of Israeli soldiers killed in the Lebanon fighting; the other three could not be identified as Israelis (although three Israelis were still listed as missing in action). In return, the Syrians received 291 prisoners of war, among them 23 officers, as well as 20 civilian security prisoners and the bodies of 70 Syrian soldiers. According to former justice minister Shmuel Tamir, the chief Israeli negotiator in the talks that led up to the prisoner exchange, three Israeli soldiers were still being held by Ahmed Jibril's terrorist organization (it admitted to having only two), while Nayif Hawatmeh's organization was holding one Israeli.

On June 9 some 30,000 persons marked the second anniversary of Israel's incursion into Lebanon by staging a protest march, organized by Peace Now, in Tel Aviv. Speaking in the Knesset on June 12, Yitzhak Rabin, Labor's candidate for defense minister, excoriated the Likud government for its Lebanon policy. With the war now in its third year, Rabin pointed out, Lebanon was under virtual Syrian control, the Beirut government was inimical to Israel, there were 20,000 terrorists in Lebanon, and "Shi'ite Khomeinist terrorism" had emerged as a factor against Israel. Rabin went on to call for a two-stage IDF withdrawal from Lebanon within six months, with UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) and a beefed-up Southern Lebanon Army (SLA), the successor to the Haddad militia, to take the place of Israeli troops and to prevent terrorist infiltration.

Meanwhile, as the election campaign at home gained momentum, Israeli forces in Lebanon continued to sustain heavy casualties. On June 16 five soldiers were wounded near Sidon when a suicide driver blew up his car as he drove by an IDF

convoy. Earlier that week four soldiers were wounded when a roadside bomb went off near Tyre, and three more were hurt when their vehicle was hit by light-arms fire from an ambush south of the Zaharani River. On June 13 two Katyushas landed just north of the Israeli border.

On June 28 the Israel Navy sank a terrorist boat off Tripoli. The following day an Israeli gunboat intercepted a Cyprus-Beirut ferryboat on the high seas and towed it into Haifa port. Rejecting allegations of "piracy," the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem issued a statement saying that the seizure of the boat was an act of self-defense and part of Israel's "unending war against PLO terrorism." Moreover, it was "the duty of every civilized nation" to assist in that war, the statement added. The boat and most of its passengers were soon released, and by mid-July Israel continued to hold only two of the passengers. With attacks on Israeli forces intensifying, on August 1 the IDF used helicopter gunships, supported by offshore naval vessels, to attack PLO targets in a refugee camp north of Tripoli. In southern Lebanon, with Shi'ite resistance mounting, the IDF forbade the public display of pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini and other extremist religious figures.

As the coalition talks in Israel were concluding in mid-September, it was "business as usual" in Lebanon. On September 10 the IAF bombed a terrorist site at Bahamdoun, its fourth raid over Lebanon within six weeks. On September 12, the day before the new government was presented in the Knesset, one Israeli soldier was killed while dismantling a roadside bomb and a second died of wounds he had sustained in an attack two days earlier. The Parents Against Silence group held a silent vigil outside the Knesset and dispatched cables to all the newly installed cabinet ministers, asserting that the country's most urgent problem was not the economy but the need to withdraw the IDF from Lebanon.

This was certainly the top priority for Israel's new defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, a former prime minister and chief of staff. In his first public address after taking up his new duties, Rabin signaled a dramatic Israeli policy shift when he told a United Jewish Appeal leadership conference in Jerusalem that the IDF's presence in Lebanon was not a *sine qua non* for an untroubled Galilee. He intimated that an IDF withdrawal was a matter of "months not years." Two days of talks between Israeli leaders and U.N. undersecretary-general Brian Urquhart (September 19-20) seemed to reinforce Rabin's prognosis, with Urquhart telling reporters that his current regional swing through Israel, Syria, and Lebanon had shown him that a "mood of realism" now prevailed.

Lebanese reality was driven home when, on September 20, Druze members of the SLA massacred 13 residents of a village where 4 Druze had been killed in an ambush. (The same day also saw the terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 23 persons, with responsibility claimed by an extremist Shi'ite group.) After meeting with SLA commander General Lahad, the IDF's liaison officer in southern Lebanon, Brig. Gen. Shlomo Iliya, described the massacre as a private act of revenge and said the incident did not compromise the SLA's ability to defend southern Lebanon.

In a by-now-standard Middle East pattern, incipient diplomatic activity evoked intensified anti-Israel action. On September 23 an Israel Navy gunboat spotted a rubber dinghy bound for Israeli waters from the north. Returning to the Lebanese shore, the occupants of the dinghy ran into an Israeli ambush. In the exchange of fire three terrorists were killed (one of them a French woman) and two others were captured. Later that day five Israeli soldiers were wounded when the convoy they were traveling in came under light-arms fire near Nabatiyeh. Three of the ambushers were killed by SLA troops following a chase. In a third incident on the same day, another three Israelis were wounded when a roadside bomb went off as their vehicle passed about two kilometers from the border crossing at Metullah. The following day an Israeli soldier and a member of the General Security Service were killed when their vehicle was ambushed in the eastern sector.

On October 4 Defense Minister Rabin told a memorial service for fallen paratroopers that negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal were already under way. Rabin indicated that the intention was to reach an understanding, *perforce tacit*, with the Syrians, by which they would prevent terrorist infiltration into southern Lebanon following an Israeli withdrawal. Visiting Washington in the second week of October, Prime Minister Peres set a timetable for withdrawal, albeit a sketchy one, when he told reporters that the cabinet would make decisions on the Lebanon issue within a month, and that Israel would "unilaterally" pull out of Lebanon within six to nine months after that. In a meeting with UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in New York on October 12, Peres presented Israel's ideas concerning the role that UNIFIL could play in helping stabilize southern Lebanon. (The UN Security Council subsequently extended UNIFIL's mandate for a further six months, until April 19, 1985.)

On October 17 the first detailed official public announcement of the new government's position was issued in the form of a statement released by the Prime Minister's Office, following talks between Peres and visiting U.S. secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger. Although Israel was "firmly resolved" to bring the IDF home "soon," there would be no compromise over security arrangements in the north, the statement said. According to the official communiqué, Peres had told Weinberger that the "framework for an arrangement in Lebanon" entailed "a political understanding with the Syrians and a military accord with the Lebanese." Peres then went on to list four specific terms for an IDF withdrawal: "A Syrian commitment not to expand the deployment of its forces into the areas to be evacuated by the IDF; a Syrian undertaking to prevent terrorist infiltration from the territory under Syrian army control; the continued existence of the SLA under General Lahad's command, and its deployment in the southern area contiguous with the Israel border; and the deployment of UNIFIL units in the zone north of the SLA strip, from the Mediterranean in the west to the Syrians' lines of deployment in the east." Israel, the statement concluded, would "welcome the good offices of the United States in mediating between the sides." Three days later, on October 20, the 835th day of the war, a rocket-propelled grenade fired at an Israeli vehicle in southern Lebanon took

the life of Corp. Alon Tzur, a 30-year-old reservist from Kibbutz Shamir in Upper Galilee. He was the 600th Israeli soldier to die in Lebanon.

On November 8 talks on an IDF withdrawal opened between Israel and Lebanon when military delegations from the two countries (a concession by Israel, which had sought civilian talks) met at Nakoura, in southern Lebanon, under UN auspices. About a week earlier, Prime Minister Peres had explained to the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that the government was going to give diplomacy two or three months to effect a withdrawal agreement.

Unlike the 1983 talks that had produced the May 17 agreement (which had already been abrogated), and despite Israel's declared wish for American mediation, the United States was pointedly absent from the Nakoura talks, another trenchant reminder of its abrupt disengagement from the Lebanese arena. Indeed, the invisible presence hovering above the Nakoura talks was that of the undisputed victor in Lebanon, the Syrians, who had been able to delay the start of the negotiations at will before giving their tacit consent to Beirut to proceed with them. Nor was the Gemayel government immune to pressure from within. Less than 48 hours after the talks began, Gemayel, bowing to pressure from Nabih Berri, head of the Shi'ite Amal militia, suspended the negotiations. The reason was Israel's arrest of the Amal commander in Sidon following the death of one Israeli soldier and the wounding of four others in that city on November 7, the day before the talks opened, when an IDF convoy was ambushed.

Little progress was discernible in the opening round of the talks. Israel outlined its plan for a two-part security zone, with the southern section to be controlled by the SLA and the area immediately to its north by UNIFIL. For its part, Lebanon insisted that its army must take control of any areas evacuated by the IDF, a patently unfeasible notion since the Lebanese army was barely in control of large parts of Beirut itself. The talks resumed on November 15, one week after their suspension, and the following day Israel released the Amal commander—his interrogation had been completed, the IDF said—and expelled him from southern Lebanon. To some, the Israeli move, which was clearly part of a deal, was yet one more demonstration of Israel's weakened resolve where Lebanon was concerned. With the positions of both sides now on the table, the talks continued in a desultory manner on a twice-weekly basis, against a backdrop of continuing attacks on Israeli forces. On December 13, in what seemed to mark the onset of a new policy vis-à-vis anti-IDF activity in southern Lebanon, Israeli forces conducted a sweep of nine villages there, in the course of which 2 local residents were killed, 7 were wounded, and 30 terrorist suspects were detained. The Israeli operation touched off a general strike by both Moslems and Christians.

The 608th Israeli soldier to die in Lebanon, the third since the start of the Nakoura talks, and the last in 1984, fell on December 16 in a clash between an IDF patrol and a local guerrilla force. Later in the week, on December 19 and 20, the final rounds of the Nakoura talks for 1984 took place. They were scheduled to reconvene in January 1985, but it was evident by then that they held little promise.

Looking ahead, Prime Minister Peres and, more guardedly, Defense Minister Rabin said they favored a full unilateral IDF withdrawal when and if the talks broke down. However, Vice Prime Minister and Likud leader Shamir told the *Jerusalem Post* late in December that "unless there are satisfactory arrangements on the border, the IDF will stay in Lebanon in one form or another." The national unity government had just survived a coalition crisis set off by what, in comparison with Lebanon, was a minor affair involving the allocation of two ministries (see "Political Affairs"). Now it would have to decide how to proceed regarding a war which, as Defense Minister Rabin put it shortly after assuming his post in September, "has brought about a divisiveness that I cannot recall in any of [Israel's previous] wars."

Foreign Relations

THE UNITED STATES

Israeli-U.S. relations in 1984 showed a marked improvement over recent years. This was due largely to the collapse of American policy in Lebanon and the physical withdrawal of the marines from Beirut, accompanied by Israel's professed desire to get out of Lebanon. Attention now shifted to two areas: the evolving strategic cooperation between the two countries, carried out within the framework of the joint political-military committee created during Prime Minister Shamir's Washington talks at the end of 1983 (its first meeting was held in the U.S. capital in January 1984); and, with the advent of the national unity government in September, Israel's economic situation.

In February Israel's plans to build its own jet fighter for the 1990s, the Lavi, received a shot in the arm when the Reagan administration announced that Israel would be allowed to spend the \$250 million allocated for related research and development projects in Israel itself. A growing controversy in Israel about the economic feasibility of the Lavi project was partially muted by the fact that the funds were coming from Washington. Later in the year, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger reported that the United States would release technology required by Israel for the Lavi's development. While in Israel in mid-October for a 36-hour visit, Weinberger promised that red tape would be cut for direct sales of Israeli weapons systems to the U.S. military, as long as the Israeli products were "competitive both in price and technology" with their American-made counterparts.

The American commitment to Israel's security was reaffirmed in April by Vice-President George Bush. Speaking at the annual policy conference of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) in Washington, Bush asserted that Israel was America's "foremost strategic friend in the Middle East." The ongoing talks and growing strategic bonds between the two countries were a manifestation, he continued, of "America's long-standing commitment to ensure Israel's qualitative edge in armaments over any potential combination of adversaries." Regarding

World Jewish Population, 1984

Updated Estimates

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS updates, as of 1984, of the Jewish population estimates for 1982 which were first published in the 1984 AJYB and reprinted in a condensed version in the 1985 AJYB. The estimates reflect some of the results of a prolonged and ongoing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry.¹ Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. Also, population censuses taken around 1980 have yielded useful information on the Jews of some countries. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of a worldwide set of estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties. The reader has been given some information on the quality of the estimate for each country by an accuracy rating, using a simple scale explained below.

About 95 percent of world Jewry is concentrated in nine countries, with approximately 100,000 or more Jews each. The aggregate of these nine major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of the size of total world Jewry. The figures for 1982 have been updated to 1984 in accordance with the intervening changes—natural (i.e., births and deaths), affiliative, and migratory. In addition, some corrections have been introduced in the light of newly accrued information from recent population censuses and Jewish surveys. Analogous corrections have also been applied retrospectively to the 1982 figures, which appear below in revised summary (see Table 1), so as to allow for comparison with the 1984 estimates.

Jewish Population Trends²

Diaspora Jews are highly dispersed. In most countries their number is now rather small and they constitute no more than a minute fraction of the entire population.

¹Many of these activities have been carried out by, or in coordination with, the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

²A fuller discussion of the subject can be found in U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," AJYB, Vol. 81, 1981, pp. 61-117.

Consequently, though Jews tend to cluster in large cities, they are greatly exposed to assimilation. While the assimilatory process leads to demographic losses for the Jewish population, there may also be gains through affiliation of persons who were born as non-Jews. It is the net balance of the affiliative changes that matters demographically; in the longer run, the cohesion of a Diaspora population may be affected as well.

The Jews in most countries of the Diaspora are demographically characterized by very low fertility, considerable out-marriage (which may involve losses of children to the Jewish population),³ some other net assimilatory losses, and great aging. Since an increased proportion of elderly in the population usually implies not only many deceased but also a reduced proportion of persons of reproductive age—and therefore relatively fewer births—the aging factor has the effect of reducing the birthrate and raising the death rate. There are differences in the levels of these demographic factors among the Jews in various regions and countries of the world. In all the major Diaspora populations the joint balance of the natural and affiliative changes is now close to nil or outrightly negative, with the Jewish deceased frequently outnumbering newborn Jews. These negative tendencies have been taken into account in updating the estimates of Jews in many countries.

With regard to the balance of external migrations, there is no regularity among the various Diaspora populations or even in the same population over time. Where the migratory balance is positive—e.g., in North America—it counteracts or even outweighs any numerically negative influence of internal demographic developments. Where the migratory balance is negative, it may cause, or aggravate, the decrease of a Jewish population. In 1983–1984, the overall volume of international migrations of Jews was rather restricted, primarily because of the virtual cessation of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

In contrast, Jews in Israel incur virtually no out-marriages and direct assimilatory losses. Moreover, they have so far had a positive migration balance almost continually. They have a younger age structure than Diaspora Jews and the general population of the developed countries and exhibit a fairly high level of fertility. The previously substantial fertility differentials between Jews in-gathered in Israel from Asia-Africa and Europe-America are no longer in evidence. Remarkably, European Jews in Israel have not participated in the drastic fertility decline that has characterized the developed nations and Diaspora Jews during the last few decades, but have actually raised their fertility. In recent years, both major origin groups among Israel's Jews have displayed a fertility level surpassing not only the vast majority of Diaspora Jewry but also the general populations in the developed countries.

In the overall demographic balance of world Jewry, the natural increase of Israel has, until recently, made up for losses in the Diaspora. But such compensation will not be possible for much longer. As a consequence of the intensifying demographic

³If less than half of the children of the out-married are themselves Jews.

deficit in the Diaspora, a trend for some reduction in the total number of the world's Jews may soon be setting in.⁴

*Difficulties in Estimating Jewish Population Size in the Diaspora*⁵

Some of the difficulties involved in estimating the size of Jewish Diaspora populations are common to all aspects of the study of Diaspora demography. They are mainly due to the great geographical scattering of Jews (a factor that makes multiple data collection mandatory but also hinders its feasibility); their unusually strong demographic dynamics in many respects—migrations, social mobility, family formation patterns (including out-marriage), etc.; and to lacunae of available demographic information, which is deficient in both quantity and quality.

More specific difficulties in estimating the up-to-date size of Jewish populations are due to conceptual and measurement problems.

When mixed couples and households are not infrequent, it is necessary to distinguish between the "actually Jewish population" and the "enlarged Jewish population." The latter comprises also the non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.) of the Jews. However socially significant the non-Jewish household members (and more distant non-Jewish relatives) of the Jews may be, they should not be included in a count of Jews. The paradoxical situation that exists is that growth of an enlarged Jewish population may be associated with contraction of the respective actually Jewish population.

Another vexing problem is affiliative changes among Jews. Under present conditions, there are Jews who have not formally embraced another religion, yet are either very estranged ("marginal") or have even become resolutely alienated from Judaism and the Jewish community and, if questioned, disclaim being Jews any longer. When a census or survey is taken which inquires into religion or ethnicity, these individuals have an opportunity to define their current status subjectively.⁶ In general, the practice of self-determination is followed in all relevant censuses and surveys. This applies to marginal individuals, converts to Judaism (although some of the conversions may be contested between the various ideological trends—Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform), and to all other persons who claim to be Jews. In estimating the size of a Jewish population, it is usual to include, in principle, all marginal individuals who have not ceased to be Jews.⁷

Not a few Jews (like other persons) have some residential status in more than one country.⁸ This may be due to business requirements, professional assignments in

⁴*Aliyah* and *yeridah*—immigration to, and emigration from, Israel—obviously constitute only internal transfers within the global Jewish framework.

⁵Reliable figures are currently forthcoming for the Jews of Israel from official statistics.

⁶Misreporting of Jews in official censuses is a different issue; see below.

⁷Even persons who disclaim being Jews at some stage of life may change their minds later.

⁸The problem is even more acute with regard to residential status in more than one locality of the same country, but this does not affect the population estimates for entire countries.

foreign countries, climatic differences between countries, migrants staying temporarily in prolonged transit, etc. The danger of double-counting or omissions is inherent in such situations. As far as possible we have tried to account for such persons only once, giving precedence to the usual country of residence.

Figures on Jews from population censuses are unavailable for most Diaspora communities. Even where census statistics on Jews are forthcoming, they are usually scant, because the Jews are a small minority. There have been instances where detailed tabulations on Jews have been undertaken, through Jewish initiative, from official census material; examples are Canada, South Africa, and Argentina. In some countries serious problems exist, or are feared to exist, in the reporting of Jews as such: individuals may prefer not to describe themselves as Jews, or non-Jews may be erroneously included as Jews (as has happened in Latin American countries). These problems require statistical evaluation whose feasibility and conclusiveness depend on the relevant information available.

Surveys are the only way of obtaining comprehensive information on Jewish populations in the absence of official censuses. Jewish-sponsored surveys have the additional advantage of being able to inquire into matters of specifically Jewish interest, e.g., Jewish education, observances, and attitudes. However, since they address themselves to a small and scattered minority with identification problems, they are not easy to conduct competently and may encounter difficulties with regard to both coverage and response, especially with regard to marginal Jews. Again, these aspects require evaluation. Countrywide surveys have been undertaken in the United States, South Africa, France, Italy, Netherlands, etc. Local surveys have been carried out in many U.S. cities, in the United Kingdom, Latin America, Australia, etc. However, these local initiatives have so far been uncoordinated with regard to content and method.

Many estimates of Jewish populations for which no solid data from censuses or surveys exist are regrettably of unspecified or dubious source and methodology.

Besides the conceptual and measurement difficulties affecting the figures for a Jewish population at any base date, similar problems recur with regard to the updating information which should account for all the various types of changes in the time elapsed since that base date. For natural and affiliative changes, age-sex-specific models can be of use; these may be applied after studying the evolution of the respective or similar Jewish populations. With regard to the migratory balance in any updating interval, concrete information must be gathered, because of the above-mentioned irregularity, over time, in the intensity of many migratory streams.

Presentation of Data

The detailed estimates of Jewish population distribution in each continent (Tables 2-6 below) refer to residents in countries with at least 100 Jews. A residual estimate of "other" Jews living in smaller communities, or staying temporarily in transit accommodations, supplements some of the continental totals. For each of the reported countries, the four columns in the table provide the United Nations estimate

of mid-year 1983 total population,⁹ the estimated end-1984 Jewish population, the proportion of Jews per 1,000 total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimates.

There is wide variation in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries it would be best to indicate a range (minimum-maximum) rather than a definite figure for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. Yet, the figures actually indicated for most of the Diaspora countries should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate.

The three main elements which affect the accuracy of each estimate are the nature of the base data, the recency of the base data, and the method of updating. A simple code, combining these elements, is used to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of the Jewish population figures reported in the detailed tables below. The code indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates: (A) base figure derived from countrywide census or relatively reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the intervening period; (B) base figure derived from less accurate but recent countrywide Jewish population investigation; partial information on population movements in the intervening period; (C) base figure derived from less recent sources, and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of Jewish population in country; updating according to demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends; and (D) base figure essentially conjectural; no reliable updating procedure. In categories (A), (B), and (C), the years in which the base figures or important partial updates were obtained are also stated.

For countries whose Jewish population estimate of 1984 was not only updated but also revised in the light of improved information, the sign "X" is appended to the accuracy rating.

Distribution of World Jewish Population by Major Regions

Table 1 gives an overall picture for 1984 as compared to 1982. For 1982, the originally published estimates are presented along with somewhat revised figures that take into account, retrospectively, the corrections made in 1984 in certain country estimates, in the light of improved information. These corrections resulted in a net reduction of world Jewry's estimated size by 44,700 or 0.3 percent, mainly due to Israel and Great Britain (explanations for these two countries are given below).

⁹These were the latest official estimates available at the time of writing. See United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, *Population and Vital Statistics Report; Data Available as of January 1, 1985*. Statistical Papers, Series A, Vol. 37, No. 1, New York, 1985.

TABLE 1. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENTS AND MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS, 1982 AND 1984

Region	1982			1984		% Change 1982-1984
	Original	Revised		Abs. Nos.	Percent	
		Abs. Nos.	Percent			
Diaspora	9,614,300	9,594,300	74.1	9,491,600	73.2	- 1.1
Israel	3,374,300	3,349,600	25.9	3,471,700	26.8	+ 3.6
World	12,988,600	12,943,900	100.0	12,963,300	100.0	+ 0.2
America, Total	6,477,700	6,477,600	50.1	6,469,000	49.9	- 1.3
North ^a	6,013,000	6,015,000	46.5	6,015,000	46.4	—
Central	46,800	46,800	0.4	47,300	0.4	+ 1.1
South	417,900	415,800	3.2	406,700	3.1	- 2.2
Europe, Total	2,842,700	2,825,100	21.8	2,758,600	21.3	- 2.6
West	1,070,900	1,053,300	8.1	1,048,900	8.1	- 1.0
East & Balkans ^b	1,771,800	1,771,800	13.7	1,709,700	13.2	- 3.5
Asia, Total	3,417,200	3,392,500	26.2	3,509,300	27.1	+ 3.4
Israel	3,374,300	3,349,600	25.9	3,471,700	26.8	+ 3.6
Rest ^b	42,900	42,900	0.3	37,600	0.3	- 12.4
Africa, Total	172,000	169,700	1.3	147,400	1.1	- 13.3
North	21,250	19,950	0.2	16,700	0.1	- 17.5
South	120,250	119,250	0.9	119,100	0.9	- 0.1
Rest ^c	30,500	30,500	0.2	11,600	0.1	- 62.0
Oceania	79,000	79,000	0.6	79,000	0.6	—

^aU.S.A. and Canada.^bThe Asian territories of USSR and Turkey are included in "East Europe and Balkans."^cIncluding Ethiopia.

The size of world Jewry is assessed at slightly below 13 million. According to the revised figures, the estimated growth between 1982 and 1984 was negligible—about one-tenth of a percent annually. Despite all the imperfections in the estimates, it is clear that world Jewry is in the state of "zero population growth," with the natural increase in Israel compensating for the demographic losses in the Diaspora.

While the number of Jews in Israel rose from a revised figure of 3,349,600 in 1982 to 3,471,700 at the end of 1984, Diaspora Jewry declined from 9,594,300 (according to the revised figures) to approximately 9,491,600. By the end of 1984, Israel's Jews constituted nearly 27 percent of total world Jewry.

About half of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with 46 percent in North America. Twenty-seven percent live in Asia (excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey), nearly all of them in Israel. Europe (including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey) accounts for 21 percent of the total. The proportions of the world's Jews who live in Africa and Oceania are very small.

Among the major geographical regions listed in Table 1, Israel—and, in consequence, total Asia—increased by more than 3 percent in the two-year span 1982–1984. The total number of Jews estimated for North America, South Africa, and Oceania virtually did not change. With the probable exception of Central America, all the other regions sustained decreases in Jewish population size.

Individual Countries

THE AMERICAS

In 1984 the total number of Jews in the American continents was somewhat less than six and a half million. The overwhelming majority (about 93 percent) reside in the United States and Canada, less than 1 percent live in Central America (including Mexico), and about 6 percent live in South America, where Argentina and Brazil have the largest Jewish communities (see Table 2).

The Jewish population in the United States is estimated to have increased from 5,690,000 in 1980 to 5,705,000 in 1982, as a consequence of immigration. Several local surveys taken in recent years provide evidence of very low “effectively Jewish” birthrates and of increasing aging among the Jewish population. Thus, it is possible that the influence of internal evolution on the size of U.S. Jewry may be negative, though there is no consensus with regard to this assessment. Any negative internal balance in U.S. Jewry was more than offset for several years by an undoubtedly positive balance of external migrations. This latter has been greatly reduced, however, by the virtual cessation of Soviet Jewish immigration. Pending further research, we have repeated for 1984 the figure of 5,705,000 already reported for 1982.¹⁰ This figure does not include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, who are included in the detailed U.S. Jewish population estimates which are reported elsewhere in this volume.

In Canada an official population census held in 1981 enumerated 296,425 Jews according to religion. If the persons are added who responded “Jewish” (as a *single* reply) to the census question on ethnic groups, while not indicating any religious affiliation (i.e., they were not Christians, etc.), the figure rises to 306,375. There were additional persons who did not indicate religion but mentioned “Jewish” as part of a *multiple* response to the question on ethnic groups; however, the full number of these people was not published. It is likely that some of them were merely thinking in terms of ancestry but did not actually consider themselves as Jews at the time

¹⁰For derivation of the estimate for U.S. Jewry from the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) of 1970–1971, see U.O. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 32–36. For a discussion of U.S. Jewish population dynamics and perspectives, see U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, “The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends,” *AJYB*, Vol. 83, 1983, pp. 141–187.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE AMERICAS, 1984

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Canada	24,907,000	310,000	12.4	A 1981 X
United States	234,496,000	5,705,000	24.3	B 1971-83
Total Northern America		6,015,000		
Bahamas	222,000	500	2.2	C 1970
Costa Rica	2,379,000	2,500	1.0	C 1984
Cuba	9,884,000	700	0.1	D
Dominican Republic	5,962,000	100	0.0	D
Guatemala	7,932,000	800	0.1	A 1983
Haiti	5,201,000	100	0.0	D
Jamaica	2,258,000	800	0.1	B 1982
Mexico	75,103,000	35,000	0.5	C 1980
Netherlands Antilles	256,000	700	2.7	D
Panama	2,089,000	3,800	1.8	D
Puerto Rico	3,350,000	2,500	0.7	D
Other		300		D
Total Central America		47,300		
Argentina	29,627,000	228,000	7.7	C 1960-75
Bolivia	6,082,000	600	0.1	C 1984 X
Brazil	129,662,000	100,000	0.8	B 1980
Chile	11,682,000	17,000	1.5	C 1982 X
Columbia	27,515,000	7,000	0.2	C 1977
Ecuador	9,251,000	1,000	0.1	C 1982
Paraguay	3,472,000	900	0.3	C 1984 X
Peru	18,707,000	5,000	0.3	C 1982
Surinam	351,000	200	0.6	B 1984
Uruguay	2,988,000	27,000	9.1	D
Venezuela	16,394,000	20,000	1.2	D
Total Southern America		406,700		
Total		6,469,000		

of the census. By making some allowance for others who considered themselves as Jews but were identified in the census by multiple ethnicity only, a round total of 310,000 is arrived at for 1981, as compared to the previous 1982 estimate of 308,000 for Canadian Jewry. The figure of 310,000 was also adopted for 1984, as a migratory surplus may have roughly offset the probably negative balance of internal evolution since the census.

The estimate for Mexico has been kept unchanged at 35,000. While the official Mexican censuses have given widely varying figures—(1950) 17,574; (1960) 100,750; (1970) 49,277; (1980) 61,790—it is generally admitted that the last three censuses erroneously included many thousands of non-Jews among the Jews.

The Jewish population of Argentina is marked by a negative balance in both internal evolution and external migrations. The estimate has been reduced, therefore, from 233,000 in 1982 to 228,000 in 1984, allowing for some return migration since the present democratic regime came to power.

The official population census of Brazil in 1980 showed a figure of 91,795 Jews, thus confirming the lower order of magnitude of the authors' estimates as compared to the exaggerated figures previously circulated. Since it is possible that some Jews failed to declare themselves as such in the census, the estimate for 1984 has been kept at the round figure of 100,000. On the strength of fragmentary information that is accumulating, the admittedly quite tentative estimates for Uruguay and Chile have been revised downward, while that for Venezuela has not been changed.¹¹

EUROPE

Of Europe's estimated 2,759,000 Jews, 38 percent live in Western Europe and 62 percent in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries (including the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey).

France has the largest Jewish population in Western Europe, estimated at 530,000, as in 1982.¹² Monitoring of the plausible trends in the internal evolution and the external migrations of Jews in France renders it likely that there has been little net change in this two-year interval. A reestimation of the size of British Jewry was carried out by the research unit of the Board of Deputies, based on an analysis of Jewish deaths during 1975–1979. The revised population figure for 1977, first announced as 354,000, was later amended to 336,000, with a margin of error of

¹¹For a more detailed discussion of the region's Jewish population trends, see U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Latin American Jewry," *AJYB*, Vol. 85, 1985, pp. 51–102.

¹²This estimate is empirically based on the detailed analysis of the French Jewish Population Study. See Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris, 1984).

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN EUROPE, 1984

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Austria	7,549,000	6,500	0.9	A 1981
Belgium	9,856,000	32,200	3.3	D
Bulgaria	8,939,000	3,300	0.4	C 1965
Czechoslovakia	15,415,000	8,500	0.5	D
Denmark	5,114,000	6,800	1.3	C 1984
Finland	4,863,000	1,000	0.2	A 1984
France	54,652,000	530,000	9.7	B 1972-78
Germany, East	16,699,000	800	0.0	D
Germany, West	61,421,000	33,000	0.5	B 1984
Gibraltar	29,000	600	20.1	A 1981
Great Britain	56,377,000	330,000	5.8	B 1984 X
Greece	9,848,000	5,000	0.5	B 1984
Hungary	10,690,000	61,500	5.7	D
Ireland	3,508,000	2,300	0.7	A 1984 X
Italy	56,836,000	32,000	0.6	B 1982
Luxemburg	366,000	700	1.9	C 1970
Netherlands	14,362,000	26,200	1.8	C 1984
Norway	4,129,000	1,000	0.2	A 1982
Poland	36,571,000	4,600	0.1	D
Portugal	10,099,000	600	0.1	D
Rumania	22,553,000	26,000	1.1	B 1984
Spain	38,228,000	12,000	0.3	D
Sweden	8,329,000	15,000	1.8	C 1982
Switzerland	6,505,000	19,000	2.9	A 1980
Turkey ^a	47,279,000	20,000	0.4	C 1984
USSR ^a	272,500,000	1,575,000	5.8	B 1979
Yugoslavia	22,800,000	5,000	0.2	B 1980
Total		2,758,600		

^aIncluding Asian regions.

± 34,000.¹³ Allowing for an excess of deaths over births, some assimilatory losses, and emigration, the update for 1984, as elaborated by the board's research unit,

¹³S. Haberman, B. A. Kosmin, and C. Levy, "Mortality Patterns of British Jews 1975-79: Insights and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Ser. A*, Vol. 146, Pt. 3 (1983), pp. 294-310.

came to 330,000. Western Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands each have Jewish populations ranging around 30,000. There is an internal tendency toward shrinkage of all these Jewries, but in some instances this is offset partly or perhaps even wholly (Italy) by immigration. Switzerland's Jews are estimated at below 20,000, on the strength of the 1980 census. While there is evidence of a negative balance of births and deaths (connected *inter alia* with great aging) and of frequent out-marriage, in this instance, also, immigration may have offset the internal losses.

By far the largest Jewish population in Eastern Europe is concentrated in the Soviet Union, including its Asian territory. Only about 2,000 Jews were permitted to leave for abroad in 1983-1984, but the heavy deficit of internal population dynamics continued and even grew, due to the great aging which prevailed. Under these circumstances the estimate has been reduced from 1,630,000 in 1982 to 1,575,000 in 1984. The Jewish populations in Hungary and Rumania and the small remnants extant in Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria are all reputed to be very overaged. Their inevitable numerical decline, accelerated by relatively large emigration in the case of Rumania, is reflected in reduced estimates. The Jewish population of Turkey is being eroded by both emigration and a probable deficit of births versus deaths.

ASIA

Israel accounts for 99 percent of all the Jews in Asia, excluding the Asian territories of the USSR and Turkey. Israel held its fourth national population census in June 1983. After evaluation of the results by the Central Bureau of Statistics, in light of all available information the benchmark figure (which serves as the base of subsequent updating until the next census) for the Jewish population as of census date was placed at 3,371,000. This represented a downward revision by some 20,000, or 0.6 percent, of the "old" estimate of 3,392,400 (ultimately based on the previous census, taken in 1972). The corresponding figure for end of 1982 was revised from 3,374,300 to 3,349,600, and the bureau's current estimate for the end of 1984 was 3,471,700. Israel's Jewish population grew over those two years by more than 120,000; 81 percent of this growth was due to natural increase. The Jewish population of Iran continued to dwindle.

AFRICA

Somewhat fewer than 150,000 Jews are estimated to remain now in Africa. The Republic of South Africa accounts for an ever-increasing share (81 percent in 1984) of total Jews in that continent.

According to the 1980 census of the Republic of South Africa, the final figure for Jews (by religion, among the white population) was 117,963. Pending analysis of the

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN ASIA, 1984

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Hong-Kong	5,313,000	1,000	0.2	C 1980
India	732,256,000	4,300	0.0	C 1971
Iran	42,071,000	25,000	0.6	D X
Iraq	14,654,000	200	0.0	D
Israel	4,200,000 ^a	3,471,700	826.6	A 1984
Japan	119,259,000	1,000	0.0	C 1984
Lebanon	2,635,000	100	0.0	D
Philippines	52,055,000	100	0.0	C 1982
Singapore	2,502,000	300	0.1	C 1984
Syria	9,611,000	4,000	0.4	D
Thailand	49,459,000	300	0.0	C 1980
Yemen	6,232,000	1,000	0.2	D X
Other		300		D
Total		3,509,300		

^aEnd 1984.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA, 1984

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Egypt	45,915,000	200	0.0	D
Ethiopia	33,680,000	10,000	0.3	D
Kenya	18,774,000	100	0.0	B 1984 X
Morocco	22,109,000	13,000	0.6	D X
South Africa	30,802,000	118,000	3.8	B 1980
Tunisia	6,886,000	3,500	0.5	C 1982
Zaire	31,151,000	200	0.0	D
Zambia	6,242,000	300	0.0	D
Zimbabwe	7,740,000	1,100	0.1	D
Other		1,000		D
Total		147,400		

data from this census, the 1984 estimate is still given as 118,000 Jews. While the Jews of Ethiopia were affected by calamitous conditions, more than 10,000 succeeded in reaching Israel. In the absence of solid information, the number of those still in Ethiopia is estimated at 10,000. The remnant of Moroccan Jewry continued

to shrink through emigration. It should be pointed out, though, that not a few Jews have a foothold both in Morocco (or Tunisia) and in France, and their geographical attribution is uncertain.

OCEANIA

The major country of Jewish residence in this geographical region is Australia, where 95 percent of the estimated total of somewhat below 80,000 Jews live.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN OCEANIA, 1984

Country	Total Population	Jewish Population	Jews per 1,000 Population	Accuracy Rating
Australia	15,369,000	75,000	4.9	B 1981
New Zealand	3,203,000	4,000	1.2	B 1981
Total		79,000		

The figures for Australia and New Zealand have not been changed from 1982 to 1984, since a migratory surplus may have largely offset an internal deficit caused by low fertility, aging, and out-marriage.

Dispersion and Concentration

Table 7 demonstrates the magnitude of Jewish dispersion. The individual countries listed above as each having at least 100 Jews are scattered over five continents. More than half (40 out of 74 countries) have fewer than 5,000 Jews apiece.

In relative terms, too, the Jews are now thinly scattered nearly everywhere in the Diaspora. There is not a single Diaspora country where they amount even to 3 percent of the total population. In most countries they constitute a far smaller fraction. Probably only three Diaspora countries have 10–25 Jews per 1,000 of total population; and only nine countries have more than 5 Jews per 1,000 of population. The respective nine countries are, in descending order of the proportion—but regardless of the absolute number—of their Jews: United States (24.3), Gibraltar (20.1), Canada (12.4), France (9.7), Uruguay (9.1), Argentina (7.7), USSR (5.8), Great Britain (5.8), Hungary (5.7). This list includes all the Diaspora countries with Jewries of 100,000 or more, except for South Africa and Brazil (in the latter's large population the Jews form only 0.8 per 1,000). In the State of Israel, by contrast, the Jewish majority amounted to 82.7 percent in 1984.

While Jews are widely dispersed, they are also concentrated to some extent (Table 8). In 1984 over 95 percent of world Jewry lived in the nine countries with the largest Jewish populations, each comprising about 100,000 Jews or more; 83 percent lived in the three countries that have at least a million Jews each (United States, Israel,

TABLE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S JEWS, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION (PER 1,000 POPULATION) IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Number of Jews in Country	Jews per 1,000 Population					
	Total	Below 1	1-5	5-10	10-25	25
						and over
Number of Countries						
Total	74 ^a	50	14	6	3	1
Below 1,000	23	19	3	—	1	—
1,000-5,000	17	14	3	—	—	—
5,000-10,000	7	6	1	—	—	—
10,000-50,000	16	10	5	1	—	—
50,000-100,000	2	—	1	1	—	—
100,000-1,000,000	6	1	1	3	1	—
1,000,000 and over	3	—	—	1	1	1

Jewish Population Distribution (Absolute Numbers)						
Total	12,963,300	389,500	333,400	2,751,500	6,015,600	3,471,700
Below 1,000	11,000	6,900	1,900	—	600	—
1,000-5,000	41,900	31,600	10,300	—	—	—
5,000-10,000	43,800	37,000	6,800	—	—	—
10,000-50,000	362,400	214,000	121,400	27,000	—	—
50,000-100,000	136,500	—	75,000	61,500	—	—
100,000-1,000,000	1,616,000	100,000	118,000	1,088,000	310,000	—
1,000,000 and over	10,751,700	—	—	1,575,000	5,705,000	3,471,700

Jewish Population Distribution (Percent of World's Jews)						
Total	100.0	3.0	2.6	21.2	46.4	26.8
Below 1,000	0.1	0.0	0.0	—	0.0	—
1,000-5,000	0.3	0.2	0.1	—	—	—
5,000-10,000	0.3	0.3	0.0	—	—	—
10,000-50,000	2.8	1.6	0.9	0.2	—	—
50,000-100,000	1.1	—	0.6	0.5	—	—
100,000-1,000,000	12.5	0.8	0.9	8.4	2.4	—
1,000,000 and over	82.9	—	—	12.1	44.0	26.8

^aExcluding countries with fewer than 100 Jews.

TABLE 8. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATIONS (100,000 JEWS AND ABOVE), 1984

Rank	Country	Jewish Population	% of Total Jewish Population			
			In the Diaspora		In the World	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	United States	5,705,000	60.1	60.1	44.0	44.0
2	Israel	3,471,700	—	—	26.8	70.8
3	Soviet Union	1,575,000	16.6	76.7	12.1	82.9
4	France	530,000	5.6	82.3	4.1	87.0
5	Great Britain	330,000	3.5	85.8	2.5	89.5
6	Canada	310,000	3.3	89.1	2.4	91.9
7	Argentina	228,000	2.4	91.5	1.8	93.7
8	South Africa	118,000	1.2	92.7	0.9	94.6
9	Brazil	100,000	1.0	93.7	0.8	95.4

Soviet Union). Similarly, the United States alone accounted for 60 percent of total Diaspora Jewry; two countries (United States and Soviet Union) for 77 percent; and the eight Diaspora countries with 100,000 Jews or more together comprised 94 percent of the Diaspora Jewish population.

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